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The Grand Strategies of Middle Powers: Organizational Determinants and Constraints 
 
Stephen M. Worman, PhD 
 





What exactly is grand strategy? Is it a phenomenon that can be observed in practice, and in 
real time? What causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do? This dissertation tackles these 
questions head on, by proposing a novel theory which explains the form a state’s grand strategy 
might take. The “organizational determinants of grand strategy” theory posits that disparities in 
state and organizational-level resources (in the form of money, manpower, and elite attention) 
influence the form a state’s grand strategy takes, and governs the rate of change. This dissertation 
focuses on middle powers, which provides analytic leverage on the notoriously difficult concept 
of grand strategy. It examines the case of India and its grand strategy around three conflicts: the 
1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1999 Kargil Crisis. Additional 
three other cases are studied to increase generality of my theory: Australian grand strategy around 
the Vietnam War, Pakistani grand strategy around the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and Dutch grand 
strategy around Operation Trikora. This dissertation showcases that the “organizational 
determinants of grand strategy” theory is able to explain most, if not all, grand strategies 
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Grand strategy is one of the many areas of both the security and strategic studies literatures 
that has received a large amount of attention and active research. As such, there are a number of 
overarching questions in the field. First and foremost, while discussions about grand strategy are 
nothing new, there is a notable lack of consensus as to what constitutes grand strategy. Second, 
some scholars raise questions about whether grand strategies exist in practice. Related to this, there 
is a question about whether scholars and policymakers can observe grand strategy while it is 
unfolding, as much research in the field seems content merely to describe historical grand 
strategies, opening up charges of relying solely on hindsight to bring the concept to life. There is 
also an open question about what causes states to adopt the strategies they do. Finally, many wage 
fierce debates over the policy direction for a country’s future grand strategy, and are consumed 
with the appropriate response to a state’s particular circumstances. Complicating the study of grand 
strategy even further is the fact that analytic tools and theoretical models for discussing the 
aforementioned problems are relatively underdeveloped. 
As such, the field is rife with topics that require elaboration and theoretical expansion. My 
dissertation posits an answer to the question about the existence of grand strategy, in order to 
demonstrate that not only do they exist in practice, but are knowable and observable while they 
are unfolding. Second, I develop a framework that explores the answer to the question of what 
causes a country’s grand strategy to change. In so doing, I shed light on what domestic factors may 
influence a state’s choice of strategy. This is an important question to address, as there is much 
discussion and debate in both the scholarly and policy-making communities over not only the 
correct grand strategy to choose, but in also understanding the grand strategies adopted by other 
 2 
countries. My dissertation seeks to help broaden the academic study of grand strategy by 
unpacking the organizational forces constraining and enabling a country’s grand strategic decision 
making. This is, in and of itself, a novel contribution in a field largely dominated by state-level 
explanations of grand strategic change.   
The fundamental background question that drove this research project is to what extent can 
grand strategy be subjected to theoretically informed social science research? This is no mere idle 
question. Scholars such as Murray soundly reject the idea that grand strategy can be subject to 
“theoretical principles.”1 I sought to understand if the relative lack of theoretically-driven research 
on grand strategy is simply an oversight, or because the concept itself is not amenable to theoretical 
generalization, as some critics allege. This question is important, in part, because the existing body 
of literature on this subject tends towards preferring either retrospective, or prospective takes on 
the topic. Few scholars articulate frameworks with which to study grand strategy in the manner I 
propose. By focusing on understanding grand strategy from a theoretical perspective, I help both 
academics and policy makers begin to more deeply understand the drivers of grand strategy, and 
the constraints which may be placed on their own, or other nations, decision-making processes. 
 
1.1 Defining grand strategy 
One thing that becomes clear almost immediately in the study of grand strategy is that there 
have been numerous attempts to define the concept over the years. Posen, for example, writes: “A 
 
1 Murray (2011, 9) 
 3 
grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for itself.”2 Brands’ 
definition is not entirely dissimilar, with grand strategy being defined “…as the intellectual 
architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy.”3 Both definitions evoke the mental 
processes that require states to think carefully about the situations they face, and the best way to 
accomplish those goals. While Posen is slightly more specific as to the goal—security—Brands’ 
definition does not preclude it, opting instead for a more nebulous end-state, of which security 
would doubtless be one amongst many priorities. Rosecrance and Stein offer a summary definition, 
saying: “In modern terms, grand strategy came to mean the adaptation of domestic and 
international resources to achieve security for a state.”4 Here again there is a focus on a specific 
end; the security of the state. Kennedy writes:  
The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the 
capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, 
both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement 
of the nation’s long term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best 
interests. 5 (emphasis in original)  
Martel generally agrees with the description, defining the term as “…a coherent statement of the 
state’s highest political ends to be pursued globally over the long term…In essence, grand strategy 
provides an overarching guide for the policies that the state should implement.”6   
With even this brief overview of a handful of definitions, it becomes clear that there are 
several common elements which almost all definitions of grand strategy share. The first is that 
grand strategy is concerned with ends, means, and the reconciliation of the two; this is the very 
 
2 Posen (2015, 1) 
3 Brands (2014, 3) 
4 Rosecrance and Stein (1993, 4) 
5 Kennedy (1991b, 6) 
6 Martel (2015, 32) 
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essence of the concept of “strategy.”7 The second is that grand strategy is long-term, and not 
necessarily tied to a specific set of day-to-day circumstances that could be handled by lower-level 
strategy.  This temporal element is what separates grand strategy from, for example, a yearly 
national security strategy. The production of security is inherently not a short-term endeavor; 
battles may be won, or economic advantage gained, but security is a moving target that states 
constantly strive to achieve in order to survive. Finally, there is the holistic nature of grand strategy; 
it is the combination of military, economic, and diplomatic strategy. Yet it is not the sum-total of 
all a state’s interactions with the outside world.8 Grand strategy is the main current of foreign 
policy, its guiding principle; grand strategy is not, for instance, mid-level ambassador meetings, 
day-to-day consular activities, or any of the myriad routine interactions states have with one 
another. 
 In this dissertation, I adopt Posen’s definition of grand strategy, which, to reiterate, is “… 
a nation-state’s theory of how to produce security for itself.”9 This definition combines all the 
essential elements listed above while providing a flexible, but still operationally useful, guide for 
identifying various countries’ grand strategies. Furthermore, Posen’s definition encompasses an 
overwhelming majority of the Brands, Rosecrance and Stein, Kennedy, and Martel definitions, all 
of which fundamentally deal with the intellectual processes by which states make tradeoffs for 
security (amongst other goals) over the long-term. Grand strategy concerns the means associated 
with those ends, and a theory is concerned with how those two things interact to produce an end-
state, in this case the security of the nation.10  
 
7 Betts (2000, 5) 
8 Brands (2014, 3-7) 
9 Posen (2015) 
10 While security is not the only goal a nation pursues, it is one of the most important, even if how critical its pursuit 
is may depend on how much security one enjoys. See: Baldwin (1997, 19-20) 
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One of the problems hindering the study of grand strategy is that such theories of how to 
generate security are infrequently written down or clearly articulated; contradictions in statements, 
actions, or circumstances can lead to misperception or confusion. Silove has meaningfully 
advanced the field in her article “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand 
Strategy,’” by laying out three distinct meanings of the frequently used term grand strategy. Silove 
summarizes the three meanings as: a plan, an organizing principle, and a pattern of behavior.11 
The definition that I adopt, and the pattern I look for in the empirical chapters of this dissertation, 
might best be thought of as fitting Silove’s definition of a grand pattern, without conforming 
rigidly to her typology. As mentioned above, grand strategy is not everything a state does in the 
international arena, but rather the flow of foreign policy, most of which is observable to the outside 
world. Thus, having a disciplined way of categorizing these currents, and smoothing the variation, 
is essential to discern the overall pattern. In this dissertation I unpack what it means for a nation-
state to have a theory of security, and examine how this theory of security might be influenced by 
the resourcing decisions of the country under consideration. 
The potential means available for a state to resource its security priorities might at first 
seem problematically large. However, as outlined by several prominent scholars in the field, the 
elements of any successful grand strategy can be broken down into three main conceptual 
categories: persuasion, inducements, and armed coercion.12 Persuasion is essentially synonymous 
with diplomacy and other non-coercive, and/or non-transactory suasion, although it allows for tit-
for-tat vote bargaining (e.g., in the United Nations). Inducements, then, are focused on transactory 
 
11 Silove (2017) 
12 This particular framing and the following definitions are found in Epstein and Loyola (2016, 90-1), which cites 
Brands (2014) as the intellectual forerunner to this categorization, even though it appears (in some form) in other 
places such as Nye Jr. (2008) 
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suasion. or the financial, and other bargaining chips used to win over actors which persuasion and 
diplomacy would otherwise fail to move. Finally, armed coercion is the threat or use of military 
forces to achieve intended ends.  These general categories represent a broad typology of the ‘ideal-
types’ of strategies that states can pursue. States in reality can and will pursue mixed strategies. It 
is my contention, however, that, because of scarce resources, states are more likely to choose to 
emphasize one of the three types above the others. These three types of strategies—persuasion, 
inducement, and coercion—will constitute my definition of the form grand strategies can take.  
1.2 Understanding grand strategy 
Having defined what a grand strategy is, there are still two problematic questions which 
plague its study: whether or not grand strategies exist in practice, and whether grand strategies are 
knowable in real time. This section unpacks these two questions plaguing the study of grand 
strategy, ultimately coming to the conclusion that grand strategy both exists and is knowable in 
real time. Finally, I discuss potential drivers of a state’s grand strategy. 
1.2.1 Does grand strategy exist in practice? 
While many scholars believe that grand strategy does exist, there is a sizeable minority that 
does not. Generally, there are those who outright deny the concept’s existence, and there are those 
who are doubtful about the concept in general. I call the former grand strategic nihilists and the 
latter grand strategic skeptics. Both groups raise fundamental, and important, questions which 
must be addressed by scholars seeking to study grand strategy. In this subsection, I briefly unpack 
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the argument surrounding the former, as it a foundational concern, and discuss the implication of 
this argument for the study of grand strategy.  
Grand strategic nihilists doubt that grand strategy exists as a meaningful or useful concept 
in the real world. They are distinct from the grand strategic skeptics, in that nihilists tend to believe 
that, for any number of reasons, crafting a meaningful strategy is impossible. Betts, while not a 
strategic nihilist himself, neatly summarizes a large number of criticisms that encompass this 
nihilistic school of thought. For instance, he describes the critiques of: 1) luck vs. genius (people 
often perceive as genius those who are simply lucky); 2) randomness vs. prediction (results often 
deviate from predicted outcomes); 3) psychoanalysis vs. conscious choice (leaders cannot often 
articulate what drives them); 4) cognition vs. complex choice (human cognition is limited in its 
ability to analyze potential paths); 5) culture vs. coercion (cultural differences make coercion 
difficult); 6) friction vs. fine tuning (friction in war prevents delays between signals and responses, 
hampering signaling); 7) goal displacement vs. policy control (institutions often pursue their own 
interests rather than the ends policymakers direct); 8) war vs. strategy (war often requires strategic 
change, meaning war drives strategy); 9) democracy vs. consistency (democracies cannot conduct 
strategy because consistent preferences can’t be obtained); and 10) compromise vs. effectiveness 
(compromise inherently destroys the efficacy of any strategy).13  More recently, scholars such as 
Edelstein and Krebs have continued in this vein of strategic nihilism, ostensibly rejecting strategy 
as a futile pursuit on the grounds that a state’s preferences do not remain consistent long enough 
for strategic choice to take place.14 While this is a variant of Betts’ critique of democracy vs 
 
13 Betts (2000) 
14 It is important to note that neither Betts, nor Edelstein and Krebs (2015) (even though their article has the term 
“grand strategy” in the title) directly tackles the question of (actual) grand strategy, but it is only a small leap to realize 
if they reject the ability to conduct strategy at lower levels, then this would, axiomatically, apply to the higher order 
and more complex realm of grand strategy as well. 
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consistency described briefly above, that these arguments are still continuing and in the public 
discourse underscores the pervasiveness and persistence of such beliefs. 
Ultimately, the question of whether or not grand strategy exists is an empirical one; if it 
does, I should be able to observe it. In order to proceed, I assume that the answer to the question 
“does grand strategy exist” is yes, and look for it in the empirical record. In doing so, I address 
grand strategic nihilists head-on, and help fill a major gap in the literature. This dissertation directly 
challenges the strategic nihilist’s assertion that strategy as a concept does not exist, or cannot be 
pursued. If I am indeed able to identify grand strategies in the empirical record, I will have a firm 
answer as to whether or not it exists; this alone will prove a valuable addition to the literature on 
grand strategy. 
1.2.2 Can we know grand strategy in real time? 
Assuming that grand strategy does exist, is it something that can be observed in real time, 
or is it only knowable after the fact? Grand strategic skeptics raise important doubts about the 
observability of the phenomenon, which has important implications for the study of grand strategy. 
If grand strategies are not generally observable, this makes researching current grand strategies 
extremely problematic, if not impossible. One important implication is that, if grand strategies can 
only be knowable retrospectively, then there is little academics and policy makers can do in the 
moment. In this subsection, I summarize the general critiques raise by grand strategic skeptics, and 
lay out the implications of this line of argumentation for my dissertation. 
Murray is a prominent grand strategic skeptic, and raises doubts about grand strategy as 
the kind of empirical phenomena which can be subjected to theoretical scrutiny. In Murray’s own 
words: 
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In fact, the best analogy for understanding grand strategy is that of 
how French peasant soup is made – a mixture of items thrown into 
the pot over the course of a week and then eaten, for which no recipe 
can possibly exist. In thinking about the soup of grand strategy, 
recipes and theoretical principles are equally useless. What works in 
one case may well not work in another. In various strengths, grand 
strategy consists of leadership, vision, intuition, process, adaptation, 
and the impact of a nation’s particular and idiosyncratic 
development and geographic position, but in no particular order or 
mixture.15 
Murray goes on to contend that grand strategy cannot be studied in the present, and instead 
is most understandable and able to be studied by way of retrospective coherence.16 Murray’s chief 
critique seems to be that the conditions under which states find themselves are so innumerable that 
they cannot be subject to any possible governing law, and that states cannot hope to come up with 
principles on how to proceed in advance. Advancing a different critique, Jervis suggests that grand 
strategy is almost impossible outside of extra-ordinary conditions in the international environment. 
As he famously argued, the United States would not and could not develop a grand strategy in the 
post-Cold War era due to the lack of “pressing threats.”17  What unifies these skeptics is that, while 
they admit the existence of the concept of grand strategy, they emphasize the extraordinary nature 
of the topic and underscore the difficulty in consciously creating, or rigorously studying, grand 
strategy. 
Works analyzing grand strategy retrospectively tend to fall into the category of histories, 
and seek to describe or analyze the contents of past grand strategies. Luttwak is among the leading 
scholars of this school, having written a number of books on the topic including The Grand 
Strategy of the Roman Empire and The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.18 Other authors 
 
15 Murray (2011, 9) 
16 Murray (2011, 10) 
17 Jervis (1998) 
18 Luttwak (2009, 1976) 
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have produced edited volumes in the same vein, such as Kennedy’s Grand Strategies in War and 
Peace, which consists of a series of chapters, contributed by several notable authors, primarily 
focusing on the British and continental powers up to the World War II era but ending with a couple 
of post-World War II examples.19  Some authors, such as Layne, seek to use historical 
retrospectives to explore how history can be used to provide guideposts as to what a country’s 
(America, in Layne’s case) grand strategy should look like in the future.20 
I assume that grand strategies are knowable in real time. Just because the entirety of a 
strategy becomes clear after it has unfolded does not imply it was not present the entire time. To 
reason by way of analogy, a chess grand master does not articulate their strategy before sitting 
down with an opponent; their strategy is revealed in the choices they do or do not make. So, too, 
should grand strategy be observable as it unfolds. Once again, this claim is empirically verifiable, 
and I look for ways to identify and understand grand strategy in real time. Should I be able to do 
so, this will provide a firm rebuttal to skeptics claims. 
1.2.3 What causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do? 
There are authors who accept the points made above and seek to impose theoretical 
frameworks onto the study of grand strategy by approaching the problem from a more academic 
perspective. These works tend to try to advance the conceptual or analytic tools necessary for a 
theoretical study of grand strategy. Martel is once such author.  His Grand Strategy in Theory and 
Practice articulates a framework for grand strategy that consists of two general phases, articulation 
 
19 Kennedy (1991a) 
20 Layne (2006)  
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and implementation. Martel describes a number of phases for both articulation and 
implementation, but his fundamental thesis is that articulation occurs over time and functions as 
an iterative process, but that it also must be matched with the resources of all varieties to be 
successful. Without these two components, he concludes, a grand strategy is doomed to fail.21 
Martel’s work fails to fully satisfy because it is concerned primarily with the American experience; 
while it does an excellent job explaining the evolution of American grand strategy, his framework 
is unable to provide meaningful expectations or guidance regarding grand strategic form more 
generally. 
Krasner’s paradigm is one in which grand strategies will be successful when a state’s 
“…power and beliefs – cleave along the same lines.”22 Krasner fails to elaborate or provide a 
rigorous testing of this assertion instead offering only the example of Containment as a positive 
example of this assertion, and the failure of Bismarck to draw Germany, Russia, and Austria-
Hungary into an alliance as an unsuccessful counter-point.23 Krasner limits his discussion to the 
well-trod Cold War era and 19th century, as well as a brief explanation as to why the U.S. has not 
been able to create a grand strategy to deal with Al-Qaeda. What is crucially left wanting in his 
analysis is an examination of a case that is not nearly so well studied as Containment. An expansion 
to thinking about countries outside the Western Hemisphere would also be welcome.  
Other authors have used historical vignettes to highlight the enduring challenges faced by 
current practitioners. Brands is one such scholar, and seeks to both address the concerns of grand 
strategic skeptics and develop a list of grand strategic principles through a series of case studies 
 
21 Martel (2015) 
22 Krasner (2010) 
23 Krasner (2010) 
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on U.S. presidential administrations.24 Brands seeks to draw more generalizable guidance for 
policy makers while avoiding offering guidance on the content of a given strategy. This provides 
diagnostic value, but was intended to highlight barriers to change as opposed to providing guidance 
on when states will adopt a given strategy. 
Others, such as Thompson, seek to test grand strategy “theories,” in the academic sense. In 
Thompson’s case his theory attempts to explain changes in a particular nation’s grand strategy 
through the use of historical vignettes, such as the interwar period and World War II from 1920-
45.25 Thompson advances a rudimentary theory that the presence (or absence) of five factors 
(problem definition-correspondence, shocks, policy entrepreneurs, contestation, and 
reinforcement) indicates when a grand strategic shift is likely. The chief problem with his theory, 
at the moment, is that, while it may be able to retrospectively analyze and assess whether these 
factors are present in a given case, it does not necessarily provide expectations for what strategies 
states will pursue when and, by Thompson’s own admission, requires more rigorous testing across 
a wider number of cases to see if it is generalizable.  
Porter highlights a somewhat different theory of grand strategy, by first noting American 
grand strategy has been stable over a long period of time in which much has changed.26 Porter 
suggests that a combination of power and habit have converged to cause stability where one might 
otherwise expect change.27 Where Thompson’s framework cannot necessarily provide 
expectations about what strategy will be pursued, Porter’s theory succeeds both in both providing 
guidance on how to potentially identify grand strategy in real time and offers meaningful guidance 
 
24 Brands (2014) 
25 Thompson (2016) 
26 Porter (2018, 9) 
27 Porter (2018, 11) 
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on what may cause change and what direction that change might take. What is required to bear out 
Porter’s theory, however, is also more rigorous testing. 
Here, I engage in a more disciplined application of theory to the problem of what causes a 
state’s grand strategy to change. By adopting a focus on organizations, I am able to explore the 
interactions between state investments, grand strategy articulation, and most importantly grand 
strategic capabilities.  In pursuit of macro-level foreign policy ends, as well as for idiosyncratic 
internal reasons (e.g., concerns over regime stability), states develop an incredibly diverse array 
of formal organizations to serve as the functional means. Organizations, as articulated by Simon, 
can be defined most simply as “…systems of interrelated roles.”28 Formal organizations, which 
will be examined in more detailed in Chapter 2, are defined as purposely created networks of 
people, hired to pursue a common goal, that possess formal and informal roles, specified tasks, 
and the financial and technological resources to pursue their goal. It logically follows that these 
organizations may generate, by virtue of their mere existence, unique, nation-specific capabilities. 
This raises the questions: do the tools at a state’s disposal bias their choices of grand strategy in a 
systematic way? Are stronger sets of organizations preferentially favored?  States, and especially 
those without sufficient power or resources to develop new organizations or tools, make do with 
what they have at their disposal.   
Other things being equal, states should choose the strongest tools: in this case, the 
organizations they have created and resourced to reach their desired foreign policy ends. Therefore, 
the specific research question of my dissertation is: Does the variation in the strength of states’ 
formal organizations affect the form their grand strategies take?  I find that the answer appears 
to be yes; the strength of a given set of institutions, as measured by the money, manpower, and 
 
28 Simon (1991, 3) 
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elite attention invested, influences the form a state’s grand strategy will take. I contend that, if a 
state preferentially resources organizations whose function and goal is to persuade, then that state 
will pursue a persuasive grand strategy; states that favor organizations that provide investment 
opportunity or foreign aid should pursue inducive grand strategies. Likewise, states that invest 
preferentially in organizations like the military should pursue coercive grand strategies. In the 
process, I utilize text analysis in a novel way to identify grand strategic form, which also provides 
the potential to identify both current and historical grand strategies.29 Finally, my theory allows 
for testable predictions and concrete follow-on research to explore how certain state-level factors, 
such as organizational resources, influence a state’s grand strategy. 
To address grand strategic skeptics’ concerns about the infinite variation of external 
context, I instead look inside the state. By bracketing the external situations states find themselves 
in, I can understand the forms grand strategies may take and observe under what conditions they 
may change. This has the effect of making my theory more generalizable, as it also limits the 
manifold forms the internal environment can take by focusing on the organizations which execute 
specific functions. Another example of a work looking at state-level factors is an edited volume 
by Rosecrance and Stein, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, which demonstrates that factors 
such as domestic politics, beliefs and ideas, constitutional fitness, threat perception, and 
nationalism might matter in a state’s formation of its grand strategy.30 Rosecrance and Stein’s 
volume is concerned with how these internal factors influence the content of a country’s response 
to the international environment, for instance if the domestic conditions inside a country favor 
revisionism.31 I provide insight into the general form a state’s grand strategy will take. It is also 
 
29 This methodology is elaborated on in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
30 Rosecrance and Stein (1993) Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, & 8 respectively 
31 Rosecrance and Stein (1993, 19) 
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important to note that this volume does not address grand strategy from an organizational 
perspective, although much attention is paid to domestic political and economic constraints. The 
importance of internal differences among states, and their effects on grand strategy, are also 
supported by Martel, who asserts that “…not every state, society, and value system can produce 
any possible grand strategy, because it depends on the nature of [the state, its society, and political 
values.]”32 I demonstrate that this statement might be usefully amended to say that it depends on 
its organizations.  
1.2.4 Why understanding grand strategy matters 
This research question helps address two key areas for the scholarly community that are 
currently under-served in the literature and for policy makers (especially those in the United 
States), I provide insight into a foreign policy conundrum. First and foremost, this research 
question helps understand and explain grand strategy formulation and constraints. Unlike 
numerous others in the field, I am seeking to understand and inform what types of grand strategies 
might be adopted, not what type of grand strategy should be adopted. There are a large number of 
authors who look at the question of grand strategy prospectively and, quite often, prescriptively. 
These works overwhelming tend to seek to influence the contents of a given state’s grand strategy.  
Feaver has written on the subject of American grand strategy extensively and, in a more policy-
oriented piece, discusses the need to refine America’s ‘legacy’ grand strategy and embrace the 
strategy that served the country well in the past.33 Posen has also written from a prospective 
 
32 Martel (2015, 25) 
33 Feaver (2012, 59-70)  
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framework, arguing for a strategy of ‘restraint’ in an attempt to shepherd the nations resources and 
avoid overstretch.34 Art shares Posen’s concern about overstretch, but argues for America to 
practice selective engagement with the world in order to manage the threats he sees brewing.35 
Finally, this discussion about prospective grand strategy is not entirely limited to the United States 
experience, with authors such as Porter and Layton arguing about the usefulness of the concept for 
the United Kingdom and suggesting different paths that might be pursued to manage Britain’s 
place in the world.36 My dissertation adds to this body of work focusing on non-Western grand 
strategy.  
Quite frequently these authors are predominantly seeking to influence current policy 
debates and change the macro-level direction of a country’s foreign policy. Typically, proscriptive 
grand strategic literature focuses on policy problems facing a country or a new administration. 
Given that these authors are quite often deliberately attempting to influence policy decisions, this 
focus is understandable. Drezner notes that effecting major change in grand strategy is difficult, 
despite many administrations’ attempts to do just that. In his words: “The tyranny of the status quo 
often renders grand strategy a constant rather than a variable, despite each administration’s 
determined efforts at intellectual differentiation and rebranding.”37 My research question tackles 
this problem head on, by proposing an explanation for this observed phenomenon, namely 
organizational continuity, and the difficulty associated with rapid change across a state’s 
organizational strengths.  
 
34 Posen (2015) 
35 Art (2012) 
36 Porter (2010), Layton (2012) 
37 Drezner (2011, 59). This resistance to change is a similar line of argument to Porter (2018) 
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Theories that start with assumptions that grand strategies are either mere policy statements 
or fundamentally easy to change ignore the vast amount of governmental machinery and 
experience required to successful execute a country’s foreign policy. By examining the 
organizations that execute a country’s grand strategy, I can help explain why new grand strategies 
often only tinker around the margins or appear difficult to alter in the absence of some existential 
threat. My explanation is that, absent a fundamental re-alignment of a state’s organizational mix, 
there is unlikely to be a dramatic change in a country’s grand strategy; the strength of the 
organizations that execute it are unchanged.  Such an explanation, if valid, would represent a 
deepening of scholars’ and policy makers’ knowledge of what causes states to adopt the grand 
strategies they do, and how to effect change. 
My research can also help provide empirical support for the concept of grand strategy’s 
existence in practice. By approaching grand strategy from a theoretically-driven angle, I can 
provide a framework that has specific, testable expectations about states’ grand strategies across 
time. Should my theoretical expectations be borne out, this will provide powerful evidence in favor 
of grand strategy’s existence and worth beyond mere rhetorical shorthand. Alternatively, should 
my expectation not be borne out, I will still have provided evidence that can suggest whether it is 
a fruitful to study grand strategy from an organizational perspective. 
Finally, my research has important implications for policy makers because it will help 
inform their understanding of the constraints on their own grand strategies as well as those of 
partners and adversaries. Grand strategy is an expansive enterprise that seeks to harness all of a 
state’s resources towards securing the nation’s highest priorities in the international environment. 
Focusing on the reasons that states may be led to favor one strategy over the other provides insight 
into the mechanisms by which nations choose the strategic paths they take. This has the added 
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benefit of not relying on highly detailed intelligence post-mortems about decision maker 
preferences. Rather, it provides an understanding of the general ‘lane’ the country is operating in, 
even if it cannot predict which specific pins the ball will strike. 
1.3 Plan of this dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation proposes and tests a fundamentally new theory about 
grand strategic formation and change. In Chapter 2, I propose that grand strategy formation and 
change is best understood by looking at the disparate strengths of the formal organizations a state 
utilizes to execute its foreign policy. I also advance a novel methodology for measuring a state’s 
grand strategy, which seeks to address some of the concerns of grand strategic skeptics and nihilists 
by reducing some elements of analytic bias. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 form the heart of the dissertation, 
and apply my theory to India by examining Indian grand strategy in the wake of three major 
conflicts. These conflicts serve as potential inflection points around which resources may be 
reallocated to reinforce strengths or remedy deficiencies, meaning they are the periods when grand 
strategic change is arguably most likely.  
Chapter 3 unpacks India’s famous grand strategy of Non-Alignment, as articulated by its 
founding Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and explores the stability of this grand strategy before 
and after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Chapter 4 jumps ahead 10 years in time and considers Indian 
grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. While India’s grand strategy at the time is not 
as clear cut, I argue that it is best defined as a persuasive grand strategy, which is in contrast to 
much of the literature that suggests it might be best defined as coercive. Chapter 5 looks at the 
1999 Kargil Crisis and helps answer the question of what theme best defines Indian grand strategy 
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in that era. Chapter 6 explores three mini-cases—Australia, Pakistan, and the Netherlands—in 
order to generalize my theory and methodology beyond India. Chapter 7 concludes with a look at 
each of the three primary cases as well the mini-cases and evaluates my theory against other 
leading theories of grand strategic formation; this chapter also addresses my dissertation’s 
implications for other debates in the field and ends by offering some concluding thoughts and 
directions for future research. 
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2.0 Toward a new theory of grand strategic change 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I am primarily interested in examining the sources of 
stability and change in a country’s grand strategy.  As detailed in the previous chapter, I adopt 
Posen’s definition that grand strategy is “…a nation-state’s theory of how to produce security for 
itself.”  Typically, theories in the field either assume that change happens as a response to external 
events or as a function of internal forces. The theory that I lay out in this chapter suggests that 
change is instead a combination of these two factors; it is primarily a function of how states 
resource formal organizations that interact with the outside world. This change of focus can 
provide meaningful guidance about when to expect grand strategic change as well as the rate and 
substance of that change, redressing a deficiency in existing theories on the topic. 
That states tend to be a privileged unit of analysis in both the international relations and 
security studies literature is a phenomenon that is neither new nor surprising.38 A state, as famously 
defined by Weber, is “…a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”39 The state, however, is conceptually 
distinct both from ‘government’ and ‘the government.’ Bealey and Johnson succinctly summarize 
the difference between the latter two. About government, they write: “Government (without the 
definite article) is an abstract term referring to the style, range, scope, purposes and degree of 
control [in a state].”40 ‘The government’, they note, “usually refers to the rulers, that group of 
people who are in charge of the state at a particular time.”41   
 
38 Grey (2009, 304) 
39 Weber (1947) 
40 Bealey and Johnson (1999, 147) 
41 Bealey and Johnson (1999, 147) 
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My theory is primarily concerned with the way the state makes decisions, not any particular 
government or administration. Whereas governments can vary over time with the people and legal 
forms that make them up, states endure. This focus allows my dissertation a broader scope and 
wider generalizability than if it were limited to the study of a particular set of historical actors or 
legal frameworks. My observations examine the various governments of the state (e.g., the Nehru 
government, or the Gandhi government) across different time periods but, in general, it is the state 
as described above that is the object of my concern. The rest of the chapter first examines existing 
theories of grand strategic stability and change before laying out my theory. I close by describing 
the methodology used to test my theoretical claim. 
2.1 Existing Theories of grand strategic change 
Generally speaking, theories that describe grand strategic stability and change come in two 
distinct types: externally oriented and internally oriented. Externally oriented theories posit that 
states respond to events in the external environment and choose their grand strategies primarily as 
a response to these developments. A theory that posits that grand strategies change in response to 
the rise and fall of external threats to a state’s survival is an example of an externally oriented 
theory. Internally oriented theories of grand strategic change posit that it is factors internal to states 
that determine when change is likely to occur. Theories that contend grand strategic change is tied 
to things like leadership turnover, election cycles, or strategic culture are best described as 
internally oriented theories. 
Every theory of grand strategic change must explain two things: the form grand strategy 
takes before and after the evolution and the rate at which the change takes place. There are three 
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basic types of grand strategic form, each of which can be concisely described by the primary means 
by which it intends to achieve a state’s goals: Persuasive, Inducive, and Coercive. Persuasive grand 
strategies tend towards the use of diplomacy to solve challenges in the international environment; 
countries adopting this form of grand strategy would tend to shy away from bellicose rhetoric and 
threats. They may act in the international realm through multilateral forums such as the United 
Nations or cultivate an extensive network of bilateral relationships. Alternatively, a state might 
have a large diplomatic corps, be a member in many international committees or organizations, 
and have cultural ties (e.g., through a common language or ethnic population) to many other states. 
It this through activating these networks that the state seeks security. Any of these can be described 
as hallmarks of a persuasive grand strategy. Obviously, a state pursuing a persuasive grand strategy 
such as the one outlined above will also exhibit coercive and inducive behavior from time to time. 
Any of the three types of grand strategies described here will include a complex mixture of means, 
and so-called “pure” strategies of any type are extremely unlikely in the real world. Persuasive 
grand strategies are those whose dominant strategy is a reliance on the use of diplomacy even 
while they occasionally utilize coercive and inducive subordinate strategies. 
Inducive grand strategies utilize transactory suasion as its primary tool. The key difference 
between inducive and persuasive grand strategies is in the use of monetary or other economic 
incentives to achieve their ends. Countries that primarily invest in and act through state-owned 
enterprises, for example, could be said to be pursuing an inducive grand strategy. Alternatively, a 
country might offer a large amount of development assistance or infrastructure investment to other 
countries in exchange for security, resources, or economic advantage. China’s heavy investment 
in Africa in exchange for favorable terms of trade on raw resources could be considered an example 
of an inducive grand strategy. If a state seeks influence in the world based on its abundance of 
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natural resources and forges numerous of financial or commercial ties around the world, that state 
is likely to leverage those contacts and offer financial inducements in order to achieve its foreign 
policy goals. In this example, the state recognizes that it has a strength in, hypothetically, its 
sovereign wealth fund, state-owned enterprises, or the fact that the state controls access to natural 
resource wealth and reaches for that option first when seeking to achieve its goals. 
Finally, coercive grand strategies rely primarily on the threat or use of force to generate 
security. Not every country that pursues a coercive grand strategy is a malicious actor or possesses 
malicious motives. Coercive grand strategy in this context refers to the use of specifically military 
strength in any of its various forms to generate security rather than implying any normative moral 
judgement. Countries that invest heavily in their defense establishment, pursue robust alliances, 
utilize belligerent rhetoric, or rely on an active or burgeoning nuclear deterrent can be said to have 
a coercive grand strategy. Alternatively, they may be active in pursuing dense networks of military 
alliances, rely on ballistic missile or nuclear tests, or intimidate or even outright invade 
neighboring countries. North Korea’s reliance on displays of force to both deter other countries 
and force them to the negotiating table where aid can be obtained is a prime example of a coercive 
grand strategy. Thus, coercive grand strategies are those that generate security primarily through 
reliance on military strength even if diplomatic overtures or inducive incentives are also made. 
After a theory sets expectations about what a shift in grand strategic form looks like – that 
is, what a grand strategy is changing from and what it is changing to – it should offer guidance on 
the expected rate of change. Can the drivers of grand strategic change identified by any given 
theory be said to be doing the heavy lifting in explaining variation in a case if the response comes 
years or decades after the stimulus? Put another way, given a change in the theory’s independent 
variable, how quickly should researchers expect to observe changes in the dependent variable? In 
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this respect, the concept of swift changes in grand strategy means moving at the rate of change in 
the cause; that is, the two should occur very nearly in time. Conversely, slow in this context implies 
the precipitating event may be many years in the past. For example, an internally oriented theory 
that posits grand strategy is a function of individual leader’s personal preferences implies a 
relatively rapid change, as grand strategy may change when a new leader takes office or a leader 
updates their information about a situation.  
Consider a case where evidence shows that the grand strategy of a country endured after a 
new leader was elected and had articulated a new grand strategic direction for the country. Such a 
rate of change would be considered slow from a leadership theory’s perspective, as grand strategic 
change should propagate relatively rapidly. This would suggest that there must be either some 
other causal mechanism or an important heretofore omitted intervening variable at work in the 
case. This provides an objective benchmark by which to assess the speed of change in grand 
strategy consistent with the logic of the theory. The remainder of this section lays out a number of 
prominent externally and internally oriented theories of grand strategic change, describing the 
cause of change in each of the theories, how those theories conceive of the path change should 
take, and the speed with which that change is likely to occur.   
 
2.1.1 Externally oriented theories of grand strategic change 
Any theory that starts with the assumption that a state primarily alters its grand strategy as 
a response to changes in its operating environment can be said to be externally oriented. While 
there are potentially any number of theories that suggest grand strategic change is caused by factors 
external to the state, external threat and regional security architecture are the two most prominent 
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such claims. External threat (or lack thereof) is a prominent system-level factor that could force 
an internal grand strategy shift; some form of this explanation is dominant amongst neo-realist 
scholars. Waltz and Mearsheimer both emphasize that the potential threats faced by rival states in 
the anarchic international system serve as prime causes of the outcomes observed in international 
relations, even if their conclusions about what to do about such threats differ.42 In this line of 
thinking, grand strategy change needs to keep pace with changes in the threat landscape. This type 
of theory could explain Canada’s adoption of a persuasive grand strategy as a logical outgrowth 
of the fact that it has enjoyed throughout its history a relatively peaceful coexistence with its 
southern neighbor and the lack of existential threats in the region. Likewise, the employment of a 
coercive grand strategy could be explained by a relative abundance of either strength over 
neighboring rivals or neighboring threats. Regional security architecture is similar to external 
threat but differs in that it is the constellation of other actors around the state that can cause grand 
strategic change. That is, a country’s grand strategy is a function of the neighborhood in which it 
operates. Some scholars have argued that the post-World War II security architecture in Europe, 
and specifically the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), played an 
important role in the formation of conditions which allowed (then-Western) Europe to join together 
in a common economic framework.43 Having been freed from the security dilemma in their 
immediate backyard, smaller states such as Belgium were able to pursue alternative grand 
strategies while the alliance looked after the common defense. 
In order to say a theory of this sort fits a given case, it is not enough to merely show that 
grand strategic change or stability tracks cleanly with events in the international environment; the 
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speed with which these changes are observed is also critically important. An external threat theory 
implies that such shifts are temporally tied to the rise and fall of a country’s external situation or 
power position. In the case of regional security architecture, one would expect to see shifts in grand 
strategy tied to shifts in the balance of security arrangements and diplomatic support dominant in 
the region. Overall, the speed of grand strategic change should roughly correlate with the rate of 
change of the phenomenon it is describing. If a change in grand strategy is only observed decades 
after a new threat emerges, the theory cannot fully explain the case. 
 
2.1.2 Internally oriented theories of grand strategic change 
As the name implies, any theory that looks inside the state for the answer to the question 
of what causes a country’s grand strategy to change would be categorized as an internally oriented 
theory. Strategic culture is a prominent and robust internally oriented theory of grand strategic 
change. Broadly speaking, strategic culture advocates that countries have a particular set of 
historical circumstances and educational processes that condition strategic preferences and 
decision-making.  Prominent strategic culture theorist Johnston argues that knowing how a culture 
views the role of war in human affairs, the threat war poses, and the efficacy of the use of force 
can provide meaningful insight into their strategic culture.44  The predominant strategic culture 
and the relative ‘stickiness’ of cultural beliefs both explain grand strategic choices and the 
persistence of such choices across relatively long periods of times.  Variation in strategies between 
states in relatively similar power positions can be explained through the variation in cultural beliefs 
 
44 Johnston (1995) 
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or historical circumstances and the organizations they develop; the grand strategies they pursue 
should be a reflection of those beliefs. Leadership change is another prominent internally oriented 
theory. Those who believe that leaders set grand strategy, or that leaders can drive change, fall into 
this camp.45 One problematic aspect of this line of argumentation is that such an ability to rapidly 
pivot is contrary to the long-term notion of grand strategy described in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, 
variations on the theme of leadership setting grand strategy are prominent in the literature. A more 
sophisticated version of this theory might argue that grand strategy changes if leaders and/or their 
grand strategic preferences change. Stability occurs when leaders or preferences remain constant. 
In internally oriented explanations, just as in externally oriented ones, the direction of grand 
strategic change should track with the mechanism in question. Thus, in a strategic culture 
argument, change in grand strategic substance should map onto changes in cultural attitudes 
towards different grand strategy option sets. A country with a strategic culture that shifts from an 
emphasis on economic ties towards more traditional hard power would be expected to have its 
grand strategic form shift from an inducive to a coercive grand strategy. The direction of change 
should run in accordance with changes in the dominant internal mechanism. In a leadership theory, 
change should go with either the leader’s beliefs or the leader him- or herself. 
Rate of change in these theories is governed by how quickly internal changes take to 
propagate through the system. If a strategic culture argument is correct, a relatively slow rate of 
grand strategic change should be observed because of the “stickiness” of culture.46 Sharp, sudden 
cultural shifts are possible, but unlikely. Strong confirmatory evidence for strategic culture as the 
dominant force at work would generally see incremental changes in a country’s grand strategy 
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absent a major cultural shift and any large-scale discontinuity or clean break would present an 
extremely strong signal this theory was incorrect. For a leadership theory, if grand strategy is stable 
in the face of a leadership change, or a change in leader preferences, this theory is likely incorrect. 
 
2.1.3 Problems with these theories 
While these types theories can provide useful macro-level guidance for factors which can 
drive change, they are typically incomplete in one or more ways. For instance, some externally 
oriented theories cannot provide useful guidance as to the form change should take or account for 
variability in the speed of observed change. For instance, regional security theories do not predict 
what grand strategic change will look like, but only when change is likely to occur. Internally 
oriented theories can provide interesting insights into the process of grand strategic change, but 
can fail to explain what generates the impetus for change in the first place; this is a question that 
scholars have been fiercely debating for a long time.  Neither set of theories can fully explain the 
complexities observed in the historical record, although some do a better job than others. 
Externally oriented theories generally provide clear and observable answers to the question 
of what causes grand strategic change. They may even provide some guidance as to when 
researchers should observe change, but not necessarily expectations as to the form that change 
would take. Indeed, according to some, primarily realist, readings of international relations, it is 
hard to see an external threat theory of grand strategy predict anything but the pursuit of a coercive 
grand strategy. As such, more information about the internal workings of the state may be needed 
to explain non coercive grand strategies. Regional security architecture also provides guidance on 
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when to expect change, but it is unclear under what conditions different grand strategic forms 
might result.  
Internally oriented theories provide a clear explanation for the process by which change 
occurs and provides some insight into the form that change might take. Nevertheless, these theories 
have their own shortcomings. For strategic culture, the difficulty is one of genesis. What sets the 
strategic culture of a country on a different path? Some variant of this problem has been identified 
as a potential source of weakness in these types of arguments for several decades.47 While not 
necessarily a fatal flaw, there is still room for improvement. Leadership theories tend to fare better, 
as change is generally expected around leadership transitions or shifts in preferences, and the form 
of change should follow leader preferences. The shortcoming of a leadership theory centers around 
cases of grand strategic stability and providing evidence of stability of preference being the 
mechanism at work. In the next section, I advance an argument that seeks to combine the best parts 
of both externally and internally oriented theories. In doing so, I generate a novel theory that can 
account for when grand strategic change will occur and provide crucial insights into what form 
that grand strategy might take and at what rate.  
2.2 The organizational determinants of grand strategy 
States are functionally similar to macro-level organizations. Accordingly, it follows that 
they may be understood utilizing concepts and models borrowed from organization theory. These 
concepts provide an important starting point for a new theory on grand strategic change. In fleshing 
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out this claim in this section, I first lay out a theoretical argument for why states may be thought 
of as organizations before dealing with some of the potential complications caused by states’ 
unique ends and describing a critical assumption that makes my theory work. I then introduce a 
prominent theory from the literature on organizations that can shed light on how states can generate 
their strategies. I conclude by offering my new theory, focusing on the organizational determinants 
of grand strategic change.  
My dissertation focuses heavily on the role organizations play in shaping grand strategies, 
but this raises the question of what, then, are organizations? At its most basic level, an 
organization, as articulated by Simon, can be defined simply as “…systems of interrelated roles.”48 
Blau and Scott, in differentiating formal organizations from other types, write: 
Since the distinctive characteristic of these organizations is that they 
have been formally established for the explicit purpose of achieving 
certain goals, the term “formal organizations” is used to designate 
them.49 
It is not enough simply to define what a formal organization is (system of interrelated roles 
formally established for an explicit purpose); it is also necessary to consider the properties of such 
an organization in order to specifically highlight the types of organizations I am most interested 
in. Scott and Davis go on to list the “Essential Ingredients” that make up organizations, namely: 
environment, strategy and goals, work and technology, formal organization, informal organization, 
and people.50 I am specifically concerned with what are typically defined as ‘work organizations’ 
or those formal organizations, as defined above, that are staffed by paid professionals, as opposed 
to charities or volunteer organizations.51 Given these considerations, for this dissertation, I define 
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formal organizations as purposely created networks of people, hired to pursue a common goal, that 
possess formal and informal roles, specified tasks, and the financial and technological resources 
to pursue their goal. Having specifically defined what an organization is, there is an additional 
characteristic of organizations that must be considered: their rationality. 
Rational actors are considered to have consistent and complete lists of preferences and 
choose the highest ranking of the multiple choices available to them given their constraints.52 
Frequently, it is also assumed that rational actors have perfect information available about the 
choices available to them. Many scholars, such as Simon, have noted that the aforementioned 
assumptions are frequently problematic in the real world.53  Other advances in the behavioral 
sciences like those posited by Kahneman and Tversky on the constraints on human cognition 
caused by uncertainty cast further doubt on the limits of pure rationality.54 Bounded rationality 
does not invalidate the notion that actors still behave as though they have generally consistent and 
stable preferences that guide their decision making, however; indeed, the assumption that actors 
function in such a way is a hallmark of the International Relations literature. 
Accepting that individual, unitary actors can be thought of as rational, what evidence is 
there that aggregate, or organizational, rationality exists?  It is after all a lynchpin of the argument 
I advance in this dissertation and, typically, rational choice theory deals with aggregate rationality 
by simplifying collective behavior into statements about individual behavior.55 This simplification 
could be problematic. As Brunsson points out “an individual has less difficulty going from decision 
to action than does an organization.”56 Olson famously described the difficulty in organizing large 
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groups to provide collective goods in his work The Logic of Collective Action.57 Others are quick 
to point out that, “according to conventional rational choice theory, individuals participate if their 
net expected benefit from participation as compared with abstention is greater than zero.”58 Despite 
this rational basis for participation, Bendor and Hammond observe “…the literature has focused 
heavily on the tendency of institutions to be dumber than their members (via, e.g., conformity 
pressure)…”59  
People can and will participate in collective actor endeavors if they believe the goal is 
worthwhile and expect that they will benefit from participation, but this only explains the reason 
individuals will join collective endeavors. This does not change the fact that many scholars have 
asserted that collectives hinder rationality. Simon is one scholar who disagrees, demonstrating how 
organizational processes, such as the concentration of expertise and routinized decision-making, 
can help individuals more closely approximate rationality.60 At the level of the organization, this 
type of rational goal seeking behavior underlies the Rational Systems approach to organization 
theory. Scott and Davis summarize this perspective as “organizations are collectives oriented to 
the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social 
structures.”61  It is this rational systems approach, with both its goal orientation and formalized 
structures, that allows for models of rationality developed around individual behavior to be applied 
to larger groupings in a meaningful way and thus permit expectations that organizations behave 
rationally.62 It is thus appropriate to think of organizations as rational actors (of some form). 
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62 There are a number of alternatives to the rational-systems approach I adopt, including natural- and open-system 
theories. Natural-systems approaches tend to emphasize the fact that organizations tend to be no different than other 
naturally occurring systems, and thus subject to the same forces. This perspective also highlights the fact that 
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In the case of a research project such as mine, which is concerned with how states pursue 
goals, some assumption of rationality is warranted. Snidal points out that large swaths of 
International Relations scholarship utilize this assumption of rationality and the associated rational 
choice theory in various ways and at different levels of analysis.63 Accepting that organizations 
are rational actors, it is also appropriate to take the next step and apply theories and definitions 
developed in the organization theory literature to the investigation of states and grand strategies – 
actors and phenomena typically considered in the fields of Public Policy and International 
Relations. After all, these are frequently considered three distinct disciplines, require different 
expertise, and primarily focus on disparate levels of activity. Compounding this problem, states – 
the actors I examine – are required to pursue their national security, or survival, above all else, 
which bestows upon them different responsibilities, obligations, and capabilities than generic 
organizations possess. It is my contention that there is nothing contained in the definition of an 
organization I have advanced that necessitates state exceptionalism in this instance. States may be 
a unique form of organization, but the definitions I have adopted applies equally as well to a state 
in its entirety as they do to the individual sub-entities created by and within the state to execute its 
various functions. While it is true that a state’s security is its over-riding concern, the primacy of 
this objective diminishes with the relative amount of security enjoyed by that state. As a state 
 
individuals in the organization do not necessarily pursue only the organization’s goals, but also their own. An open-
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theories of organizations. As I am mostly focused on the goal-orientation and formal structures of organizations in 
this section, I have chosen to emphasize the rational-systems approach, my theory by its very nature necessitates a 
hybrid (rational/open) approach. Scott and Davis (2007, 117-118), Bastedo (2006) 
63 Snidal (2013) 
 34 
becomes more secure, and its existence is not in question, it can pursue other non-security goals 
that in many ways align with the activities of other organizations.64  
Not only can the insights of organization theory be applied to thinking about the behavior 
of states, there are numerous benefits to doing so when engaging in the study of grand strategy. 
Going back to Weber’s definition and my previous discussion, insofar as a state is geographically 
bounded and concerned with a monopoly on force, such entities can be considered a unique type 
of macro-level organization. By focusing on the larger bureaucratic apparatus erected to achieve 
its goals, this conceptualization provides the opportunity for a state to be considered no differently 
than any other organization, private or public; the state can also then be separated into its 
constituent elements (themselves organizations).  The end purpose of private and public 
organizations may differ (e.g., private pecuniary gain vs. public benefit) and the locus of authority 
may differ (boards of directors/Chief Executive Officers vs. multiple different stakeholders), yet 
the basic forces at work are similar. In fact, Blau and Scott separate different types of formal 
organizations into four conceptual categories based on the group the collective is intended to 
benefit: 
Four types of organizations result from the application of our cui 
bono criterion: (1) “mutual-benefit associations,” where the prime 
beneficiary is the membership; (2) “business concerns,” where the 
 
64 Precisely defining the concept of security, and the emphasis states should place on security as a goal, is a widely 
debated topic. Wolfers has pointed out that the concept of ‘national security’ can be difficult to define (Wolfers 1952). 
Scholars such as Ullman have further muddied the waters by seeking a broad expansion of the term outside traditional 
hard power concerns (Ullman 1983). I use the term security primarily to mean the insurance of survival and continued 
viability of a state in the international environment, setting aside the question of even more expansive concepts such 
as ‘human security’ for the sake of intellectual tractability. As for the amount of emphasis states should place on 
seeking security, Mearsheimer is one scholar who argues that states seek their own survival and to maximize their 
power position vis-à-vis other states as their primary concern (Mearsheimer 1994). Baldwin points out that this 
position that security is the prime (or overriding) concern for states is inherently flawed because it: a) does not describe 
how people behave in the real world, and b) provides no logical place for states to stop pouring resources into it. 
Baldwin argues for considering security as something that has marginal value. That is, states rank security as a priority 
relative to the amount of security they currently enjoy (Baldwin 1997). In this dissertation, I adopt a marginal value 
of security approach, as the historical record has demonstrated time and again states can and frequently do pursue non-
security related ends. 
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owners are prime beneficiary; (3) “service organizations,” where the 
client group is the prime beneficiary; and (4) “commonweal 
organizations” where the prime beneficiary is the public-at-large.65 
(italics in original) 
In this case, the various types of state level organizations which are the concern of my research are 
explicitly included in the latter two categories. While I frequently refer to the state as an 
organization, it is more precise to conceptualize the state as a ‘system-of-systems.’ In Management 
Science, a system is defined at its most basic as “…a set of interrelated elements.”66 The similarity 
with Simon’s definition of organizations is no coincidence, as organizations are a special category 
of system.67 Systems-of-systems can be thought of as “…the combination of a set of different 
systems forms a larger “system-of-systems” that performs a function not performable by a single 
system alone.”68 Throughout, I explore various components of this “system-of-systems” and tend, 
for the sake of simplicity, to refer to individual components as if they were independent. 
Given the focus placed on organizations and organizational processes above, an 
assumption of rationality is an essential one for my theory. As I noted above, formal organizations 
are created to achieve a specific goal and the ability to set and pursue goals is a fundamental 
characteristic of rational choice. Furthermore, a recognition of constraints and the ability to 
adjudicate between competing goals is an essential element of strategy. If one cannot match 
appropriate means to the corresponding ends, then one cannot be said to be acting strategically. 
Mistakes, even self-inflicted ones, tend to bear the hallmarks of rational calculus; misperception, 
adversary or ally actions, unforeseen consequences, or simply bad luck are just some of the ways 
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that errors can disrupt an otherwise rational means-ends calculation. Finally, if a state was not 
behaving rationally—that is, acting to satisfy its most pressing issues first—then that state is likely 
to be at least a failing, if not failed. Such comprehensive mismatch would belie a deeper problem 
with the functioning of the state and such endemic problems are beyond the scope of this study. If 
a state cannot accurately assess its needs and figure out how to meet them or consistently fails to 
do so adequately, it would put the state at risk of destruction from either internal or external threats. 
None of this is to say that states, acting rationally, cannot still fail by misidentifying priorities, for 
example, or suffer some other catastrophe; rather, an inability to conform to some semblance of 
rationality makes these failures both more probable and more pronounced. 
One potential objection to the framework laid out here is Allison’s famous challenge to the 
treatment of states as  rational actors and his provision of an alternative model of “bureaucratic 
politics,” which offers an explanation for why states seem to deviate from predictions made by 
those who assume states are purposive, unified rational actors.69 In Essence of Decision, Allison 
describes the “Rational Actor Model” of consisting at its core of “…action chosen by a unitary, 
rational decisionmaker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing.”70 This 
is what Allison labels Model I, or the Rational Actor Paradigm, I described in detail.  
Allison summarizes a different model (which he labels Model II), one based on 
organizations, by saying: “Model II’s grasp of government action as organizational output, 
partially coordinated by a unified group of leaders, balances the classical model’s efforts to 
understand government behavior as choices of a unitary decisionmaker.”71 Allison’s preferred 
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explanatory model—Model III, the governmental/bureaucratic politics model—describes 
governmental action as the result of political bargaining. In his own words: 
The decisions and actions of governments are intranational political 
resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as 
a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, 
and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal 
influence; political in the sense that the activity from which 
decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining 
along regularized channels among individual members of the 
government.72 (emphasis in original) 
By this logic, outcomes like grand strategies are not best described as the rationally derived 
solutions to identified problems, but rather results of intragovernmental bargains.  In their analysis 
of the strengths and weaknesses of Allison’s work, however, Bendor and Hammond point out that 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model explicitly includes bureaucratic actors who can make fine-
grained distinctions about their interests and power positions as well as negotiate strategically to 
maximize their influence.73 From this they conclude that the bureaucratic politics model is 
essentially a variant of the rational choice model, but one that relaxes Model I’s assumption of a 
unitary rational actor and replaces it with an outcome which is the product of negotiation.74 What 
is important to take away from this discussion is that, for the theory developed in the remainder of 
this chapter to apply to the crafting of grand strategy, there is no requirement for the decision 
maker to be a unitary rational actor; even assuming Allison’s bureaucratic politics model 
dominates, as long as the outcome is fundamentally rational and driven by the logic of 
consequences, then my theory may be applied. 
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2.2.1 The Resource-Based View of the Firm 
If states can be usefully thought of as fundamentally rational organizations, what 
phenomena are likely to drive the creation of, and change in, their grand strategies? For many 
scholars in International Relations theory, the answer of how to formulate grand strategy is 
obvious. The international environment presents innumerable external threats and opportunities 
which must be navigated or exploited to the benefit of the nation. The same is true for many 
prominent theorists in organization theory. Whenever someone suggests changes to strategy 
because of current or future changes in the operating environment, they are starting from the 
assumption that the external environment should be the starting point determining which strategies 
are chosen.75 This externally oriented view is not the only basis on which firms or states can base 
their strategies, however.  
A prominent alternative to a purely externally driven strategy is known in the strategic 
management literature as the Resource-Based View of the Firm. This view, as opposed to a market-
or externally oriented focus, takes “the role of the firm’s resources as the foundation for firm 
strategy.”76 In its most basic form, the theory posits that it is the variation in firms’ resources and 
capabilities and the difficulty of competing firms in replicating those resources and capabilities 
that forms the basis for understanding a firm’s competitive advantage.77 Applying this resource-
based view to strategy formulation, Grant outlines a five-step iterative process of how firms use 
 
75 Take (for example) Porter (2008), a classic article on the competitive forces that shape strategy. Therein, he argues 
that the constellation of forces external to the firm, that is, the threat of new entrants to the market, bargaining power 
of both suppliers and buyers, threat of substitutes, and existing rivalries amongst extant competitors, shape 
competition, and which it turn shapes strategy (Porter 2008, 79-80). This all but explicitly assumes that the only 
relevant factors that drive strategy are outside the boundaries of the firm. 
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an assessment of their resources as the foundation of their strategy. Figure 2.1 below lays out these 
steps and the associated logic. 
 
Figure 2.1. Resource-Based View of the Firm and Strategy Formulation 78 
 
 
78 Grant (1991, 114). Image used courtesy of Sage Publications. 
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The starting point of this framework begins with resources because, in Grant’s words, 
“Resources are inputs into the production process.”79 These resources could be things such as 
human or monetary capital, intellectual property, capital equipment, and the like. Grant notes they 
are not generally productive on their own and organizations typically require bundles of resources 
working together to generate capabilities, which he defines as “…what [a firm] can do as a result 
of teams of resources working together.”80 Evaluating these resources and capabilities facilitates 
an understanding of which are the most difficult for other firms to replicate, and thus can serve as 
the basis of the firm’s competitive advantage.81 When distinctive or superior resources are matched 
to environmental opportunities, competitive advantage is achieved.82  Given this, Grant concludes, 
“The essence of strategy formulation, then, is to design a strategy that makes the most effective 
use of these core resources and capabilities.”83 Given the difficulty in replicating the foundation 
for a firm’s competitive advantage, it follows that a properly designed strategy should capitalize 
on this phenomenon, influencing the direction of the firm’s strategy towards utilizing its 
competitive advantage over other potential capabilities.  
At first blush, theories of the firm, especially those which relate to profit-seeking 
motivation, may not seem directly applicable to states given the emphasis states need to place on 
their security.  These two ends are not as incommensurable as they might first appear. The 
foundation of a firm’s continued existence is profit, or at least breaking even. As profit increases 
for a firm, so does the margin-of-error it enjoys. The firm’s ability to seek more diverse revenue 
streams (or even greater profit) also increases. The same is true for states and security. In fact, neo-
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realism predicts much the same behavior as firms seeking profit as states seeking security. This is 
unsurprising given the fact that both share an underlying common foundation in economic logic. 
As noted earlier, Mearsheimer argues that states are power maximizers, an argument not entirely 
dissimilar from firms being profit maximizers.84 There are, however, a number of important 
differences between the two which warrant elaboration. 
In seeking these profits, a firm can accumulate debt, sometimes even significant amounts 
of it, and continue operating for a period of time. A firm must eventually break even or continue 
to expand to remain viable. The same can be said of states, even states running considerable 
security deficits. This deficit can be sustained provided states (or firms) can find the backing of 
others. It is also true that the higher one climbs the power ladder, the higher the potential stakes, 
especially in the modern era. This is even more reason to utilize any potential insights into how 
states might increase their security. Security differs from profit in another crucial way, in that 
security can be a remarkably perishable commodity and vulnerable to potential shifts in 
equilibrium. Conventional armies were suddenly rendered much less secure at the onset of the 
nuclear age. Today, asymmetric anti-access/area denial capabilities are undermining aspects of 
both U.S. power projection capabilities and raising questions about new vulnerabilities that could 
be exploited in dangerous ways. Despite these shifts in equilibrium, balance is eventually restored, 
but not without noteworthy changes in the security environment. As the consequences of state 
death are high, it is important to utilize insights from as many fields as possible in order to try and 
prevent this disastrous occurrence. As such, utilizing insights from organization theory in the realm 
of international relations has tremendous value for the field. Furthermore, scholars such as Grey 
have pointed out the numerous parallels between the organization theory and security studies 
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literature, and the potential for even greater integration between the two fields.85 In short, given 
the close association between the two disciplines, there is a strong argument for adapting theories 
from one field for use in the other. 
 
2.2.2 The Theory 
Grant’s description of the application of the resource-based view of the firm’s role in 
strategy formulation demonstrates in clear detail the logic that undergirds my assertion that the 
capabilities available to a state may predispose them to favor one grand strategy over another. 
Figure 2.2 provides an adaptation of Figure 2.1, modified to fit the context of a state. The words 
in parentheses inside the boxes (e.g., State Resources (resources)) provide a cross-walk between 
the terminologies in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 for the convenience of the reader. 
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Figure 2.2. Proposed mechanism at work with examples 
 
States, like firms, possess resources in a variety of forms, which are harnessed for the 
functioning and continuance of the state. One such enumeration of state resources is described by 
Morgenthau as the ‘elements of national power.’ For material elements of national power, 
Morgenthau lists: Geography, Natural Resources, Industrial Capacity, Military Preparedness, and 
Population.86 In order to turn these state resources into productive components of a government’s 
foreign policy, they are funneled into various state organizations such as the Ministry of Defence. 
Just as natural resources are latent wealth until they are extracted and refined, state resources such 
as money or manpower require institutions or organizations to harness and direct them to 
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productive ends. There could be innumerable reasons for initial investment in one organization or 
another. Over time, any pattern of differential investment and prioritization leads to state 
organizations of varying strength with differing abilities to achieve the state’s foreign policy 
objectives.  
The implications of such a states-as-organizations, resource-based perspective on how 
states formulate strategy are profound.  For one, this view suggests that, although states may have 
different ends than private firms, both are obligated to make resource allocation and investment 
decisions that in turn affect their current and future performance. This matching of ends and means 
is the core concept of strategy. Porter, one of the most prominent scholars of strategy in the private 
sector, defines strategy as: “… the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different 
set of activities.”87 As Porter goes on to point out, there is no one best market position to adopt, 
otherwise operational effectiveness, and not strategy, would be all that was required.88  Stated 
succinctly, states possess bundles of resources (e.g., Money, Manpower, Elite Attention), which 
they allocate to various organizations (e.g., Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry) to pursue their foreign policy priorities. The disparity in resource 
allocation caused by limited resource availability and imperfect substitution (e.g., foreign service 
officers generally possess different skill sets than civilians working in national defense) creates 
organizations of various strengths.  
Over time, this disparity in strength, which may be slight at first, is factored into the 
decision-making calculus of policy makers when they decide how they believe they should pursue 
their desired end-state. A key process at work at this juncture is the concept of path dependence 
 
87 Porter (1996, 10) 
88 Porter (1996, 10) 
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and increasing returns. Pierson argues that one of the key features present when an increasing 
returns process is at work is that of inertia. That is, once a pattern is in place, it becomes hard to 
alter and the cost of substitutes are high.89 To re-iterate, the independent variable in this 
understanding is the state’s resource allocation decisions and the dependent variables are the form 
a state’s grand strategy takes and the rate of grand strategic change observed. When considering 
different options, policy makers take the differential strength of the state’s functional sub-
organizations into account and display a tendency towards the use of stronger organizations more 
frequently, creating a bias in grand strategy form. That is, policy makers call upon those 
organizations more frequently because of their increased relative capability, and the resultant grand 
strategic form follows.  
Change in grand strategic form, according to this organizational, resource-based theory, 
occurs because of both external and internal drivers. Similar to externally oriented theories, events 
in the international environment can become a catalyst for change when the states’ operating 
environment changes sufficiently or events demonstrate that existing grand strategies cannot cope 
with the burdens placed on them. Like internally oriented theories, change is moderated by the 
choices made previously. States cannot simply will away their existing organizations or alter the 
distribution of their resources and power overnight. Path dependence and a pattern of increasing 
returns logic is difficult to break outside of extra-ordinary circumstances. Changes can take time 
to propagate through the system. How, and to what degree, states alter the balance of resources 
 
89 Pierson argues that, in cases where increasing returns and path dependence are present, four features are liable to 
be found: multiple equilibria, contingency, a critical role for timing and sequencing, and inertia (Pierson 2014, 263). 
This logic of increasing returns and path dependence undergirds my theory as it explains why once states make 
resource allocation decisions, they are likely to continue to do so. 
 46 
between their organizations will dictate the expected form of grand strategy, and the expected rate 
of change. 
In this theory, substantive change in grand strategic form should map relatively cleanly 
onto the changes in resourcing levels across various state organizations. As resources flow into 
and out of these organizations, they become relatively more or less effective at their assigned 
function. Thus, when resources flow out of organizations that had previously been responsible for 
the country’s grand strategic form towards organizations associated with another form (e.g., from 
coercive organizations towards inducive ones), a corresponding shift in that country’s grand 
strategic form should be observed. The rate of change will be dependent on how dramatically the 
balance of resources is altered. Typically, changes in resources are incremental in nature, and thus 
change can take more time to propagate through the system; In cases where the resource 
reallocations are more dramatic, change may happen faster than it otherwise might. 
The rate of change of grand strategy expected in this resourced-based theory thus places a 
heavy emphasis on the rate at which resources are distributed. If my theory is correct, there should 
be an observable correlation between the rate of change in resourcing patterns and the rate of 
change in grand strategic form. At the most extreme, my theory expects a very rapid grand strategic 
shift if all of the state’s resources previously devoted to one set of organizations are removed and 
focused on another set. Alternatively, the rate of change would be slower if resources were divided 
across organizations or provided in incommensurate amounts. Thus, if I were to observe marked 
shifts in resources from coercive to persuasive organizations, I would expect a marked shift in 
grand strategic form from coercive to persuasive grand strategy. More incremental rates of change 
in resources should yield more incremental changes in form. Alternatively, it may be that all of the 
indicators do not point in the same direction; that is, money and manpower may point in two 
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opposing directions, and elite attention in a third. It may be also be the case that all of these 
indicators are not created equal. In situations where indicators are pointing in opposing directions, 
my theory expects that the previously pursued grand strategy should dominate because of path 
dependence. In short, the cost of an alternative grand strategy is higher than it would otherwise be, 
whereas the cost of the current grand strategy is lower. Therefore, in these instances effecting 
change may require large preferential investment in one organization over another in the short 
term, or smaller preferential investments in the long term. 
Put formally, I advance the general hypothesis that: States vary in their organizational 
strengths, and this variation is reflected in the grand strategy pursued by those states.  From this 
general hypothesis, I derive two subsidiary hypotheses. The first is: The form grand strategic 
change takes is determined by the patterns of resource allocations amongst the organizations. The 
second subsidiary hypothesis is the rate of grand strategic change is correlated with the rate at 
which states invest resources into their organizations.  
2.3 Methodology 
The methodology selected to test the viability of my hypotheses alongside existing 
explanations of grand strategic change is to perform a within-case analysis and utilize congruence 
procedure to rule out as many alternative hypotheses as possible. This procedure is paired with 
process-tracing to determine which of the theories passing the congruence test best explains the 
case. This methodological approach is particularly useful for several reasons. First, as this research 
project is fundamentally developing a theory, there is a high priority on uncovering whether or not 
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it can accurately make predictions in the empirical record, a hallmark of the congruence method.90  
Second, process-tracing allows me to unpack the specific links proposed by my theory, facilitates 
further development and refinement of the theory, and functions as an analytic explanation of the 
case, providing evidence of the theory’s validity.91 Finally, if my theory is right, it would suggest 
that it would be impossible, or at least extraordinarily unlikely, to find comparable cases of 
individual nation-states changing their grand strategies in ways that would permit between-case, 
controlled comparisons. When the added risk of multiple causality inherent in the determinants of 
grand strategy is considered, these three factors make the selected methodology an appropriate and 
strong choice to test my theory. The remainder of this section explains how I intend to increase the 
inferential power of my theory in a notoriously difficult area of study, describes the cases chosen, 
and details the critical variable operationalization necessary to test my claim. 
 
2.3.1 Increasing Inference 
Obviously, the list of priorities for a state and the possible means to achieve those ends can 
be problematically large to analyze. This is one of several challenges frequently cited as 
detrimental to the development of predictive theory in grand strategy.92 To make this problem 
more analytically manageable, I focus on the grand strategies of middle powers. Restricting my 
study to middle powers as opposed to super or great powers (the focus of almost all other studies 
of the topic) has three primary benefits. First, the scope of concern of middle powers is more 
 
90 George and Bennett (2005, 181)  
91 George and Bennett (2005, 211)  
92 For examples of the sorts of challenges which are frequently cited, see Murray (2011). 
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narrowly focused than great powers. Unlike great powers, with diverse geo-political interests 
spanning the globe, middle powers are more likely to have a limited scope of concern in a particular 
region or issue area. Determining middle powers’ grand strategic ends is therefore more readily 
accomplished than it is for great powers. The narrower scope of concern also implies that the major 
currents of middle power foreign policy should be directed at achieving grand strategic ends 
relatively unfettered by problems such as “wars of choice,” or as Freedman termed them, “Liberal 
Wars.”93 Freedman defines these Liberal Wars as:  
Liberal wars are not pursued in the name of strategic imperatives but 
because values are being affronted. Interests might be involved at 
the margins, but these are unlikely to count as 'vital', except in the 
most enlightened terms. For this reason, liberal wars have acquired 
a discretionary aspect, to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. On 
this basis they have been described as 'wars of choice' to be 
contrasted with those of the past, which were 'wars of necessity' or 
'of survival.’94 
This is not to imply that middle powers cannot undertake such “wars of choice;” rather, relative to 
their great power brethren, the number and scope of such wars of choice is dramatically limited by 
their weaker power position. Before one can engage in such wars, one has to enjoy a surplus of 
security such that a war of choice does not turn into a war of necessity. This serves to throw into 
sharper relief the priorities and problems facing middle powers in the realm of foreign policy.  
Second, the marginal value of strategy is arguably higher for middle powers than great 
powers. Typically, great powers only need to worry about the impact of peer competitors or large 
coalitions on their existence, while middle powers do not enjoy the same luxury and can suffer at 
the hands of both peer and superior rivals. Super or great powers enjoy a dominant position in the 
 
93 For an overview of the definition(s) of the term “Wars of Choice” and its uses in academic and policy contexts, see: 
Saunders (2008, 1) 
94 Freedman (2005, 98) 
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international environment and, as such, have the ‘luxury’ of being able to afford potential strategic 
missteps that other, smaller powers do not. Some might argue that super or great powers are often 
operating without a net whereas middle powers have the luxury of potentially being able to rely 
on a more powerful patron. This may be true in some cases, but it would also necessitate middle 
powers to sacrifice of much of their strategic freedom of action and, in effect, sublimate their 
strategic priorities to the more powerful countries’ priorities in exchange for said protection. If the 
middle power cannot fully guarantee a greater power will ‘bail it out,’ then it still needs to consider 
the course of action more closely than its potential patron does.   
Third, middle powers have fewer resources to invest and, as such, are more likely to 
concentrate on investing in one set of organizations rather than diluting the effect by spreading the 
wealth around. With limited resources and even more limited room for error, greater care must be 
taken to ensure that the nation’s resources are used wisely; a carefully devised and well-executed 
strategy can be decisive, especially when attempting the jump from middle power to great power 
status. A further implication is that middle powers are less able to create new capabilities or 
reallocate massive resources on the fly to suit their changing needs than are stronger states. This, 
in turn, means middle powers are forced to lean more heavily on the tools already at their disposal; 
that is, given their position, middle powers’ strengths are less fungible than their great power 
brethren. As Waltz argues about the relative fungibility of power:  
As ever, the distinction between strong and weak states is important. 
The stronger the state, the greater the variety of its capabilities. 
Power may be only slightly fungible for weak states, but it is highly 
so for strong ones.95 
 
95 Waltz (1986, 333)  
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Focusing on middle powers thus narrows considerably the scope of both ends and means 
to be analyzed in any given case of grand strategic change. Additionally, this focus increases our 
collective understanding of the drivers and effects of grand strategy, as middle powers have only 
occasionally been studied in this context. One prominent example of such work is Brands’ analysis 
of the grand strategy pursued by one of Brazil’s presidents.96 This piece demonstrates that the 
study of middle powers’ grand strategy is both warranted and valuable for understanding the 
phenomenon more generally. Finally, middle powers serve as a pool of most likely cases to test 
theories of grand strategy more broadly, as well as my theory specifically. Given the importance 
of strategic decision making in times of resource shortage, if grand strategy is to be found 
anywhere, it should be among middle powers.    
This focus on middle powers invariably comes with a multitude of different challenges, 
some of which have been discussed above. One additional challenge is the specification of a widely 
agreed upon list of middle powers. In offering his own definition of small states, Keohane divides 
states into the following categorizations: “A middle power is a state whose leaders consider that 
it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or 
through an international institution” (Emphasis in original).97 Cooper and Parlar Dal identify three 
contemporary ‘waves’ of middle power scholarship since the term’s coining in the Post-World 
War II era. The primary challenges they highlight for the study of middle powers are the tension 
between expansive and specific characterizations as well as the dangers of picking arbitrary 
thresholds for membership in the category of middle powers.98 This latter drawback was 
particularly evident in early attempts to define middle powers based on quantitative definitions, as 
 
96 Brands (2010) 
97 Keohane (1969, 296)  
98 Cooper and Parlar Dal (2016) 
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they often employed arbitrary thresholds for middle powers that had an extremely limited temporal 
scope.99  
To circumvent the problem of arbitrary analytic thresholds, Goldstein utilizes a 
methodology of grouping countries that were relatively similar on the basis of military 
expenditure, ending up with three general categories: superpowers, secondary powers, and an 
uncategorized ‘rest’.100 I employ this method of utilizing natural groupings of countries to 
determine the break points between power categories (superpowers, great powers, and middle 
powers) to determine my list of candidate middle powers. Specifically, I take the GDP (at then-
year prices, in US Dollars) of a relevant year, look at approximately the top 15% of countries in 
that year, and group them into one of the three categories above.101 To demonstrate this method in 
action, consider the top 15% of countries identified by this metric in 1971 depicted in Figure 2.3. 
 
99 For a brief discussion of the problems of at least two previous studies, see: Handel (1990, 26-28)  
100 Goldstein (2000) 
101 One challenge in the study of power rankings of countries, as previously discussed, is determining the threshold 
for inclusion. This approximate floor of the top 15% of countries was proposed by Gilley (2016). However, this 
concern is not directly relevant for my dissertation, as the case selected, India, is well within the category.  
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Figure 2.3. Top 28 Countries, by GDP, in 1971 (then-year prices) 102 
 
The guidance provided by Goldstein, combined with the GDP data, yields Table 2.1, which groups 
countries into super, great and middle powers by their GDP in 1971. Notional break points between 
countries are based on the rough step down in GDP level observed in Figure 2.3. 
  
 
102 United Nations Statistics Division (2016) 
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Table 2.1. Ranking of Powers in 1971 by GDP 
Category Country 




























Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
This ranking methodology has the benefit of being straight forward and replicable across 
time, especially in the post-World War II era, given the relative homogeneity of available measures 
like GDP.  Furthermore, the list in Table 2.1, sorting merely on GDP, yields an intuitive list of 
powers based on common understandings of the Cold War power distribution. This method could 
be extended even further back to the 19th century, if necessary, by utilizing data such as the 
Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of National Capability and diplomatic reach. While 
there are limitations to this method, especially as it relates to measuring non-military power 
historically, for my purposes, the method’s elegance and replicability outweigh such concerns. 
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The second important methodological choice for my study is that I only consider 
observations of potential grand strategic change that occur around major conflicts in which the 
relevant country was involved. This focus has two benefits. First, looking at whether and how a 
country’s strategy changed post-war helps break the iterative nature of grand strategy and removes 
some of the problems of possible endogeneity inherent in the study of this phenomenon. That is, a 
country’s current position in the international environment might be a function of past grand 
strategies. Looking at a state’s grand strategy after a war creates a plausible break point with the 
status quo ante strategy; it functions essentially as a natural experiment.103 Avoiding the problem 
of endogeneity inherent in the study of grand strategy is a critical first step in the development and 
testing of social scientific theories of the concept.  
By looking at the differences in resourcing before and after a war, I can pinpoint what 
Kingdon calls a ‘policy window’ where a change, if any was to occur, is most likely to be 
observed.104 Kingdon contends that these policy windows can be either problem windows or 
political windows. Problem windows occur when “decision makers become convinced a problem 
is pressing” while a political window “can be opened by an event in the political stream – a change 
of administration, a shift in national mood, an influx of new members of Congress.”105 Often, both 
problem and political windows open after wars. Additionally, my theory asserts that states continue 
investing in organizations and grand strategic forms because an increasing returns logic is at work. 
One of the criticisms of such arguments is that such a cycle is hard to break once started and 
 
103 Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002, 12) 
104 For a complete definition of Policy Windows see: Kingdon (2003, 166-168) 
105 Kingdon (2003, 174) 
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implies relative stasis.106 These potential inflection points provide a clear opportunity to deviate 
from the path and, if necessary, begin movement towards a new equilibrium. 
Second, wars can involve an influx or reduction in the material resources available to a 
state. Studying how a state reinvests these gains or rebalances after a conflict (if at all) further 
lessens the risk of encountering an endogeneity problem. An expansion or contraction in the 
resources available to a state should force pointed decisions about their investment decisions and, 
therefore, their grand strategy. Given these two benefits, focusing my observations around wars 
experienced by a state yields substantial increases in my ability to draw conclusions from the 
empirical record. 
 
2.3.2 Case Selection 
For my case studies, I examine the grand strategies pursued by India during the periods 
surrounding three conflicts: the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1999 
Kargil Crisis. These cases are appropriate to test my hypotheses for several reasons. First and 
foremost, selecting one country as my case allows me to control for a large number of background 
factors, such as geography, adversaries, and cultural characteristics, which would otherwise 
complicate my analysis. Because of my methodological choices and after ruling out countries 
which would be prohibitively difficult to conduct research in or on (e.g., China), the list of cases 
 
106 Pierson (2014, 265) 
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which could be considered is relatively small. Given the already formidable challenges studying 
grand strategy, a within-case design presents the strongest case selection available.107  
Second, these cases represent various military outcomes for India: defeat and loss of some 
territory in the case of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, victory and sundering of its arch-enemy in the 
case of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and stalemate in the case of the 1999 Kargil crisis. The Sino-
Indian War of 1962, in which the Indian Army suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the 
People’s Republic of China, serves as the first potential break point for Indian grand strategy. 
Given that the outcome of the Third Indo-Pakistan War in 1971was the division of East and West 
Pakistan into modern day Bangladesh and Pakistan, this case should prove a strong test of my 
theory as well as the potential alternative hypotheses.108  During the Kargil conflict, Pakistani 
forces made incursions into Indian territory. Although they were eventually defeated, the conflict 
spurred new interest in defense reform and Indian grand strategy.109 Third, there is potential for 
significant variation on the dependent variable values (grand strategic form, and the rate of any 
change) in the wake of these conflicts.  
Fourth, as a post-colonial country that gained full independence relatively late, the 
organizations and structures comprising India’s government were originally created by the British 
to suit their own ends. This decomplicates an otherwise thorny analysis by further stripping away 
concerns about endogeneity. In the case of grand strategy, a crucial endogeneity concern is the 
potential for current grand strategies to be the results of prior grand strategic choices. The selection 
 
107 Other potential cases included Australia (post-Vietnam War), Netherlands (post-Operation Trikora), Pakistan (post-
1971 Indo-Pakistani war). Case selection was validated by utilizing the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate 
Disputes Version 4.0 B dataset filtering on major conflicts (as defined by a value of 4 [Use of Force] or more on the 
HostLev [Hostility level of dispute] column) and identifying conflicts involving middle powers. Palmer et al. (2015), 
Kenwick et al. (2013) 
108 Marwah (1979) 
109 O’Donnell and Pant (2015) 
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of India removes this concern, as India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947 and 
reshaped its government dramatically in the aftermath of its independence. This means that Indian 
grand strategy from 1947 until the 1962 Sino-Indian war is a purely Indian grand strategy, as no 
“Indian” grand strategy would have been possible under colonial rule.  
For all of these reasons, India represents a “most likely” test of my theory; if my theory 
should apply anywhere, it should apply to the selected cases. If I fail to find evidence that my 
theory and its attendant causal processes are at work in these instances, it would provide strong 
evidence that my theory is incorrect. As a most likely case for my theory, should I uncover little 
or no connection between India’s organizational resource allocation decisions and their form of 
grand strategy, my theory likely does not hold in other cases.  
India offers more analytical leverage than many “most likely” cases, however, because it 
allows me to test my theory against the power of alternative theories. Specifically, each case is one 
which is a strong candidate for explanation by an alternative hypothesis. Post-World War II India, 
like many other countries around the world, found itself caught between two ideological blocs as 
the Cold War took hold. In the years leading up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India was under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who famously pursued a policy of Non-Alignment 
with either of the competing blocs.110 Debate still rages over whether or not the defeat of the Indian 
army at the hands of the Chinese led to an abandonment of the country’s policy of non-alignment 
within both the policy making and scholarly community.111 Because of this ambiguity, this case 
provides fertile ground to test both my methodology and the alternative hypotheses; theories that 
expect change and theories that expect stability have an equal chance of being able to explain the 
 
110 Mukherjee and Malone (2011a, 313)  
111 Chaudhuri (2009) 
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case. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War serves as my next observation.112 Any grand strategic change 
detected in this observation should be easily explicable by an external threat hypothesis, as 
Pakistan was weakened in military, economic, and territorial terms. The case is accordingly a tough 
test for my theory. Finally, I examine the 1999 Kargil Crisis in the post-Cold War era. This case 
is an important one to test a strategic culture argument, as India was at that point 50 years 
independent from British rule and, if Indian strategic culture was doing the work of dictating Indian 
grand strategy, it would be most detectable in this case. These cases thus help to transform my 
“most likely” case into something closer to a “crucial case” that is important in developing theories, 
as it has the potential to tell us much about how applicable my theory is across a range of possible 
cases.113  
There are some who urge caution when generalizing from the case of India, especially as 
it relates to strategy. Sullivan succinctly summarizes this strain of argument, saying: 
Scholars refer to a distinctive Indian identity and view of history, 
underpinned by unique values, images and ideas, but they do not go 
so far as to illuminate the nature or sources of such traits, nor do they 
reveal the complex systems of meaning and practice that lie behind 
them.114 
A corollary to this argument is made by Tanham, who argues that India is unique because it 
possesses no history of formal strategic thinking: 
…Indians do think strategically and have developed some strategic 
concepts, but like the British before them, they have developed these 
concepts in an informal and haphazard way. For example, India has 
never issued a white paper and does not appear inclined to do so. 
Thus, the forces of culture and history and the attitude and policies 
of the independent Indian government have worked against the 
concept of strategic thinking and planning. As India’s need for 
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strategic planning increases, a structure for planning is likely to 
develop slowly.115 
Some have taken Tanham’s work to mean that India does not have a grand strategy, even while 
noting that there is much scholarship that rebuts this line of reasoning.116 The underlying assertion 
is that there is something that hinders generalizability from the Indian case, especially in the 
domain of strategy. I have no reason to believe that the theory I have developed or my method 
cannot be applied to the case of India, and if this particular argument has any merit, I would expect 
to observe it. 
To investigate the generalizability of my argument and findings, however, I make one final 
effort and conduct a series of mini-case studies to assess the applicability of my theory to countries 
other than India. I utilize congruence testing on three mini-case studies: Australia after the Vietnam 
War, Pakistan after the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and the Netherlands in the wake of Operation 
Trikora. These three cases represent alternative observations that were not selected for analysis 
because of the difficulties associated with holding a sufficient number of variables constant.117 
Testing these cases for congruence with my theory’s expectations, even if only at the level of a 
plausibility probe, allows for a more robust analysis than looking at India alone.  
2.3.3 Variable Operationalization 
In this section, I detail how I operationalize each aspect of my research design, citing 
specific examples from my cases. Strategy formulation, a key piece of my research question, is 
 
115 Tanham (1992, 52) 
116 Chatterjee Miller and Sullivan de Estrada (2018, 50 Footnote 13). More recent work which casts doubt on this line 
of argumentation includes, for instance, Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa (2014), Scott (2006), Daulet Singh (2010). 
117 For an overview of how the case was chosen, and a mention of these other cases as potential candidates see this 
chapter, footnote 107. 
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best described as the process by which a strategy is created and articulated. In the strategic 
management literature, strategy formulation is often described as a process and typically either 
occurs via deliberate planning or emergent processes.118 In either case, evidence of grand strategic 
formulation should be detectable in the historical record. Accordingly, I expect that statements 
made by key leaders and public discourse to often reference a particular end and the means 
associated with achieving that end and, more specifically, that such utterances will fall broadly 
into one or more of the general grand strategic forms discussed previously. That is, there should 
be some connection between the topics leaders focus on and the language they use to describe 
those topics that is both identifiable and distinctive. I use such statements to identify grand 
strategies. 
In measuring grand strategy, an alternative method might be to observe what policy makers 
do, as opposed to what policy makers say. After all, words and deeds frequently do not align for 
any number of reasons. I contend that focusing on outcomes does not truly get at an understanding 
of a state’s grand strategy, its theory of how to provide itself security, as there are myriad potential 
reasons for an observed action. In fact, this focus on observable actions is at the core of the concern 
articulated by grand strategic skeptics that grand strategy can only be analyzed through 
retrospective coherence. Focusing on actions or outcomes without understanding the theory that 
guides them at best risks misunderstanding and at worst allows the scholar to project one’s own 
theory or biases onto the facts.   
To be clear, I am not arguing that focusing on what policy makers say as opposed to what 
they do is necessarily superior, as policy-makers may have unspoken motivations for their actions. 
Rather I am interested in a nation-state’s theory of how to produce security for itself, and this 
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theory should be reflected in the logic articulated to explain or defend actions taken. To illustrate 
this point, consider the purchase of advanced military hardware. Art contends there are four ‘ends’ 
to which states can acquire military power, one of which he terms ‘swaggering.’ The goal of 
acquiring military hardware in this instance is not necessarily primarily intended to increase 
security, but rather to increase prestige.119 In instances such as this, focusing on outcome would 
run the risk of misconstruing the action entirely. This type of behavior can be seen around the 
world in countries which purchase advanced fighter aircraft for which they have no clear 
operational need or indigenous capability to operate effectively. Rather than being a signal of 
military strength, and thus a coercive grand strategy, it suggests affluence and perhaps even an 
inducive grand strategy. 
To operationalize policy makers’ statements as definitions of different forms of grand 
strategy, I primarily perform a text analysis on the Foreign Affairs Record published by India’s 
Ministry of External Affairs – a resource that is freely available online and contains a wealth of 
data by year from 1955 to 1999, broken out by month.120 This text analysis uncovers key words 
and topics in the public statements, speeches, and written answers to questions submitted by 
members of the Indian parliament compiled in the Foreign Affairs Record. These documents 
contain the official messaging members of the Indian government broadcasted to the world and so 
provide good insight into how the government articulated their priorities as well as the key themes 
they emphasized.  
 
119 Art (1980, 13) 
120 These PDFs can be freely downloaded from the Ministry of External Affairs Library’s website, at: 
http://mealib.nic.in/?5486?000 [Accessed December 10, 2017]. Alternatively, see: Ministry of External Affairs (1999, 
1998, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1977, 1976, 1975, 1974, 1973, 1972, 1971, 1970, 1969, 1968, 1967, 1966, 1965, 1964, 
1963, 1962, 1961, 1960) 
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The text analysis strategy I employ enables me to identify key topics present in the data 
without introducing potential issues such as coder bias. Specifically, I use latent Dirichlet 
allocation (LDA), which is a widely utilized method to stochastically extract topics, or clusters of 
words, from the document corpus while allowing for some word overlap between the topics.121  
LDA looks at each topic as a mixture of words and each document as a mixture of topics.122 Words 
are analyzed for how frequently they co-occur and grouped based on the clusters of words that 
best fit together. Documents are ranked based on the number of words they have that belong to 
one topic relative to others. One of the issues that must be carefully considered in this type of 
analysis is the correct number of topics to tell the model to look for. As of yet, no consensus exists 
on the best way to discover the optimal number.123 To avoid choosing an arbitrary number of 
topics, I utilize k-means clustering, which is a frequently used method in the biological sciences 
and has also been used as a comparison point for topic clustering.124 This allows for a more 
rigorous and transparent method of determining the number of clusters to be used than would 
otherwise be possible. As a whole, this methodology provides a robust and replicable way of 
uncovering a country's grand strategy. 
With respect to state resources, I operationalize money, manpower, and elite attention by 
looking at three different types of data. For money, I use Gross Domestic Product, which is drawn 
from the World Bank’s DataBank and manually converted into 2010 US dollars.125 As one of the 
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Greene, O'Callaghan, and Cunningham (2014). 
124 Steinbach, Karypis, and Kumar (2000). 
125 The data utilized to operationalize this variable is GDP (current LCU) and available from 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CN?locations=IN. Normally, when performing time-series 
analysis data in real (inflation adjusted) terms is preferred. While this data is available from the World Bank, nominal 
data was chosen to begin with and I adjusted for inflation and converted the data into 2010 U.S. dollars myself because 
appropriation data available for India is only available in nominal rupees. Converting everything using the same 
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most widely used indicators for economic performance of a country, GDP represents a 
straightforward and easily understood measure for the total economic output for a country. This 
makes it a strong, and obvious, choice to represent money at the state level. For manpower, I 
similarly use the World Bank’s data on total population, as well as male population between 15-
64.126 Both total population and male population are necessary to consider, as, historically, the 
male population of this age is the pool from which military recruits are drawn while total 
population reflects the total pool from which civilian agencies can draw.  
To operationalize elite attention, I examine the headlines of a major Indian newspaper, The 
Times of India, to determine what foreign political concerns were making national attention. While 
this is not a perfect measure of elite attention, given the difficulty in measuring agenda-setting in 
public policy, focusing on foreign entities mentioned in a leading newspaper at the time can serve 
as a useful instrumental variable for my analysis. Given the historical importance of the English-
language press in India, especially amongst the elite, looking at The Times of India, traditionally 
India’s highest-circulating English-language newspaper, is an appropriate choice as a proxy 
marker for elite discourse at the time.127 Every other Sunday, with some exceptions due to data 
unavailability, was sampled.128 Sunday editions of papers are frequently larger in size and more 
 
methodology ensures as fair a comparison as possible with the same inflation adjustment measures and conversion 
rates applied. Data for the consumer price index (CPI) as well as the GDP Deflator is available for the same time-
period from the World Bank 
126 The data utilized to operationalize this variable is Population, total and Population, Male 15-64 and is available 
from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IN. 
127 Windmiller (1954, 293 & 315). The Times of India is India’s is the highest-circulating English-language newspaper 
in India, has enjoyed a high reputation, and is generally considered an “establishment” paper (Sonwalkar 2002). Thus, 
while not a comprehensive picture of what was in the public conversation at any given time, it represents the 
mainstream establishment view and provides a relatively stable window across time. Sonwalkar (2002) also discusses 
the changing context of media in India, and Kumar and Sarma (2015) details the changing balance between English 
and vernacular daily newspapers (“dailies”) in modern India in much greater detail. Data available from ProQuest 
(2017). 
128 Every-other Sunday, as opposed to every Sunday, was selected as a sampling technique due to technical restrictions 
on data collection efforts placed on the researcher by the vendor. To verify this limitation did not bias my findings, I 
downloaded and analyzed a full year and a half of every Sunday data, then compared it against results from my every-
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widely read than other days of the week, making them a good barometer of the types of stories in 
the national consciousness. 
At the organizational level, I use commensurate data to measure money, manpower, and 
elite attention resources. For money, I look at the total amount of funding appropriated by the 
Indian parliament to the organizations of interest (Ministry of Defence, External Affairs, and 
Commerce and Industry respectively). Data was primarily gathered from the Legislative 
Department of India’s Ministry of Law & Justice, which maintains a .pdf repository of the Text of 
Central Acts enacted by Parliament, published yearly with a range from 1851 to 2017.129 All 
appropriations acts, excluding temporary spending bills (Votes on Account) that were superseded 
by another appropriations bill, were summed and then converted to 2010 US dollars.130 Because 
of the nature of the Indian appropriations process, which often sees appropriations bills passed 
retroactively, each bill was checked for the fiscal year for it was authorized and added to that year’s 
total. Additionally, bills in the period of four to five years after the end of the case were examined 
to ensure no bills retroactively authorizing funding were overlooked. This allows for as 
comprehensive a snapshot of the monetary resources poured into state organizations as possible 
and provides a more complete ground truth than budget forecasts allow.  
 
other Sunday technique. The results were similar, typically with only the frequency of mentions for individual topics 
going down, as would be expected. There was some minor rearrangement of topic ranking, but nothing dropped off 
the list entirely. Additionally, some Sundays were simply missing from the digital archive. A look at the digitization 
efforts of the data shows that this may be because the original microfilm containing the data was either corrupted or 
unavailable. Missing dates only account for less than 2% of the total data sampled. 
129 Data is available here: http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/textofcentralacts/index.htm [as of December 10, 2017]. 
Alternatively, see: Government of India (2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995, 
1994, 1981, 1980, 1979, 1978, 1977, 1976, 1975, 1974, 1973, 1972, 1971, 1970, 1969, 1968, 1967, 1966, 1965, 1964, 
1963, 1962, 1961, 1960) 
130 As discussed in an earlier footnote, I converted the data myself utilizing CPI data available from the World Bank 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=IN) and period average US Dollar exchange rates 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?locations=IN). Period average (as opposed to period end) data 
is appropriate here, as government expenditure is typically considered a monetary “flow” (i.e., it goes out over time) 
and thus the exchange rate average is more appropriate than data collected at the end of the period, which is more 
useful for “stocks” (e.g., debt). 
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For manpower, I draw from India’s Census of Central Government Employees and use the 
total number of civilian persons employed by the ministries in question, including overseas and 
shorter-term hires.131 Data is generally available yearly from 1955 until at least 1978, and then 
every couple of years after that. These measures allow for a straightforward link between total 
population and the number of personnel employed by these organizations. Finally, elite attention 
is operationalized through a list of the most frequently occurring word pairs. The crucial difference 
between the two is that attention at the state-level is on the frequency of mentions of specific 
foreign entities in the Times of India headlines, while attention at the organizational-level looks at 
all entities in the abstracts of the articles. Looking at abstracts and bigrams (word pairs) allows for 
more information to be captured, which is desirable at this level of analysis. 
If my theory is correct, my topic modeling should uncover a pattern in India’s foreign 
relations consistent with either a persuasive, coercive, or inducive grand strategy. This grand 
strategy should be matched by corresponding resource allocations in the form of money, 
manpower, and elite attention into the organization(s) primarily responsible for conducting that 
grand strategic function. When grand strategic change is observed, shifts in both grand strategic 
form as well as resource allocation should co-occur and the rate at which the change occurs should 
correspond closely with the level at which these resources are being allocated to one organization 
set over the others. 
 
131 This represents a more complete snapshot of personnel than simply full-time personnel, and accounts for potential 
differences in hiring patterns between domestically based ministries (i.e., Commerce & Industry, Defence) and one 
primarily operating overseas (i.e., External Affairs). See the Bibliography for the complete list of works cited from 
this source. See: (Directorate General of Employment & Training 2006, 2004, 2001, 1995, 1991, 1978, 1977, 1976, 




This chapter detailed several prominent explanations of grand strategic change and 
described the shortfalls of both externally and internally oriented theories. Borrowing an insight 
from the organization theory literature, namely the utility of analyzing a firm’s strategy through 
an assessment of its resources (as opposed to its external environment), I developed a theory of 
how states’ choice of strategy could be dictated by prior resourcing decisions. I described how this 
should be especially true for middle powers. Finally, I proposed testing this theory on the case of 
India, looking specifically at the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, and the 
Kargil Crisis of 1999, and described in detail how I operationalize each of my key variables with 
reference to the specific sources of data on which I draw. The proceeding chapters examine each 
of these observations in turn, first providing a brief background of the events, then describing 
Indian grand strategy in the years preceding the war and any change observed after the fighting 
ended. Finally, I assess each theory’s ability to explain any change or lack thereof in Indian grand 
strategy before ending with some general conclusions about the case. 
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3.0 The 1962 Sino-Indian War 
In the years around the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India pursued an explicit grand strategy of 
Non-Alignment.132 This grand strategy was intended to provide security for India by maintaining 
maximum flexibility in options and friendly relations with as many countries as possible. Such a 
grand strategy is a classic example of what I called in Chapter 2 a persuasive grand strategy. It is 
unusual to find as explicitly formulated a grand strategy as non-alignment, and this provides a 
perfect platform to validate my use of topic modeling to uncover grand strategies while 
simultaneously testing my theory on the causes of grand strategic change. Finally, because the 
outcome of the Sino-Indian War was a decisive defeat for the Indian military, this case provides a 
solid test of all three types of theories of grand strategic change.  
To that end, this chapter begins with a discussion of Indian grand strategy before the Sino-
Indian War and introduces the topic modelling method I employ to empirically validate both the 
existence of Non-Alignment and its form as a persuasive grand strategy. I then provide evidence 
which demonstrates that India’s persuasive grand strategy experienced a high level of stability in 
the wake of its defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 and validates the use of topic modeling 
as a method for uncovering grand strategies. The next section explores four potential explanations 
for what causes grand strategic change and stability. I unpack the theoretical expectations of 
 
132 NB: Throughout the rest of this chapter, and the chapters that follow, readers will encounter the terms non-
alignment, and Non-Alignment. Non-Alignment (Capital N, Capital A) refers to the persuasive grand strategy as 
articulated by Jawaharlal Nehru. Non-alignment (lower case n, lower case a) refers to the concept of not choosing 
sides between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Thus, only one country chose to pursue Non-Alignment as 
a grand strategy, but many countries chose to pursue non-alignment as a strategy during the Cold War. To the fullest 
extent possible, I have endeavored to maintain this convention. Quotations from other authors have not been modified 
to fit this convention, however. 
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externally oriented theories of grand strategic change as well as those of internally oriented 
theories. I find that, while each of these theories has some explanatory power, they each fail to 
account for important aspects of the case. I then evaluate the ability of my theory of grand strategic 
change to explain the case. Here, the evidence suggests that my theory can account for both the 
observed grand strategic stability as well as the observed rate of change, though a few questions 
remain about ultimate causality. I conclude with a brief overview of what was learned and offer a 
road map for the chapters ahead. 
3.1 Indian grand strategy around the 1962 Sino-Indian War 
The years after Indian independence and Partition were largely spent dealing with the 
aftershocks of those sudden events and the challenges of constructing new governmental 
institutions to bolster the ones abandoned by the British in the wake of their departure in August 
of 1947.133 In the first 15 years of Indian independence, there were a number of political, economic, 
and social issues India had to contend with. Almost immediately after partition, India and Pakistan 
fought a war in which Pakistan gained control of almost one-third of the contested territory of 
Kashmir.134 In 1948, one of the leading lights of the Indian independence movement, Mohandas 
Gandhi, was assassinated. It wasn’t until January 26, 1950 that the Indian constitution came into 
 
133 Partition is the name given to the splintering of British India into the modern states of India and Pakistan and the 
turmoil that followed. Modern estimates of the number of people that migrated, many involuntarily, in the years 
immediately after the creation of the two states is approximately 15 million. Large-scale violence was not uncommon 
in the regions most affected by the separation of the two states. This complicated historical legacy even now casts a 
long shadow over both relations between the two countries and scholarship of the period (Brass 2003, Bharadwaj, 
Khwaja, and Mian 2008, Singer 2012). 
134 Basrur (2010, 12) 
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force. Just two years later, India held its first general election, which had over 175 million eligible 
voters.135 Sitting in the background were the thorny issues of caste and Hindu-Islamic relations, 
which also needed to be addressed.136 Finally, over the course of 1947-1962, India completed two 
five-year economic development plans, which were aimed at boosting the country’s agriculture, 
infrastructure, and industrial output. 
In addition to the internal difficulties associated with a transition from a former colony of 
Britain to a newly independent nation, there were a number of pressing regional issues to contend 
with. As previously mentioned, India and Pakistan fought a conflict only months after the British 
relinquished control in 1947. Not long after this war, China re-emerged from its civil war and 
launched a military campaign into Tibet, placing it on India’s northern border. Globally, the Cold 
War between the United States and the Soviet Union was beginning to take shape. It was in this 
regional and international context that India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru formalized an 
Indian policy of Non-Alignment in international affairs, in which India would preserve its 
independence by refusing to ally itself with either of the two superpowers.137 This would leave 
India free to deal with both threats and opportunities in any way it chose. Ganguly succinctly states 
the crux of Non-Alignment, saying, “the doctrine [of Non-Alignment] called for steering a 
diplomatic path free from superpower dominance.”138  
 
135 Park (1952) 
136 Singer (2012, 17-19) 
137 Nehru served simultaneously as India’s first Prime Minister as well as its Foreign Minister from Independence to 
his death in 1964. As a politician, Nehru dominated India’s political and foreign policy landscape throughout his 
tenure.  
138 Ganguly (2010a, 1) 
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As discussed repeatedly throughout this dissertation, a grand strategy is a nation-state’s 
theory on how to provide security for itself. In Non-Alignment, one finds an unusually explicit 
example of how to do that. Appadorai contends that: 
When we say that India follows a policy of non-alignment, it means 
(1) that India has no military alliances with countries of either bloc-
or indeed with any nation; (2) India has an independent approach to 
foreign policy, not being tied down to a particular line of action 
through membership of a bloc; and (3) India attempts to maintain 
friendly relations with all countries.139  
Given the description provided in the above quote, Non-Alignment was intended to serve India’s 
security by reducing the potential for wide-spread armed conflict like the recent world wars, which 
would have a deleterious effect on India, even if it could avoid being drawn into the conflict 
directly. In Appadorai’s words: 
…it was [Nehru’s] conviction that a world war in the nuclear age 
was suicidal, and since in such a war it would be difficult to be 
neutral, India too would suffer destruction. [Nehru] bent his energies 
to reduce international tensions, to have nuclear tests suspended, and 
to achieve complete disarmament. The security of India apart, it was 
also his conviction that world peace was a precondition for the 
economic development of India which was urgently needed. To a 
country low in per capita income and in savings, and economically 
underdeveloped, assistance from the more developed countries by 
way of capital and know-how was a sine qua non for development 
and [Nehru] knew that the outbreak of war would make it impossible 
to get such co-operation.140 (Emphasis in Original) 
In practice, the positive means through which this policy of Non-Alignment was pursued were 
robust participation in multilateral institutions, strong advocacy for India’s ideals, and relatively 
 
139 Appadorai (1981, 18). In pushing for a nuanced understanding of non-alignment, Appadorai is quick to assert that 
this does not mean that India a) does not have close relationship relationships with other countries, b) is necessarily 
neutral on issues which divided the blocs, and c) would remain neutral in the event of a war (Appadorai 1981, 18). 
These caveats do not imply that Non-Alignment should be viewed as a meaningless concept, but rather that the concept 
did not necessarily imply a “passive” role for India in international affairs. 
140 Appadorai (1981, 16) 
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little emphasis on the use of force and coercion to achieve goals.141 By maintaining freedom from 
superpower ideological competition and attempting to have warm relations with as many nations 
as possible, India hoped to maximize its power position in the international arena, reduce the 
chance of international conflict by reducing what India perceived as its root causes, and maximize 
the amount of development assistance it could acquire to bring prosperity to its population.  
This aversion to the use of military force was not an absolute prohibition. India and 
Pakistan did fight a year-long war in 1947. In an interesting disjuncture between words and action, 
Indian forces were used to secure Portuguese Goa in late 1961 in what is known as Operation 
‘Vijay’, or Operation Victory.142 Despite India’s protestations of peaceful intentions, it was thus 
not above resorting to the use of force when necessary, and these incidents clearly demonstrate its 
freedom of action in the international realm, a key goal Non-Alignment was meant to serve. This 
reinforces the idea that, while grand strategies are complex mixtures of means, they should still 
have a primary ingredient. Given this understanding of Non-Alignment, I expect to uncover 
evidence of a predominantly persuasive grand strategy aimed at securing India against its most 
pressing threats while simultaneously pursuing its economic development. The rest of this chapter 
explores India’s grand strategy in the period as well as potential explanations for why India chose 
to pursue this particular grand strategy. 
 
 
141 This interpretation of some, or all, of the core means of Non-Alignment is widely supported in the literature, and 
can be found in such works as Mukherjee and Malone (2011a), Ganguly (2010a, 1), Garver (2010, 85), and Kapur 
(1994, 25-6). 
142 Singer (2012, 35) 
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3.2 Measuring grand strategy 
To understand a state’s theory of how to provide security for itself, its grand strategy, it 
makes sense to focus on how policymakers articulate their vision for doing so. By focusing on 
how leaders attempt to communicate their vision in the international arena, observers are afforded 
an opportunity to hear directly from policymakers what actions are being taken and why. To that 
end, many turn to the speeches of Nehru. Nehru exerted an enormous amount of influence on 
India’s foreign policy apparatus through his dual roles of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
during the early days of India’s independence. His influence was so pervasive that Maxwell 
declared that Indian foreign policy during his seventeen-year reign was “…[Nehru’s] private 
monopoly.”143 Privileging this dominance in seeking to understand Indian grand strategy comes at 
a cost, however. While his voice may have been the most prominent, it was not the only one. 
Focusing solely on Nehru’s speeches may present a distorted view of Indian grand strategy, and 
potentially introduce bias. By considering all the available data, it is possible to gain a deeper 
appreciation for how well-articulated and ingrained Non-Alignment was throughout the Indian 
government. 
Accordingly, to capture the Indian vision of grand strategy, I turn to the Foreign Affairs 
Record, published yearly by India’s Ministry of External Affairs between 1955 to 1999 and 
providing transcripts of various types on major diplomatic events. Included in the Record are 
documents ranging from the text of trade agreements to welcome speeches given by Indian 
officials to foreign dignitaries to formal replies to questions submitted by the Indian Parliament to 
major speeches touching on foreign policy topics given by Indian officials. This data provides a 
 
143 Maxwell (1974, 633) 
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wealth of information both on what foreign policy ends Indian officials were fixated as well as on 
what means they viewed as most appropriate to achieve those ends. This type of primary source 
data, as opposed to secondary source accounts or more sterile diplomatic communiques, provides 
clear insight into how Indian leaders articulated connecting their means with their ends. Indeed, 
the diversity of voices and situations represented in the Record has the potential to allow for the 
construction of an exceptionally accurate picture of India’s messaging to the rest of the world.  
In order to parse this large amount of data and determine whether the language employed 
by Indian officials matches the purported grand strategy of Non-Alignment, I use a common text 
analysis topic model known as latent Dirichlet allocation, or LDA. Put simply, this method extracts 
“latent” topics within the corpus of documents by looking at mixtures of words and associating 
them with other words which frequently co-occur. At its core, this method treats a topic as an 
assortment of words, and treats each document as composed, to various degrees, of one or more 
topics. As a probabilistic model, it also allows for non-exclusivity between words and topics, 
which allows for the possibility that some words may belong to several different topics 
simultaneously. The results of the model are a number of word-topic probabilities; the higher the 
beta of a word, the higher the probability it is associated with a given topic; that is, the less likely 
it is to be associated with other topics. There is also a statistic which measures document-topic 
probability, gamma. Gamma identifies which documents are primarily composed of which topic; 
the higher the gamma, the more likely the document is comprised of words associated with that 
topic. Thus, a gamma very near 1 would indicate that document is composed of words that are all 
associated with a single topic. In disambiguating topics, gamma can be helpful in rapidly 
identifying which documents are most strongly associated with the topic, giving clues as to what 
is being uncovered by the model. 
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To gain a sense of the utility of this modeling approach, consider the following hypothetical 
example. A topic identified by the model from a corpus of documents may be composed of the 
terms “trade,” “investment,” “manufacturing,” “exports,” and “tariffs.” One could surmise from 
this list that the topic the model has identified has something to do with economic development or 
international trade. In order to verify that this is in fact the identified topic, a list of the documents 
most strongly associated with the topic can be generated by the model. If, in looking at the top 
results on such a list included documents with titles like “Indo-German Automobile Import 
Agreement,” “Import-Export Tariff Reduction Treaty,” “Speech by the Indian Prime Minister to 
the Lok Sabha on GATT accession,” there would be strong reason to believe that the topic 
inference was correct. In cases where there the topic is more ambiguous; care needs to be exercised 
in the interpretation of the topics. The macro-level process remains unchanged, however. 
One issue which can plague studies employing this kind of analysis is the potential for 
introduction of different types of bias. One potential source is coder bias. As an unstructured 
machine learning model, however, no prior knowledge of any potential topics in the data is 
required by or provided to the model.144 It is also the reason that the presentation order of the topics 
is arbitrary. This methodology thus reduces the potential for the introduction of coder bias and 
prejudicing the outcome of the analysis by removing the coder from the equation.  
Another area where bias can be introduced is in the selection of the number of the number 
of topics to tell the model to look for. Setting the correct number of topics for modeling is one of 
the thornier questions in the field of LDA topic modeling; selecting too few topics runs the risk of 
artificially truncating important information while selecting too many topics risks diluting the 
results with extraneous information. I utilize a k-means clustering algorithm to identify the 
 
144 Anthes (2010, 16) 
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appropriate number of clusters for use in this analysis. K-means clustering is a mathematical 
algorithm which randomly groups the provided data until it finds the groupings which it believes 
best describe the data. Conceptually, this is similar to having a model sort through bag of 100 
marbles that are a random number of different colors and find the groupings that best represent the 
contents of the bag despite not knowing how many marbles of each color or their overall 
distribution are actually present in the bag. The model looks at a wide variety of different 
permutations, generating a graph which visually represents the declining differences between each 
additional grouping. After the model has generated the graph, all that needs to be done is to identify 
the number of clusters at which the descriptive utility of additional clusters yields a decreasing rate 
of return. The result is an overview of the major themes present in the corpus which can be 
executed relatively quickly and reliably replicated.  
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Figure 3.1 shows the estimated number of topics in both the pre-1962 and post-1962 
document corpuses. In order to strike a balance between parsimony and informational content, it 
is customary to look for the point on the graph where information begins being added at a 
decreasing rate. In a mathematical sense, this would be where the slope of the line begins flattening 
at a decreasing rate. Typically, this point can be easily determined by eye. For pre-1962, there 
appear to be between four and six number of topics that could be potentially used, so five topics 
were chosen for analysis to function as a convenient analytical mid-point. For the post-1962 data, 
the results clearly favor a choice of four topics as the correct number into which the model should 
cluster the words.    
 
 
3.2.1 Pre-1962 grand strategy analysis 
India’s grand strategy of Non-Alignment offers a unique opportunity to test the 
applicability of the use of unstructured topic modeling to the field of grand strategy. As noted, it 
is relatively rare to have a grand strategy as explicitly articulated as Non-Alignment was during 
this period. If Non-Alignment was in fact the grand strategy of India during this period and the 
topic modeling method is an appropriate tool to discover it, I would expect to see clear evidence 
of it. This section presents the results of running the LDA model described in the previous section 
on the data from the years 1960-1962. Figure 3.2 shows the topics generated by the model. It is 
important to bear in mind that the order in which the topics are presented and their identification 
numbers are assigned randomly by the model, and have no analytic utility. 
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Figure 3.2. Topic Modeling results for India’s 1960-1962 Foreign Affairs Record entries 
 
At a glance, topic 5 is the most readily understood from the collection of words; it refers 
to various economic agreements made between India and other countries. The strong association 
with the words “agreement,” “countries,” “development,” and “trade” suggest the topic refers to a 
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set of agreements between countries. It is not a stretch to assume it refers to agreements made 
between India and other countries. Non-Alignment was meant not only to generate security for 
India by reducing the potential for conflict in the world more broadly, but also to generate 
economic development within India.  Nehru was a firm believer in the importance of developing 
India’s economy and foreign aid played an important role in helping grow India’s economy.145 
Although not everyone would necessarily consider securing international economic agreements a 
security concern, economic development does generate both internal and external security for a 
state by increasing available resources. The presence of this topic can be viewed as an external 
manifestation of one of India’s leading domestic priorities. As a driving force of Nehru’s Non-
Alignment strategy was the promotion of international peace to help secure economic 
development, the presence of this topic on the list is an important indicator that this assertion is 
correct.  
Topic 3 is likewise relatively straightforward to interpret. Several keywords such as 
“Congo,” “United Nations,” “Goa,” and “Security Council” betray what the topic is almost 
immediately.  As mentioned earlier, India seized Portuguese Goa in 1961. Additionally, shortly 
after the Congo became independent in 1960, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping 
operation there to prevent a civil war. India responded by sending an infantry brigade group – 
India’s only participation in peacekeeping operations during the Cold War.146 It is therefore safe 
to conclude that topic 3 captures India’s dealings with the United Nations and specifically the 
Security Council both in handling the fallout of its seizure of Goa as well as contributing troops to 
support the efforts to help calm the situation in the Congo after the withdrawal of the Dutch. Robust 
 
145 Kapur (1994, 55-64) 
146 van Rooyen (2010, 8) 
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diplomacy and a presence in multilateral venues such as the United Nations was another key 
hallmark of Nehruvian Non-Alignment. That the analysis bears this out as well is yet another 
strong indicator that the description of non-alignment provided earlier was correct. 
Topic 2 captures the Indian concerns over China and the border issues between India the 
two countries. Strong associations with the terms “Chinese,” “China,” and somewhat weaker 
associations with the terms “border,” “territory,” and “posts” suggest this topic relates to the rising 
tension and concern in the pre-war period about Indian and Chinese forces on the Sino-Indian 
border. One of the defining features of the Sino-Indian border dispute was Nehru’s “Forward 
Policy” of placing Indian soldiers in positions north of the McMahon line (the de facto border 
between the two countries) in an attempt to force Chinese troops to withdraw. That this topic is 
present on the list indicates that this matter was a key issue in Indian foreign policy in the pre-war 
period and was discussed at length by Indian officials in their public statements.  
Topic 4 is also likely capturing India’s concerns over both sovereignty and its border 
security, this time with a focus on Pakistan, as the strong associations with the term “Pakistan,” 
and moderate association with “Kashmir” suggest. Interestingly, the document-topic associations 
show that most of documents most strongly associated with this topic are drawn from speeches 
given to visiting foreign dignitaries and heads of state. As Pakistan was a key foreign policy issue 
for India, its association with more than one topic and that it is strongly associated with a topic 
closely related to both Kashmir and sovereignty is not unexpected. 
Topic 1 is the most uncertain from a glance, with the words being generally vague and with 
no obvious link to a recognizable topic. Here, document-topic probabilities, or the gamma statistic 
introduced earlier, can help. This analysis shows that the collection of documents most strongly 
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associated with Topic 1 generally relate to the ideational aspects of India’s grand strategy.147 Many 
of the documents strongly associated with this topic relate to India’s denouncement of South 
Africa’s apartheid and participation in the United Nations Trusteeship Council for recently 
decolonized or decolonizing countries.  In describing the totality of Non-Alignment, Nehru 
asserted “[India has] other positive aims also, such as the promotion of freedom from colonial rule, 
racial equality, peace and international cooperation…”148 Given these goals were an explicit end 
of India’s engagement with the world, the topic’s presence in the topics generated by the LDA 
model yet again supports the assertion that India advocated these ideals at length. 
Notably absent from these topics were references to the superpowers. India’s grand strategy 
was predicated on explicitly avoiding entanglements with either of the two Cold War ideological 
blocs. The absence of these topics is yet further evidence that Non-Alignment – as conventionally 
described – was the grand strategy pursued by India. When thinking about Indian grand strategy, 
as well as grand strategy more broadly, it is necessary to consider both what is found as well as 
what was not.  The rather limited set of topics on which India was focused for its grand strategy 
lends credence to my earlier assertion regarding the analytic utility of the relatively limited scope 
of concern of middle powers is correct. Countries’ resources are limited, as is their ability to focus 
on multiple topics simultaneously. If the essence of strategy is matchings ends and means, then 
what ends are not pursued or what means are not used are equally important in assessing a grand 
strategy. This also suggests that, in the utilization of topic modeling for uncovering grand strategy, 
 
147 Examples of the top 5 document titles most strongly associated with this topic (gamma > .999, scores near 1 mean 
the model identified the document as being almost exclusively comprised of words related to that topic) are: “Shri 
B.N. Chakravarty's Statement on Apartheid Policy in South Africa," “Shri J.N. Khosla's Statement on Racial 
Discrimination in Non-self- governing Territories,” “Shri C. S. Jha's Statement in Trusteeship Council on Ruanda-
Urundi,” “Shri Krishna Menon's Statement in Special Political Committee on Apartheid,” and “Shri C.S. Jha's 
Statement on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries.” 
148 Nehru (1963, 456) 
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the absence of an expected or likely topic is almost as powerful a piece of evidence as the presence 
of one. 
When considering holistically the set of topics the LDA model identified, I would classify 
the grand strategy pursued by India during this period as persuasive in form. This classification is 
based on the extremely frequent appearance of words and topics typically associated with 
multilateral forums, diplomatic suasion, and an utter lack of words or topics associated with 
coercive elements of power; if anything, coercive terms are conspicuous by their absence from 
Figure 3.2. The secondary literature also fits this assessment, as scholars overwhelmingly agree 
that Non-Alignment was overwhelmingly a diplomatic strategy. One of the explicit goals of this 
project was to answer the charges leveled by grand strategic skeptics and nihilists about the 
existence of grand strategy, and this analysis represents a strong step in that direction. 
 
3.2.2 Post-1962 grand strategy analysis 
Despite the fact that non-alignment was intended to generate security through diplomacy, 
India was unable to prevent relations with China from deteriorating toward the end of the 1950s.  
In late October 1962, after months of rising tensions and occasionally bloody border skirmishes, 
China launched a simultaneous two-front offensive across the contested border between the two 
countries.  Chinese forces quickly overran Indian soldiers who had been placed in unsupportable 
forward positions high in the mountains, before the Indian soldiers had had time to properly adapt 
to the high altitude. The assault continued, with the Indian military suffering a progressive series 
of stinging defeats. A unilateral cessation in the fighting occurred in late October, at which time 
the Chinese offered to withdraw their forces and begin negotiation on a settlement. The negotiated 
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settlement did not take hold, however, and a second Chinese attack in mid-November almost swept 
the Indian military from the field.  
India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War sent shockwaves through the Indian political elite. 
Even though tensions had been steadily rising between India and China for a number of years 
before the outbreak of war, and despite the controversial “Forward Policy” that saw Indian forces 
placed at, or slightly beyond, the de facto border between the two countries, there is little indication 
that Indian officials seriously believed that war with China was likely.149 The results of the conflict 
were so shocking to India that Nehru was forced to ask for military assistance from the United 
States. Heretofore, United States involvement in the conflict had been limited to supplying 
equipment. Nehru asked President Kennedy to consider escalating the United States’ level of 
involvement dramatically, asking for it to conduct air superiority and bombing missions against 
the Chinese.150 A unilateral Chinese ceasefire on November 20th precluded this potential escalation 
and China withdrew to its proposed settlement line, handing India a complete defeat and imposing 
the desired Chinese outcome on the border dispute.151  
The loss led to a serious weakening of Nehru and cost Defense Minister V. K. Menon his 
political career.152 Such a shocking and decisive defeat should have also led to a re-examination 
of India’s grand strategy, as Non-Alignment simultaneously could not prevent the outbreak of war 
and proved unable to win once engaged in conflict. Although India’s grand strategy would not 
necessarily have to have been altered in the wake of such a defeat, a loss of this magnitude serves 
as a very clear inflection point at which a country would have the chance to reassess its grand 
 
149 Noorani and Dalvi (1970, 137) 
150 Riedel (2015, 136-8), Brecher (1979, 617) 
151 Garver (2010, 92), Riedel (2015, 140) 
152 Narang and Staniland (2018, 437) 
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strategy and decide whether or not to stay the course. In that regard, while India would remain 
non-aligned between the two superpowers, there is less clarity on whether or not Non-Alignment, 
as envisioned by Nehru, continued to be as well-defined and dominant a grand strategy as it had 
once been. 
When considering India’s grand strategy in post-war period, what is notable is the 
relatively high degree of surface-level continuity with India’s pre-war Non-Alignment approach. 
Non-Alignment, as a label, appears to have survived a number of challenges in the years 
immediately after the war. There were many dramatic short-term actions undertaken after India’s 
defeat, including seeking military assistance from the United States and joint military drills with 
Great Britain, yet there was no formal renunciation of India’s policy of non-alignment.153 Not even 
Nehru’s death in 1964 or a second round of fighting with Pakistan in 1965 were enough to cause 
formal abandonment of the doctrine. A key question in this regard is whether the apparent 
continuation of Non-Alignment as the avowed grand strategy of India was in name only. For my 
purposes, the question is whether or not there were fundamental changes to the form of Non-
Alignment that caused it to move from a persuasive grand strategy to either an inducive or coercive 
approach.  
Existing scholarship is unclear on whether there was a deviation from a persuasive grand 
strategy. Brecher contends that, in the wake of the 1962 conflict, India withdrew from its activism 
in world affairs, stating: 
In reality, the foreign policy of Nehru’s India began to change [after 
the 1962 Sino-Indian war] in two respects: (1) from “equidistance,” 
in relation to the superpowers, to “equal proximity” to Moscow and 
Washington; and (2) from an active, dynamic involvement in world 
politics, that is neutralism in its original Nehru-Menon conception, 
to a more passive role, almost a withdrawal from conflicts external 
 
153 Brecher (1979, 619, 626)  
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to India’s narrowly-conceived national interests, namely, to non-
alignment.154 (emphasis in original) 
As far as my theoretical framework is concerned, a shift from “equidistance” to “equal 
proximity” or from “neutralism” to “non-alignment” is a distinction without a difference provided 
that the overall form of the grand strategy remained persuasively oriented. From my theory’s 
perspective, whether or not India was an active, engaged participant in world politics is largely a 
matter of policy-maker preference as long as a persuasive form of grand strategy is observed. 
Figure 3.3 reveals that, between the period of 1963-1967, there good reason for concluding there 
was a continuation of Non-Alignment as a persuasive grand strategy, even if there were some 
minor perturbations in its outline.  
 
 
154 Brecher (1979, 268-9) 
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Figure 3.3. Topic Modeling results for India’s 1963-1967 Foreign Affairs Record entries 
 
Figure 3.3 is broadly consistent with Brecher’s analysis of the narrowing of India’s focus 




in the number of topics associated with the United Nations.155 What is noteworthy about the list is 
the continuity between Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3; remember that individual topic numbers assigned 
by the model are analytically meaningless. The observed stability is remarkable, as India suffered 
a decisive defeat in a war with a regional rival and, in the wake of that failure, it might reasonably 
be assumed that India’s grand strategy would radically change its shape or focus. War with the 
Chinese came as a shock and what was more surprising was the Indian military’s failure when 
push came to shove. As will be discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, the analysis in Figure 3.3 
paints a relatively clean picture of Non-Alignment as the continuing persuasive grand strategy of 
India in the post-war era. 
Topics 1 and 3 relate to two of India’s major diplomatic initiatives, with the focus being 
primarily on nuclear disarmament, with some discussion of economic development. Relatively 
strong association of the topic with words such as “nuclear,” “weapons,” “disarmament,” and 
“treaty” all attest to the nuclear weapons portion of the interpretation of Topic 1.156 This topic also 
makes sense from a historical perspective. While it did not appear in the pre-war topic analysis, 
Nehru’s India was a strong advocate for nuclear disarmament because of the danger of catastrophic 
destruction he perceived as arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.157 India did take 
some concrete steps under Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, to advance India’s nuclear 
 
155 This reduction in topics was independently derived from the k-means analysis detailed in Figure 3.1 earlier in this 
chapter. 
156 The documents most associated with Topic 1, as measured by gamma value are: "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement 
on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement in the Disarmament Commission", "Shri B. N. Chakravarty's 
Statement in the Disarmament Commission" , "Sardar Swam Singh's Statement in the General Assembly on South 
West Africa", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "Shri V. C. Trivedi's 
Speech in the Political Committee on Non- proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" , "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement in the 
Political Committee on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons",  "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on General and 
Complete Disarmament" , "Shri V. C. Trivedi's Statement on Nuclear Weapon Tests". 
157 Kirk (2010, 279) 
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program to the point where it would still be several months short of a testable device.158  Despite 
this fact, India still strongly advocated for nuclear disarmament over the period. The terms 
“agreement,” “trade,” “development,” “economic,” and “assistance” clearly mark Topic 3 as being 
related to economic development. As was discussed in the pre-war analysis, economic 
development was an important aim of Non-Alignment. Diplomacy aimed at promoting nuclear 
non-proliferation and economic development is consistent with the scholarly description of Non-
Alignment and directly increases India’s security without the use of force. 
Topic 2 relates to the two issues of the border wars, first between India and China and then 
between India and Pakistan in 1965. The strong association with “pakistan,” “kashmir,” “china,” 
“cease,” and “fire” attest to that. In the wake of a major military defeat, it is unsurprising to see 
much discussion, both internally and externally, about the subject and my analysis bears out this 
continued focus. Finally, Topic 4 is drawn from the collected speeches of Indian leaders to foreign 
dignitaries and again underscores the key themes of non-alignment with the terms “peace,” 
“economic,” “development,” and “freedom.” As was discussed, these were all key pillars of 
Nehruvian Non-Alignment strategy and ideational goals. That it remains an identifiable topic 
despite a) a major defeat in the Sino-Indian War, b) Nehru’s death in 1964, and c) the reduction in 
overall number of topics identified by the analysis suggests a strong continuity in the way Indian 
leaders talked and thought about how to achieve their priorities. Taken together, these four topics 
display a continuity in both the priorities and the language used to describe those priorities from 
the pre-war to the post-war era.  
The analysis of India’s grand strategy around the Sino-Indian War with the type of topic 
modeling performed here yields a number of important insights to the discussion surrounding Non-
 
158 Basrur (2016, 186) 
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Alignment. First and foremost, I have validated the scholarly consensus on Non-Alignment as the 
grand strategy of India in the pre-war period. Second, I was able to discern in a transparent way 
what makes Non-Alignment a persuasive grand strategy as opposed to a coercive or inducive grand 
strategy. I was also able to identify a shift in both topics and scope after the war, although the 
change was not large enough to be considered an abandonment of a persuasive grand strategy. 
Finally, these results clearly demonstrated the viability of topic modeling as a method of 
uncovering a state’s grand strategy in a manner that is not vulnerable to the sorts of criticisms 
frequently leveled against grand strategy scholarship by grand strategic skeptics and nihilists. 
Having described the form India’s grand strategy took both before and after the way, I now turn 
to an exploration of the potential causes for this observed macro-level stability. 
3.3 Potential Explanations 
What accounts for this relatively high level of continuity in Indian grand strategy before 
and after 1962? This section walks through each of the three types of potential explanation 
(externally oriented, internally oriented and organizational determinants) discussed in Chapter 2. 
Each of these potential explanations are analyzed in turn, focusing first on what behavior might be 
expected from India if the theory is correct and then assessing how well the historical record aligns 
with that expectation. Should the empirical reality fail to be congruent with the theories’ 
expectations, that theory is set aside as a potential explanation. Process tracing is used to assess 
the validity of any theories passing the first test. 
In assessing the theories’ congruence with the historical record and tracing their causal 
mechanisms, there are two important things to keep in mind. First, the theories will have different 
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expectations for when grand strategic form should change. Second, the theories operate on 
different time scales and posit that grand strategic shifts should occur more or less swiftly. Theories 
that expect grand strategic change based on external threat implicitly assume that grand strategic 
shifts can happen quickly once that threat is identified. Alternatively, theories emphasizing 
strategic culture operate on a much longer time frame. The implication of this is that, for example, 
what may be relatively rapid change for a strategic culture explanation may be relatively slow in 
the context of a theory highlighting external threat. A given theory may fail to explain the case 
based on its inability to account for either the observed change or stability in form or the speed of 
response. Congruence testing provides a transparent method to determine whether or not a theory 
can adequately explain the change or stability observed in a case. Process-tracing is necessary both 
to determine whether or not the proposed causal mechanism is present but also to judge whether 
the rate of change is in line with theoretical expectations.  
 
3.3.1 Externally oriented theories 
Can externally oriented theories of grand strategic formation account for the relative 
stability in Indian grand strategy after their defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War? On its face, this 
case should be relatively easy for such claims to explain. In this section, I consider the explanatory 
power of the two potential externally oriented theories considered in this dissertation: external 
threat and regional security architecture. I first determine whether they are congruent with the case 
and then, if they are, conduct more detailed process tracing to determine whether or not their causal 
mechanisms may plausibly be at work.  I conclude with a section summarizing how the theories 
fared. 
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3.3.1.1 External Threat 
 Prior to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, although tensions had been rising for several years, 
Indian policy-makers generally did not believe war with China was a real possibility. The 
surprising failure of the country in the conflict shocked the nation. Per the logic of the external 
threat claim, this shocking defeat should necessitate a re-calibration of threats, which would be 
likely yield either a major grand strategic shift or a dramatic increase in focus on the attention paid 
to the threat from the Chinese. It is possible that an external threat claim could anticipate grand 
strategic stability, however, if the regional threat posed by China was thought to be dwarfed by the 
more pressing threats posed by the superpowers; in such a situation, even a shocking defeat by 
China would not change India’s grand strategic calculus. In my earlier examination of Indian grand 
strategy during this period, I determined that the Indian approach is best categorized as stability. 
Thus, the theory could be congruent with the case, though the explanatory power of the theory 
depends on whether Indian policymakers did, in fact, concentrate on the threats posed by the 
superpowers when crafting the state’s grand strategy. Because Indian grand strategy was stable 
across the pre- and post-war periods, to substantiate the explanatory capacity of an external threat 
explanation, I would need to find evidence that India was more focused on superpower competition 
than regional security concerns when crafting its security policy. If such evidence is not present in 
the historical record, an external threat theory cannot pass the necessary hoop that would suggest 
causal import, and it will be likely that some other causal mechanism was at work in shaping Indian 
grand strategic thought.  
In his comprehensive study of Non-Alignment, Rana contends that it was a strategy 
consciously created to deal with three threats: 1) the Cold War superpowers, 2) the “northern 
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neighbors” (i.e. Pakistan, and China), and 3) the other south-east Asian countries.159 Rana argues 
that Non-Alignment was first and foremost created to preserve India’s new-found independence 
from the predations of the superpowers, especially in the realm of foreign policy decision 
making.160 This is suggestive evidence in favor of an external threat explanation. What is 
problematic about this argument is that it raises questions about why India should be more 
concerned about loss of independence in foreign policy over the threat of invasion by China. This 
is especially true given India was dealt a painful lesson in just how large, and real, a threat China 
posed to Indian territorial integrity. That India’s grand strategy would have remained fixated on 
such a hypothetical, far-off threat when more concrete, proximate threats were present in both time 
and space seems to run contrary to this theory’s theoretical expectations. 
Moreover, the empirical record demonstrates that India was focused on China as a threat 
in the aftermath of the conflict and largely chose to direct its focus towards an internal balancing 
strategy against China.161 In the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of the Chinese, India did take 
some concrete steps to redress its military deficiencies. They included increasing military spending 
and seeking military assistance in the form of equipment, training, military exercises, and funding 
from both Great Britain and the United States. What assistance was provided by the Western 
powers was both meagre and short-lived. A military assistance program signed between India and 
the United States in the aftermath of the war reportedly totaled between $70 to $120 million 
dollars.162 While it is unclear whether these are inflation-adjusted numbers, I will conservatively 
 
159 Rana (1976, 49) 
160 Rana (1976, 49) 
161 One of the potential causes for this is Nehru’s alleged disappointment in the relatively even-handed approach of 
the Colombo powers to the conflict, despite his outward public support of their proposals. Reference to this fact is 
made in Brecher (1979, 629), though the source is personal conversations between Indian officials and the author, 
rendering corroboration of this assertion difficult. 
162 Brecher (1979, 626), Riedel (2015, 162). Additionally, all numbers in the remainder of this paragraph are in 2010 
United States Dollars, unless otherwise stated. 
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assume they represent figures in then-year dollars. Adjusting for inflation, the total amount of aid 
given by the U.S. in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War totaled somewhere between $190 to 
$330 million 2010 dollars. In the fiscal year immediately after the war, Indian defense spending 
shot up from around $2.9 billion (fiscal year 1961-1962) to $7 billion (fiscal year 1963-1964). U.S. 
assistance thus translates to roughly 2.7 to 4.7 percent of all the money spent on Indian coercive 
elements of power for the fiscal year 1963-1964. A more substantive package of aid was negotiated 
but never executed.163  
Another important historical fact that needs to be accounted for is that India’s intelligence 
service also worked with the CIA to assist Tibetan rebels against the Chinese occupation. The CIA 
operation had been ongoing prior to the outbreak of the war; formalization of the collaboration 
with India was the only thing which signaled a break from historical precedent.164 Given that this 
activity was inherently clandestine and involved a high-level of public deniability, it is unclear 
how much weight one should assign to this piece of evidence; as a fairly low-level clandestine 
activity, it is unlikely that it alone would justify declaring a significant disjuncture with the overall 
current of Indian grand strategy. It is also highly debatable the extent to which this data point 
represents a significant departure from prior Indian policy. Nevertheless, the effort highlights an 
increased focus on the Chinese threat. Finally, there was some effort to increase India’s ability to 
acquire a nuclear weapon should the need arise, although it would still be more than a decade 
before India’s first nuclear test.165 While India did cite the threat from China as part of its 
 
163 Riedel (2015, 162-3) recounts how an agreement between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru for an aid 
package totaling $500 million over 7 years, a much more substantive and lasting commitment, was agreed to in 
principle, but the death of Kennedy and Nehru in close succession ultimately led to the deal falling through. 
164 Riedel (2015, 160) 
165 Kirk (2010, 285) 
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justification in acquiring nuclear weapons, it conducted only a single nuclear weapon test in 1974 
before suspending tests for almost twenty-five years.166  
From the available evidence, it does not appear that an external threat theory passes the 
theoretical hoop it needs to. While India did take some steps to increase its military capabilities, 
the actions were not sufficient to demonstrate the theory’s stipulated causal mechanism was at 
work. The argument for grand strategic stability in this case rests on prioritization of non-alignment 
between the superpowers, and not regional concerns. Mention of the superpowers does not appear 
in my content analysis, severely weakening the case for expectations of stability. If regional 
concerns dominate, then either grand strategic change or a dramatic shift in focus are called for, 
and neither appears to be the case. Scholars have argued that, despite the defeat in 1962, China 
was perceived both to be a less salient threat than neighboring Pakistan and tended to remain on 
the periphery of the public mind; the reduced prominence of this issue meant that politicians had 
less incentive to deal with the issue than other, more salient matters.167   
This lack of security prioritization is borne out by the content analysis performed in the 
previous section. An external threat theory would expect to see China appear as a focus in multiple 
topics in my content analysis. Instead, China appears in only one topic: the same as the pre-war 
 
166 Malik (1998, 193-4) 
167 Narang and Staniland (2018, 417, 435-6). It could be argued that the reason for stability in this case was that India 
was fixated not on the superpowers, but the threat of Pakistan. If Pakistan was the over-riding threat that India was 
focused on, and not the combination of the superpowers, Pakistan, China, and India’s regional neighbors as Rana 
(1976) contends, then the assertion that Non-Alignment was primarily articulated to keep India free from superpower 
interference is simply wrong and, moreover, the very logic of Non-Alignment as a strategy begins to unravel. If one 
considers Pakistan the primary threat, then the logic of Non-Alignment falls apart in the following manner: In order 
to deal with Pakistan and its neighbors in the way it wanted, India recognized that it had to contend with the threats 
of the superpowers first, and it did so by refusing to choose sides. It could not, however completely ignore the threat 
posed by the superpowers, as the concern about intervention by the superpowers was always a possibility. 
Additionally, as I mentioned earlier in my discussion, India clearly recognized the threat posed by China and felt 
compelled to respond. Thus, Pakistan may have been the object of primary concern, but Indian leaders were clearly 
cognizant of the potential threat posed by superpower intervention and of China, suggesting that concerns over 
Pakistan were not totally dominant. 
 96 
level. Instead, it is Pakistan which continues appearing in multiple topics both pre- and post-war. 
This is surprising from an external threat perspective because, until 1965, India and Pakistan had 
not fought a conflict for almost 20 years. If it was the proximity to conflict that was increasing the 
number of mentions of an issue, both countries would be expected to appear in the same number 
of topics pre-war. Additionally, India managed to fight Pakistan to a draw in 1965; it was beaten 
handily and embarrassed on the world stage by the Chinese in 1962. Given the fact that it was 
China, and not Pakistan, that dealt India a crushing major defeat, that Indian grand strategy did not 
focus more directly and emphatically on addressing it is problematic and suggests an external 
threat theory cannot explain grand strategic stability in this case.   
3.3.1.2 Regional Security Architecture 
The most straightforward expectation of a regional security architecture theory is that, 
given the failure of Indian strategy to maintain Indian security in the regional security environment 
in which it operated, change would be expected if there was a change in the constellation of 
alliances and diplomatic support in the region; stability is generally expected when the 
constellation of alliances and countries remains unchanged. The problem in this case is that India 
suffered a defeat and the pressure on India’s web of relationships changed; suddenly, the threat 
from the Chinese was greater than previously anticipated. Thus, grand strategic stability in this 
case would only be expected if there was a strengthening of India’s extant security network to 
ensure it could withstand the strain. Since Indian grand strategy in this period is characterized by 
stability, a regional security architecture theory can be said to be potentially congruent with the 
case; the important theoretical hoop that now needs to be cleared is to find evidence that India 
sought to significantly bolster its relations in the region. 
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The regional security architecture that existed in the region was relatively straightforward. 
India had positioned itself as a leader amongst non-aligned nations, with military procurement 
agreements, but no explicit defense pacts, with the Soviet Union; Pakistan was allied with the 
United States, and China found itself in a position as the odd-man out. As aligning more closely 
with the Soviet Union or the United States would violate the premise of Non-Alignment, India 
could only attempt to shore up its security position by using the non-aligned movement to 
strengthen its web of relationships in the region. As an ostensible leader of the non-aligned 
movement, India had many possible diplomatic avenues it could have exploited to attempt to 
externally balance against the Chinese. In fact, a group of non-aligned nations came forward in the 
aftermath of the Sino-Indian War and advanced a series of proposals as a starting point to address 
the dispute.168 As summarized by Elkin and Fredericks, the proposals suggested:   
China should withdraw from the western sector, this area to become 
a demilitarized zone pending a final solution; in the east, Indian and 
Chinese forces could be positioned along the McMahon Line except 
for the Thagla ridge and Longju areas where lines of control would 
be settled in future discussions.169 
These proposals were meant to represent a starting point for future negotiations and have 
been described as fairly even-handed.170 After some clarifications, India accepted the proposals in 
toto. China, on the other hand, only accepted the proposals in principle.171 Progress stalled and the 
proposals went nowhere. India also offered to refer the matter to The Hague Court of International 
Justice or other court of arbitration, but these overtures were also decisively rebuffed by China.172 
 
168 Power (1964, 283). The six countries, referred to in this context as The Colombo Powers were: The United Arab 
Republic (U.A.R.), Sri Lanka, Kampuchea, Burma, Indonesia, and Ghana. Nehru, Parthasarathi, and Jawaharlal Nehru 
Memorial Fund. (1985, 542) 
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While these failures may seem obvious signals of the need to shift toward internal balancing 
because of the failure to generate sufficient traction for an external balancing solution, this failure 
would have been far from certain at the time. More tellingly, some scholars have argued that, while 
India had a tendency towards multilateral rhetoric, its real preference was for bilateral diplomacy 
and, as such, failed to put its full weight of effort behind multilateral solutions. Arthur Rubinoff, 
commenting on India’s failure to cultivate the non-aligned movement into a third power bloc to 
counter-balance against the superpowers, declared “If Nehru was unwilling to yield India's hard-
won freedom to the major powers, he was also hesitant to sacrifice the country's independence in 
an association of non-aligned states.”173 The implication of Rubinoff’s assertion is that India would 
no more bind itself to the other non-aligned nations than it would align with the superpowers. 
Thus, India took no meaningful, sustained action to shore up its regional web of alliances. 
India could have alternatively pursued a series of bilateral security guarantees with either 
neighboring countries or the superpowers. The viability of such a path is uncertain, however. A 
quick survey of the countries surrounding India at the time shows a lack of a sufficient number of 
militarily strong allies in the region to counterbalance China. Rather than resort to an external 
balancing approach through the use of multilateral institutions or strong bilateral relationships to 
generate significant international political support for itself, a hallmark of Nehru’s Non-Alignment 
policy, India instead chose to internally balance. This suggests that India was not necessarily as 
concerned with the regional web of alliances, but rather the direct threat of the Chinese and its 
ability to counter it, which is a mechanism that is more in line with an external threat hypothesis 
than a regional security architecture one. As such, the weight of available evidence suggests the 
causal mechanism of this theory is very likely not at work in this case. 
 
173 Rubinoff (1991) 
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3.3.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case 
The previous sections have shown that, while Indian grand strategy may be generally 
congruent with the expectations of an external threat and regional security architecture theory, both 
of these theories fail to clear crucial hoops in order to suggest that their causal mechanisms are at 
work in the case. Just because some aspects of the empirical record are congruent with their 
expectations, it does not mean that these theories’ mechanisms are at work. In this case, external 
threat theories expect change when internal balancing against China is pursued or stability when 
superpower concerns dominate; available evidence suggests neither of these expectations is met. 
A regional security architecture theory would expect grand strategic stability only if the existing 
web of alliance was reinforced; here, the notable lack of attempts to bring international agreements 
in play to hem in the Chinese is telling. As such, I conclude that these theories cannot adequately 
account for the weight of evidence in the case.  
3.3.2 Internally oriented theories 
If externally oriented theories cannot fully explain the case, what about internally oriented 
claims? Internally oriented theories expect change in grand strategy only in response to internal 
factors such as changes in leadership or strategic culture. Such alterations can be catalyzed by 
external events, but there must also be a detectable internal change before the theories expect any 
observed grand strategic change. In this section, I examine the two internally oriented theories 
selected for analysis: leadership and strategic culture. Each section starts by determining whether 
or not the theory’s expectations are congruent with the case. If it is, I conduct more detailed process 
tracing to determine whether or not there is evidence of that theory’s causal mechanism at work. I 
then conclude with a separate section summarizing the theories’ abilities to explain the case. 
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3.3.2.1 Leadership 
A leadership theory expects that grand strategies to change as leaders and/or their 
preferences do; this could either be through physical leadership change, or change of a single 
leader’s preference. In the absence of a change of either administration, or inter-administration 
preference, stability should result. In my discussion of post-War Indian grand strategy, I noted that 
Nehru died in 1964. His successor, Shastri, died in 1966 and Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, 
took office after that. A leadership theory would expect grand strategic stability in these 
circumstances only if the three Prime Ministers’ preferences were similar. Given that Indira 
Gandhi was Nehru’s daughter, and, as described in greater detail in Chapter 4, favored a realist 
version of Non-Alignment, their preferences can be said to be broadly similar. This leaves the 
question of Shastri, about whom much less is written. According to Ankit’s account, Shastri also 
generally favored what I would term a persuasive grand strategy.174 Given all three leaders can 
plausibly be said to share similar preferences, then a leadership theory can be said to be broadly 
congruent and potentially explain the case. 
When considering the empirical record, however, a leadership theory of grand strategy has 
to be able to explain some of the more important variations in the case. At issue is whether there 
is a plausible mechanism specified by the theory that would account for, a) the decision to 
selectively update Indian beliefs only about China, b) the choice to internally balance in that case 
only, or c) the ultimate course pursued. If anything, it seems that such a claim would expect that 
the Indian leaders would act on their previous preferences and favor an external balancing solution 
but, as was discussed in the section on regional security architecture, that alternative was not 
pursued. At best, this suggests some intervening variable not currently specified may be at work. 
 
174 Ankit (2020, 47-53) 
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My analysis of India’s post-war grand strategy did reveal signs of a potentially coercive shift. As 
such, this criticism does not fatally weaken a leadership theory, but it does undermine confidence 
in its ability to fully explain the case. 
3.3.2.2 Strategic Culture 
A strategic culture theory anticipates no significant change in India’s grand strategy after 
the Sino-Indian War unless there is a corresponding change in India’s strategic culture. Given that 
India had a very clearly articulated grand strategy and had pursued that strategy from independence 
to the Sino-Indian War, the continuity observed in the post-war period – in form and substance – 
should be relatively easy for this theory to explain. As for the rate of any small changes observed, 
while exogenous shocks such as defeat in a war can cause factors internal to a country to shift, 
shifts in grand strategy should track changes in strategic culture and, by necessity, take time to 
propagate. Thus, grand strategic change, if it is explicable in strategic culture terms, should only 
be observed after internal factors shift, be in line with those changes, and move at the speed with 
which those mechanisms move. Any outcome that is not congruent with those expectations cannot 
be described as congruent with the case.  
In the aftermath of a decisive defeat in a major conflict, a strategic culture theory expects 
relative stability in grand strategic preference, coupled with an uptick in discourse concerning how 
to address the deficiencies. Strategic change should happen relatively slowly; culture is not an 
immovable object, but neither is it especially agile.175 Adjustments can be made, but progress will 
be slow. This is precisely the behavior observed by India throughout the period. As mentioned 
above, India’s strategic culture throughout this period was dominated by Nehru in his dual roles 
 
175 Basrur (2016, 184) 
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as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. There is also evidence that these preferences did not 
rest solely in the mind of Nehru. The presence of like-minded allies such as V.K. Menon, who 
represented India first in the United Nations and later as Defense Minister during the time of the 
Sino-Indian War, lend support to this assertion.176 Even though Menon was removed from his post 
in the aftermath of India’s defeat, Nehru remained; Nehru’s death in 1964 was not sufficient to 
change the fundamental tone and tenor of India’s foreign policy framework, as there were simply 
no alternatives to be found. Indeed, some scholars have gone as far as to argue that the original 
Nehruvian framework has lasted to the present day.177 My analysis determined the grand strategic 
form over the case is best described by stability, and thus a strategic culture theory can be said to 
be congruent with the case. 
As the trajectory of India’s grand strategy in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War seems 
generally congruent with a strategic culture hypothesis, it is necessary to determine whether or not 
there is evidence of the theory’s causal mechanisms at work. In Chapter 2, I detailed that the causal 
mechanisms for the strategic culture theory, as articulated by Johnson, consist of a central 
paradigm and operational assumptions about how to translate those preferences into reality. 
Johnson argues that the “central paradigm” of a strategic culture can be determined by answering 
three questions and understanding how a given culture views:  
…the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an 
aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses 
(zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force 
(about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and 
the conditions under which applied force is useful).178 
 
176 Power (1964, 259-60, 275) 
177 Chaulia (2002, 216) 
178 Johnston (1995, 46) 
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The answers to these questions, Johnson posits, helps frame how a country will view its 
option set in the foreign policy domain: “The second part [of the strategic culture theory] consists 
of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are the most efficacious 
for dealing with the threat environment, as defined by answers to the first three questions.”179 In 
this model, if a country’s culture tends toward believing war is an aberration, the nature of the 
threat is variable-sum, and force has limited utility, that country might tend towards utilizing what 
I have identified as persuasive grand strategies.180 Countries on the opposite end of the spectrum 
would likely pursue what I would term coercive grand strategies.181 
Johnston concludes this description with an empirically falsifiable statement of strategic 
culture which provides the testable core of the theory: 
…the essential empirical referent of a strategic culture is a limited, 
ranked set of grand-strategic preferences that is consistent across the 
objects of analysis (e.g., textual sources for potential answers to the 
central paradigm) and persistent across time. This ranking is not, 
therefore, necessarily responsive to changes in non-cultural 
variables such as technology, threat, or organization.182 
If strategic culture is driving grand strategic choice in this case, then there are two important hoops 
for it to clear; the first hoop is evidence of the central paradigm and the second hoop is evidence 
that those operational level assumptions are in alignment with that paradigm. 
A distinct Indian strategic culture, as understood in Johnston’s terms, could reasonably be 
said to exist from 1947-1964. This is exemplified by Nehru’s ideational non-alignment and the 
panchsheel agreement signed in the 1950s between India and China. As described by George 
 
179 Johnston (1995, 46) 
180 Variable sum in this context implies that the threat is not existential; there is inherently room for negotiation and 
not all conflicts represent existential threats to the state. 
181 Johnston (1995, 47) 
182 Johnston (1995, 48) 
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Tanham, panchsheel (or five principles) was an agreement between the Indians and the Chinese 
(which was later expanded by the Indians to refer to relations with all nations) in which relations 
would be based on respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual 
nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 
and peaceful co-existence.183 A strategic culture theory would emphasize that, because the 
panchsheel approach was extended by India to refer to all countries, some of these principles serve 
as important sign-posts to some of the key independent variables of this theory. For instance, 
equality and mutual benefit suggests that conflict is variable-sum. Likewise, peaceful co-existence 
could suggest a view of war as an aberration. It follows that India’s persuasive grand strategy pre-
1962 is in line with a strategic culture hypothesis expectation and, as such, the theory passes the 
first hoop. 
 A strategic culture explanation begins to break down in India’s change in perception of 
how to deal with the Chinese threat, however. If a strategic culture hypothesis is accurate, then 
India’s central paradigm dictated the selection of a persuasive grand strategy. This does not clearly 
align with what the empirical record indicates. Despite being closer to believing war is an 
aberration, threat is variable-sum, and force has limited utility, India pursued a limited military 
buildup to address the threat in the post-war era rather than a diplomatic solution.184 The central 
paradigm of Indian strategic culture suggests that war is an aberration, therefore there would be no 
pressing reason to create new military forces wholesale, yet that is what was done. For instance, 
India created a roughly 10,000-strong division of ethnic Tibetans to operate as a commando force 
to conduct operations inside Tibet in the event of a future war with China.185 The Indian Air Force 
 
183 Tanham (1992, 36) 
184 Tanham (1992, 38) 
185 Garver (2010, 93) 
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was modernized from a transport force to a fighting force and, with U.S. help, eight divisions were 
prepared for mountain defense against the Chinese.186 Whereas before India had met the expansion 
of Chinese influence in the region with diplomacy and accommodation, a more hardline stance 
was now suddenly in play.187  Thus, this theory does not seem to cleanly pass the second hoop, 
given the rapid and unexpected change in operational assumptions without a change in its central 
paradigm. 
That India’s strategic culture would selectively apply and update their operational beliefs 
very rapidly, but only in the case of China, suggests that, even if a strategic culture theory does 
seem suggestive, another causal mechanism was also at work in shaping its grand strategy. While 
an approach emphasizing the importance of strategic culture can explain the stability in Indian 
grand strategy over the period, it does not cleanly pass the hoops it needs to in order to serve as a 
persuasive explanation. 
3.3.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories ability to explain the case 
In the previous two sections, I outlined the theoretical expectations of both a leadership 
theory and a strategic culture theory of grand strategic change. While a leadership theory is 
congruent with the case based on the fact that Nehru, Shastri, and Gandhi all plausibly shared a 
similar set of beliefs regarding what grand strategy to pursue, confidence in the theory is 
undermined because it fails to account for much of the variation in the historical record; there is 
the question as to why the Indians would only update their preferences with regards to China and, 
furthermore, there is little explanation as to why they failed to follow their prior preferences, which 
 
186 Cohen and Dasgupta (2010, 8) 
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suggests another causal mechanism at work. A strategic culture theory fares better, but fails to 
fully clear one of the theoretical hoops it would need to in order to completely establish its causal 
mechanism was at work. While there was not sufficient evidence to rule out this theory, its 
explanatory power appears relatively weak.  
3.3.3 Organizational determinants of grand strategy 
My theory, which posits that the strength of a state’s constitutive organizations plays a 
crucial role in determining the course of a country’s grand strategy, expects change when 
resourcing changes and stability when it does not. In the aftermath of a major defeat, traditional 
organization theory would expect that India would be likely to adjust the way it resources its 
organizations engaged in the creation and implementation of foreign policy, though it would not 
be guaranteed to do so. If India did make such a change, and funding were shifted away from the 
strongest organization(s) (as opposed to strengthening them further), I would expect to detect a 
corresponding shift in grand strategic form. The rate at which any change occurs would be 
dependent on how quickly the resourcing levels change. If, by contrast, India did not make changes 
in its funding patterns, I would expect to observe stability in its grand strategy. As described above, 
India’s grand strategy did not change from its persuasive form in the wake of the Sino-Indian War. 
My theory can thus be congruent with the observed outcome, but only if the government’s 
allocation of resources to the various types of agencies tasked with carrying out foreign policy 
remained relatively stable over the same period. 
The next sections trace the causal logic of my theory. My theory’s key independent 
variables are described in both the pre- and post-war periods; as will be shown, their values align 
with what my theory anticipates. The pre-war distribution of organizational resources is perfectly 
 107 
in line with what my theory would expect given India’s adoption of a persuasive grand strategy. 
Post-war, the Ministry of External Affairs continued to enjoy robust resourcing, which accounts 
for the stability in India’s overall grand strategy, while increases in resources allocated to the 
Ministry of Defence shed light on why, despite the maintenance of a persuasive grand strategy, 
there are signs that other grand strategic options may have been beginning to present themselves. 
 
In tracing the causal logic of my theory, I first measure the values of state-level money, 
manpower, and elite attention. This sets the baseline expectation about what level of resources 
India had available to it and flags any important variation in overall resources that might account 
for change observed later on. I then measure the allocation of resources at the organizational level, 
the distribution of these resources conditions expectations regarding grand strategic form, and 
expectations regarding stability and change. To maintain consistency with the preceding sections 
and my earlier description of the value of the dependent variable, I begin with a discussion of the 
pre-war situation before describing any post-war variation. 
 
3.3.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources 
  
Figure 3.4 below shows Indian GDP in the years from 1960-1962, as data from the World 
Bank does not go back further. India’s GDP in 1960 was approximately $147 billion 2010 US 
dollars, putting India solidly in the middle power category for this time period and making it one 
of the more prosperous of the developing countries in the period. Additionally, this level of GDP 
puts India in the company (at the time) of states such as Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
China, even if India’s level of development lagged well behind some of these countries. While 
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rightfully thought of as a developing country during this period, India still possessed relatively 
robust monetary resources at the time. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. GDP of India 1960-1962 (Constant 2010 USD) 
 
If India had a fairly large economy at the time, it was relatively small on a per-capita basis. 
With almost 450 million people living in India in 1960, India was the second most populous 
country in the world, behind China.188 Even if one only considers the male population of India 
between the ages of 15 and 64, the approximate pool eligible to serve in the Indian military at that 
the time, India had a total of almost 132 million people from which it could potentially draw to 
staff its organizations.189 With only this population, India would have been one of the largest 
countries in the world. These resources demonstrate that, although India may have lagged behind 
even great powers (not to mention the two superpowers), it still had a respectable number of 
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resources it could devote to external issues. This data tells me that India grew at a relatively modest 
rate, and thus large increases or decreases of resources at the organizational level cannot be 
accounted for by growth or contraction at the country level. 
The final independent variable required for my theory is the set of foreign policy topics, 
and specifically other countries, that were occupying elite attention during this time period. This 
is an important distinction from what dominated policy-maker attention at the time, even if one is 
a subset of the other. Elites more broadly set the general agenda, while policy-makers set the 
specific agenda and are responsible for the ends-means reconciliation, which is the bread-and-
butter of strategy. To capture this larger audience, I look at newspaper headlines from the Sunday 
edition of the Times of India, the most widely read English language daily newspaper in India at 
the time. This gives a sense of the topics that were most likely to be at the top of the national 
agenda at the time. Text analysis of the headlines of the Times of India reveals that border issues, 
as well as reporting on the activities of the superpowers, occupied the international headlines.  




Table 3.1.  List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1960 – 1962 
Word(s) Total Number of Mentions 
“Chinese” or “China” 29 










This list generally comports with regional events, befitting India’s status as a middle power. 
High on the list are China and Pakistan, India’s neighbors and regional rivals, as well as the 
superpowers. That references to the superpowers showed up here is an indication that the Cold 
War was on the agenda. That such references were absent from the grand strategy discussion 
reinforces the idea that Non-Alignment was intended to put distance between India and the 
superpowers. Finally, those familiar with India’s colonial history know the status of both Goa and 
Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) were large issues.  
From this overview of India’s state-level resources in the pre-war period, it is apparent that 
India was very much a middle power focused on regional issues mostly involving its border regions 
as well as the status of other regional post-colonial entities. India’s financial resources were 
respectable, if diffuse, and its pool of manpower, whether measured by total population or only 
males of around military age, puts it as one of the most populous nations on the planet. Because 
this growth followed a relatively predictable trajectory, change in the distribution of 
organizational-level resources cannot be accounted for by a change in the distribution of money, 
or manpower; as such, any variation must have been a deliberate choice. Furthermore, my analysis 
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of the Times of India provides the pool of available topics I would expect India to be focusing on. 
How then, did India choose to funnel these available resources into its formal organizations?  
3.3.3.2 Pre-war organizational-level resources 
During this period, some of India’s organizations were undergoing frequent re-alignment, 
presenting a potential complication when describing the constellation of foreign policy options 
India possessed.190 The organizations responsible for both persuasive and coercive functions do 
not change. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs is the primary organization responsible for 
diplomacy and thus persuasive grand strategic functions, and is henceforth referred to as the 
persuasive organization. The Indian Ministry of Defence and the Indian Army, Navy, and Air 
Force make up the constellation of organizations which represent India’s coercive potential, and 
is referred to collectively as the coercive organization. India’s inducive potential resides in the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry until 1964; later, it undergoes several reorganizations. The 
organization(s) primarily responsible for the task at the time are referred to herein as the inducive 
organization. 
In the period leading up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, investment in India’s foreign policy 
organizations was relatively constant. Figure 3.5 displays the total amount of money allocated to 
each of the three organization areas in that fiscal year and captures the relevant line items for each 
of the respective organizations present in the Indian Appropriations Bill(s) passed both in and for 
those years. This is an important fact to bear in mind because, due to Indian law, any money spent 
by the union government must be passed in an appropriations bill. As such, it is not uncommon 
 
190 This problem is exclusively related to reorganizations related to what was known up until 1963-4 as the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, which saw various reorganizations and splits until settling into the separate Ministry of 
Commerce and Ministry of Industry in 1972. 
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for unplanned expenses to be passed retroactively. For example, should unbudgeted expenditures 
for the Ministry of Defence take place in fiscal year 1961, a bill may be passed in a future year 
fiscal to authorize it. These numbers have also been included so that the totals represent the actual 
amount appropriated for the year, rather than that simply budgeted, yielding a more holistic 
picture.191 
 
191 When I say the figures capture the relevant line items, they typically include the top line item (e.g. “Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry”), relevant major functional activities (e.g. “Foreign Trade”), any noted miscellaneous 
expenditures, and all noted capital outlays. In the case of the Inducive organization(s) some extraneous activities have 
been removed such as those related to general internal industry (e.g. “Industries” line item) or other social provisions 
(e.g. “Salt”) in an effort to isolate the effort being paid to elements of the organization relevant to foreign policy. 
Similar treatment was given to the persuasive and coercive organization(s). 
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Figure 3.5. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1960-1962 
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When interpreting Figure 3.5, care must be exercised due to the difference in scale between 
the three organizations, with coercive spending being orders of magnitude higher than the others. 
Military equipment is notoriously expensive to acquire and sustain. In comparison, running an 
organization that primarily relies on human capital (e.g., the diplomatic corps) is significantly 
cheaper. As such, relative changes in funding are the relevant statistics to consider. Funding for all 
three organizations rose in fiscal year 1961-1962 after remaining relatively flat in the years leading 
up to the conflict. Throughout much of India’s history, defense spending accounts for a large 
percentage of the Indian budget. In this period, it accounts for almost 28% of total planned 
spending. Despite this, in pure percentage increase, inducive organizations received the largest 
boost in funding thanks primarily to a dramatic increase in capital outlays for the year. While a 
capital outlay can be thought of as an investment in an organization, if it is not followed up with 
more year-to-year funding, it could signify that old infrastructure was replaced by new 
infrastructure, such as when a new headquarters is built. Alternatively, such outlays can become a 
drag on the organization if the expenditure is in excess of capacity and unable to be utilized fully. 
This suggests that the inducive organization was just getting set up, as evidenced by the fact that 
the major budgetary line item for my purposes, foreign trade, does not show up as a line item until 
1964.  
The persuasive domain experienced a 37% increase from fiscal year 1960-1961 to fiscal 
year 1961-1962, as opposed to only a 5% increase in the coercive realm. Figure 3.6 shows these 
percentage changes in chart form. The implication here is that, while in absolute amounts India 
was investing more financial resources into the coercive domain, the persuasive domain was 
getting relatively more investment. It is this relative emphasis, across all three domains, which is 
the important driver of my theory, as opposed to the absolute value. While the trend line for the 
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persuasive and coercive organizations appear to switch places in the figure, the relative emphasis 
was still on the persuasive organization, as the relative investment gap in 1961-1962 was more in 
favor of the persuasive organization than the 1962-63 gap was in favor of the coercive 
organization; this implies the relative emphasis was still in the persuasive domain and is suggestive 
of a persuasive grand strategy. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1961-1962 
 
When considering civilian personnel working in these various organizations during the 
period, it is necessary to expand the time period being discussed from 1955 to 1963. This is 
necessary because, while the Census of Central Government Employees was conducted regularly 
during this period, I have been unable thus far to locate publicly available published versions of 
the years 1960-1962. This is less problematic than it might appear at first because of the nature of 
civil service generally and the Indian civil service in particular, which is both difficult to get into 
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and experiences very low turnover, rendering dramatic changes from year to year unlikely. Figure 
3.7 details the number of civilian personnel employed by these organizations on the date of the 
census in that year. Despite the missing data points, the three graphs indicate clear trends over time 
in employment in each of the three ministries, with the beginnings of gradual changes in the post-
war years.  
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Figure 3.7. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1955-1963) 
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Civilian personnel from 1955 to 1959 in the persuasive category grew relatively rapidly - 
by over 68% before data become unavailable.  This corresponds closely to India’s observed 
persuasive grand strategic form. Scholars have contended that India reached the peak of its 
diplomatic influence in the mid to late 1950s.192 This closely correlates with growth in personnel 
in the persuasive domain. Given that data from 1960 to 1963 is missing, it is not clear quite what 
to make of the personnel spike in the persuasive organization in 1959. Regardless, manpower in 
the persuasive organization remained higher at the end of the period than it was in the late 1950s. 
Without personnel, organizations cannot do their jobs and that this variable moves in tandem with 
an observed persuasive grand strategy is an indicator that my organizational theory of grand 
strategy might help explain the case. Civilian personnel employed in the coercive domain remained 
relatively stable, growing by only around 3,500 people, or less than 1.5%, over the period up to 
1959, when personnel in the persuasive domain increased by double digit percentages. This also 
tracks with the description of Nehru as having placed limits on defense growth and his preference 
for diplomatic solutions. While personnel numbers in the inducive area actually double, it is 
unclear how many, if any, were engaged in efforts in the international arena; the inducive 
organization has a role to play not only in external trade promotion, but also in internal commercial 
regulation; many of the personnel may have been engaged in internally facing positions.  Thus, 
the significance of this level of growth is unclear. 
Analysis of the abstracts of the Times of India front page articles yields further insight into 
the organizations which were most covered during this time. Looking at the topics covered in these 
articles gives us an idea of the broader pool which were occupying elite attention at the time. For 
this piece of the analysis, rather than use a simple word frequency, a two- word (bigram) analysis 
 
192 Kapur (1988, 50) 
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was used. Bigrams have the potential to contain more detailed information than single word, or 
unigrams. For instance, bigrams have the benefit of preserving the distinction between “united 
states,” “united kingdom,” and “united nations.”  While unigrams are excellent for capturing most 
state or administrative political entities, bigrams can capture additional actors or potentially 
common descriptors associated with those words. Thus, bigrams allow for a more diverse set of 
information and better inference of foreign policy priorities. 
Table 3.2. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1960-1962 
Word 1 Word 2 Number of appearances  
Prime Minister 42 
Soviet Union 17 
Security Council 11 
Chief Minister 9 
Lok Sabha 9 
United Nations 9 
Central government 7 
Communist Party 7 
Congress Committee 7 
Socialist Party 7 
 
Many of the top appearances in the list in Table 3.2 reflect frequently reported news items, 
including, for example, reports on the activities of heads of state (prime minister, chief minister) 
or major local political entities (Lok Sabha.) Most interesting for the purposes of determining what 
elite attention was focused on was the attention paid to both the Security Council and, by extension, 
the United Nations, which also appears on the list. That the goings-on of the Security Council and 
the United Nations more broadly is on a level with major domestic issues of the day, such as the 
Indian Communist Party, sends a strong message that elite attention was pulled in the direction of 
multilateral fora. A majority of the references to the Security Council in the abstracts directly refer 
to topics identified in my analysis of Indian grand strategy over the period, including articles on 
the Security Council discussions on the Congo and the conflict between India and Pakistan over 
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Kashmir. That some of the topics covered here are also addressed specifically in both the topic 
modeling and India’s grand strategy lends support to the idea that policy-maker priorities align in 
some meaningful way with elite attention. 
All of these indicators are perfectly in line with the expectations of my theory: the 
allocation of money, manpower, and elite attention resources all point to a persuasive grand 
strategy focused on border threats, the Cold War, and economic development while also 
underscoring the importance of institutions such as the United Nations and the Security Council 
in India’s efforts to achieve security. Two of the independent variables in my theory, manpower 
and elite attention, were focused on persuasive elements of power, and this is in line with my 
theory’s expectation of a persuasive Indian grand strategy. That the third, money, shows an 
increase for all three organizations suggests that more money was flowing into the national budget 
at the time. Given that the biggest funding increase was in the inducive area, which was driven by 
a major increase in capital outlays, this is most appropriately viewed as a likely aberration rather 
than a sign of a substantive change in grand strategy. Since there was relative continuity in grand 
strategy from the period before to the period after the 1962 war, there should also be relative 
continuity in resourcing levels over that time. This expectation of relative continuity in resourcing 
is an important hoop my theory must clear.  
3.3.3.3 Post-war state-level resources 
India’s economy continued to grow at a steady pace in the period after the 1962 Sino-Indian 
War, although it did suffer a little in the aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, as Figure 
3.8 demonstrates. India’s population likewise continued to climb steadily, reaching a total of 
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almost 520 million (149 million males between 15-64) in 1967.193  The most interesting continuity 
was the maintained focus of elite attention on the border issues between India and Pakistan. Interest 
in events in Vietnam pick up during this period, coinciding neatly with an uptick in the United 
States focus on the war effort there. Overall, however, elite attention in the country at large 
remained focused rather unsurprisingly on India’s nearest neighbors, with which it had just 
engaged in two conflicts. This relatively orderly overall increase in Indian resources suggests the 
available pool of money and manpower from which India was drawing was stable, and would not 
account for any variation in organization-level resourcing. 
 
Figure 3.8.  GDP of India 1960-1967 (Constant 2010 USD) 
  
 
193 The World Bank Group (2018d, 2018c) 
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Table 3.3.  List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1963-1967 
Word(s) Total Number of Mentions 
"Pak" or "Pakistan" 65 
"Chinese" or "China" or "Peking" 51 













As these figures attest, India was not materially weakened by the defeat, nor did it undergo 
extraordinary growth. Thus, deliberate decisions about areas of emphasis are the driving factors 
behind changes in resource levels and prioritization. The next section explores the link between 
post-war Indian grand strategy and organizational resources levels. As there is wide latitude for 
potential alternative grand strategic paths the country could take in order to clear the next hoop, an 
organizational theory of grand strategy must demonstrate how the two moved in tandem over the 
period.  
3.3.3.4 Post-war organizational-level resources 
 
In the post-war period, money flowed both to the persuasive and coercive domains with 
spending peaking in 1963-1964 for coercive purposes and 1964-1965 for persuasive purposes (see 
Figure 3.9).  A majority of the spending increase in the coercive realm in the 1963-1964 fiscal year 
can be attributed to a $1.2 billion-dollar defence capital outlay as well as an almost doubling of 
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the money allocated to the armed forces. While this is a significant investment, and could 
potentially be indicative of a shift towards a coercive grand strategy, relative trends in investment 
are more important to consider than absolute dollar amounts. Figure 3.10 depicts the relative 
changes in funding and shows that, after this initial influx of investment in coercive organizations, 
the pattern falls back to historical levels. Investments in the persuasive elements also continue to 
climb upwards, but at a much slower rate than previously. Finally, money allocated towards 
inducive elements of power continued to bounce erratically, with a majority of the increase in the 
later part of the period attributable to the introduction of a “Foreign Trade” line item, which begins 
to grow substantially. This indicates that a surge of resources flowed into the primary national 
security related organizations in the aftermath of the war and suggests the beginnings of an effort 
to expand external economic outreach.  
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Personnel figures tell a slightly different story, with numbers for the Ministry of External 
Affairs beginning a slow decline and Ministry of Defence civilians beginning to tick upwards 
starting with 1962. Re-organizations continued to affect personnel numbers in the inducive 
ministries, resulting in an overall reduction in the number of personnel employed there as 
personnel were spun off into various different ministries and organizations. Based solely on this 
indicator alone, my theory would expect grand strategic change. When money is factored in, 
however, grand strategic paralysis is likely to result because of path dependence. Thus, my theory’s 
expectation of stability or change, and thus its ability to describe the case, hangs on the direction 
of the third indicator.  
Elite attention at the organization level shifted substantially from pre-1962 to post-1962, 
as measured by the frequency of mentions in the abstracts of Times of India articles from 1963-
1967.  As it relates to foreign political entities, word combinations related to the Vietnam War 
(“viet nam” and “north viet”) are the highest in the number of appearances with the Security 
Council following closely behind. The most striking feature of Table 3.4 relative to Table 3.3 is 
the almost complete lack of foreign policy topics absent the references to the Vietnam War. This 
suggests that elite attention was not as focused on foreign policy topics as it was pre-war. 
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Table 3.4. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1963 – 1967 
Word 1 Word 2 Number of appearances of pair 
Prime Minister 71 
Bahadur Shastri 30 
Viet Nam 29 
Lal Bahadur 26 
Chief Minister 23 
Indira Gandhi 19 
Home Minister 17 
Finance Minister 15 
North Viet 13 
Security Council 13 
West Bengal 13 
 
That internal issues would dominate is not especially surprising, as this was also the case in the 
pre-war abstracts (Table 3.2). Another explanatory factor accounting for the dominance of internal 
political issues is the death of Nehru in 1964, the short-lived Prime Ministership of Lal Bahadur 
Shastri, and the accession in 1966 of Indira Gandhi (Nehru’s daughter) to the role of Prime 
Minister. For a country that had been dominated by one man from its independence in 1947 until 
his death in 1964, three Prime Ministers in three years represented a dramatic change. Given that 
this indicator points in a different direction (inward) from either of the other two, this reinforces 
the expectation of stability. 
India’s grand strategy remained persuasive from pre- to post-war, but there were some 
indications that a coercive shift might be underway. As there was macro-level stability in the form 
of a persuasive grand strategy, there must be a readily identifiable reason for this, but must also 
account for the increase in coercive topics. When I dive into the variables of my theory, this pattern 
can easily be found in the differing rates of investment across the resource categories. When one 
or more are slower to move, as in this case, it would suggest a slower but still detectable change, 
which was borne out by the historical record in this case. When all three variables change in the 
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same direction at the same time, my theory would expect very rapid change in grand strategic 
form. As the indicators were mixed, with some additional monetary resources flowing to the 
coercive organization (in absolute terms) but a return to historical patterns of investment vis-à-vis 
the persuasive organization, manpower falling for the persuasive domain and increasing in the 
coercive, and elite attention firmly fixed elsewhere, my theory, emphasizing organizational path 
dependence and the logic of increasing returns, would still expect stability to result.  
3.4 Conclusion 
When assessing the relative continuity in Indian grand strategy in the years surrounding 
India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War, which theory offers the most compelling explanation? The 
short answer is no one explanation seems to have the decisive weight of evidence behind it, but 
some fit the available evidence better than others. Both externally and internally oriented theories 
have some explanatory power, but they fail to account for the rate of change under the surface. 
Conversely, my theory is able to relatively cleanly explain both the macro-level stability in grand 
strategic form and the onset of changes seen in the aftermath of the conflict.  Table 3.5 below 
summarizes the macro-level findings, comparing each of the rival theories’ expectations of any 
substantive change and the expected rate of change with the empirical reality. 
  
 130 
Table 3.5. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the case 













Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
Expectation 


















met? No No Yes Partially Yes 
Explains the 
case? No No Some Doubts Some Doubts Yes 
 
On one level, it would appear that a persuasive strategy like Non-Alignment should fit 
relatively cleanly into an externally oriented threat hypothesis. Indian policy-makers, and 
especially Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had decided the biggest existential threat to Indian 
independence was subordinating Indian foreign policy decision making to one of the Cold War 
superpowers. Non-Alignment was thus a rational response to this external reality. This theory 
breaks down in its inability to account for the relatively slow abandonment of a persuasive grand 
strategy in the wake of India’s disastrous defeat in the Sino-Indian War. Indian leaders were 
surprised that the Chinese had resorted to the use of force and found the Indian strategy for 
preventing, or winning, such a conflict woefully inadequate. Such a theory would anticipate a rapid 
pivot to both regional security concerns as dominant and a re-orientation of strategy to deal with 
these threats. While some of this behavior was observed, namely an increase in defense spending 
and attention paid to the military, the boost was rather quickly followed by a return to historical 
patterns of investment, and there was no prioritization of the threat from China; clearly another 
 131 
causal mechanism, or at the very least an important intervening variable, was at work. So, while 
an external threat theory can explain some aspects of the case, it cannot fully account for India’s 
choices. Regional security architecture’s theoretical expectations of grand strategic stability are 
also met, but India’s failure to bolster those relationships after its defeat are at odds with this 
theory. 
Internally oriented theories also present a potential explanation for Indian behavior. A 
leadership theory is plausibly congruent with the case, although there are some questions about 
why leader preferences would only update in this one instance and not more broadly. It is clear 
from Jawaharlal Nehru’s public articulations of the core tenets of Non-Alignment that he had a 
clear conception of India’s strategic culture as one where force had a limited role to play and the 
state sought diplomatic solutions to problems well before it would resort to military solutions. 
Culture, however, is a relatively sticky concept and is slow to change. If an externally oriented 
theory cannot account for the relatively slow shift away from a persuasive grand strategy, a 
strategic culture hypothesis cannot account for the speed with which India abandoned its global 
engagement and turned towards a military buildup to address the Chinese threat in this instance. 
Here, my organizational determinants of grand strategy approach can offer something of a 
“goldilocks” explanation for the rate of change. Organizational strength takes time both to generate 
and to decay; the “slowness” of India to abandon a diplomatic strategy can be explained by the 
time it takes for the coercive elements of power to build up strength. As I noted in the section on 
my theory, I observed mixed investment patterns, with money flowing generally in line with 
historical trends, an increase in coercive manpower with a corresponding decrease in persuasive 
and inducive manpower, and elite attention consumed with internal matters, resulting in grand 
strategic paralysis. The empirical record bears out my theoretical expectations, with the theory 
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passing the critical hoops that it needs to, though it fails to gain sufficient support to completely 
rule out the alternative hypotheses. 
The next chapter examines how Indian grand strategy was impacted by its decisive victory 
in the Third Indo-Pakistan War over the course of the years 1972-1977. This case provides further 
insight into the ability of an external threat theory to explain Indian grand strategic outcomes, as 
the victory by the Indians in the 1971 war saw the dismemberment of India’s arch-rival into two 
separate countries. It also robustly tests the regional security architecture hypothesis, as 1971 
marked the landmark signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship agreement, which drew the 
Soviet Union and India into closer military cooperation.  
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4.0 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War 
This chapter considers India’s grand strategy around the third Indo-Pakistan War, which 
occurred in December 1971. The conflict initially started as an internal dispute between the two 
“wings” of united Pakistan and ended with an Indian invasion into East Pakistan after a pre-
emptive attack on Indian targets by the forces of West Pakistan. The time period of this case makes 
it an attractive one for study, as it picks up at the end of the data I examine in the previous chapter, 
allowing me to see if the trends in Indian grand strategy identified in the earlier period are borne 
out. Furthermore, as this case involves India’s existential enemy and ends with Pakistan losing a 
vast swath of territory, it makes for a robust test of external theories. As such, if I find evidence 
that my theory can justify India's grand strategy in this disparate situation as well as, or better than, 
competing theories, it will increase confidence in its explanatory power. 
4.1 Indian grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War 
When studying Indian grand strategy, or Indian politics generally, there is a tendency to 
focus on the prime minister, especially in the early years of the Republic.194 In the years 
surrounding the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister and not coincidentally 
Nehru’s daughter, looms large. Malone argues “Mrs. Gandhi’s foreign policy maintained a 
rhetorical commitment to her father’s ideology of non-alignment and anti-imperialism, but 
 
194 Narang and Staniland (2012, 80) 
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contained distinctly realist strands of thought and behavior.”195 This defines Gandhi’s tendencies 
as realist as understood by International Relations scholars, as opposed to what I term a coercive 
grand strategy. Realists believe that the fundamental nature of the international system is 
characterized by anarchy, and the implication of that anarchy is that states are in a self-help system. 
As a consequence, the accumulation of power is critical to ensure survival. What does this imply 
about the likely form of India’s grand strategy during this period? A persuasive grand strategy, 
like that adopted by Gandhi’s father, but predicated on the practice of realpolitik is likely to have 
a reduced emphasis on the ideational, or idealist, rhetoric typical of Nehruvian Non-Alignment. It 
would also likely involve India attempting to maximize its power diplomatically and seek to enter 
negotiations where it has maximum leverage. This suggests that diplomacy is still likely to be 
India’s predominant means of interacting with the outside world, but bilateral, not multi-lateral; 
negotiations are likely to increase in frequency, especially with smaller countries where India 
would have more leverage.  
This expectation largely aligns with the description emerging from my analysis of Indian 
grand strategy in the wake of the 1962 war with China. Non-Alignment was in many ways 
aspirational early on, articulating goals such as anti-racialism and de-colonization, which India 
championed at the time.196 While not a pacifist grand strategy by any means, the promotion of 
those ideas was central to India’s engagement with the world. The Indian defeat in 1962 and 
Nehru’s subsequent death shook both Non-Alignment and faith in Nehru’s policies.197 This 
manifested itself in Indian foreign policy by the abandonment some of Nehru’s idealist rhetoric, 
 
195 Malone (2011, 160) 
196 Nehru (1963, 456) 
197 Kaviraj (1986, 1698) 
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and increasingly looking to maintain its security through realpolitik.198 It was through the increase 
in coercive expenditure detailed in Chapter 3, the acquisition of weaponry from the Soviets and 
others, and the signing of a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union that Gandhi sought to 
strengthen India’s military position.199 This adherence to realpolitik does not necessarily imply a 
preference for a coercive grand strategy, however, which is a point underscored by Gandhi’s 
approach to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. Even after securing Soviet support in the event of a 
conflict, she continued diplomatic overtures in both public and private over threats or outright 
intervention in East Pakistan.200 Thus, while Gandhi may have abandoned some more of the 
ideational aspects of Nehruvian Non-Alignment, there is little reason to believe that India had 
abandoned a fundamentally persuasive grand strategy. 
 
4.1.1 Measuring grand strategy 
As noted, Malone’s description of Gandhi’s foreign policy appears broadly consistent with 
the description of the changing nature of Indian grand strategy in the aftermath of 1962 outlined 
in Chapter 3: a commitment to a persuasive grand strategy while abandoning some of the ideational 
elements. Is this understanding reflected in the operational approach of the Indian government at 
this time? The types of documents collected for my analysis of the way in which India conceived 
of its grand strategy in the period between 1967 and 1977 are broadly consistent with the types of 
documents examined in Chapter 3, being drawn from the Foreign Affairs Record published by the 
 
198 Ganguly (2010b, 1) 
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Ministry of External Affairs. Speeches by the President, Prime Minister, various vice ministers, 
the Minister of External Affairs, Trade Agreements, and other various documents all appear across 
the time period covered. This diversity of documents and speakers allows for as accurate a picture 
of India’s articulation of its theory of security as possible. Utilizing k-means clustering, Figure 4.1 
suggests that the appropriate number of topics in the corpus of documents during both the pre- and 
post-war eras is three. Given that this case starts almost immediately after the last, one of the 
immediate oddities in the data is the reduced number of topics identified via k-means clustering; 
four topics were identified in the post-1962 analysis. The limited number of topics identified in 
Figure 4.1 has a straightforward explanation, however, as domestic political concerns routinely 
dominated Indian attention at the time.201 
One critical event occurred during this period which directly affects how one should 
interpret any theory of grand strategy, especially in the post-war period. If the aftermath of the 
1971 war saw India triumphant over its arch-rival, domestic political events, especially from 1975 
onwards, during a time known as “the Emergency” dominated Indian attention. Kaviraj notes that, 
despite winning an overwhelming electoral victory in parliamentary elections in 1971, by 1973 
food distribution problems and short-term inflationary pressures produced large-scale electoral 
discontent.202 In 1975, the Indian courts invalidated Gandhi’s election as Prime Minister; rather 
than abdicate power, however, she declared a state of emergency throughout India that 
significantly curtailed freedom of speech, and particularly the press.203 Gandhi was finally ousted 
in elections she called in 1977, which swept the Indian National Congress from power. 
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4.1.2 Pre-1971 grand strategy analysis 
As discussed in the previous chapter, India’s grand strategy of Non-Alignment, especially 
in the pre-1962 years, was an unusually well-articulated grand strategy against which I could 
measure the ability of my topic modeling to identify the concept. Indian grand strategy during this 
period is not quite as defined, but there are clear expectations regarding its form. As previously 
stated, I expect to observe a persuasive grand strategy similar to Non-Alignment in this period, 
though with slightly more pronounced coercive elements, or at least an abandonment of the 
ideational aspects of Nehruvian Non-Alignment. This would also generally be in line with 
scholars’ descriptions of Gandhi’s general approach to foreign policy. Ganguly and Pardesi 
describe Gandhi’s foreign policy as having “two competing visions”: one that championed 
decolonization and weak states and another that sought to increase defense readiness and the 
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Figure 4.2 displays the results of the topic modeling for the pre-war years. As mentioned 
above, Ganguly and Pardesi describe Gandhi’s foreign policy as having two competing visions. It 
is striking that one half of this vision, which emphasizes defense readiness and the utility of force, 
does not seem to be readily apparent in the topics identified by the model.  Here, turning to gamma, 
a statistic measuring how much a given document is composed of words from the set of topics, 
can be especially helpful in deciphering the topics by providing a deeper understanding of the 
kinds of documents these topics were drawn.205 While the specific ordering of the topics is 
analytically meaningless, the model allows for terms to overlap between topics, which may be 
significant when interpreting results from the overall topic analysis described below.  
Topic 1 primarily relates to Indian issues raised through the Security Council. That the 
model identified both the terms “United Nations” and “Security Council” in Figure 4.2 are strong 
indicators of this. A look at the top ten documents by their gamma value also confirms this; seven 
out of the top ten documents explicitly reference the Security Council in their titles.206 That 
“Pakistan” rates so highly as a term in this topic, as well as the terms “east” and “west,” is to be 
expected for at least two reasons. First, India had fought an inconclusive war with Pakistan in 
1965, and the unfolding crisis that would eventually lead to war in 1971 was heavily discussed.207 
 
205 It is important for readers to bear in mind that, in LDA, each topic is a mixture of words, and each document has 
contained within it, to varying degrees, a mixture of different topics. Beta, the statistic displayed in Figure 4.2 shows 
the strength of the association between the word and the topic, whereas gamma displays the strength of the 
association between a document in the corpus and the topic. 
206 The top ten documents associated with topic 1 as measured by their gamma statistic are: “Shri G. Parthasarathi's 
Statement in Security Council on West Asia,” “Indian Representative's Statement on Colonialism,” “Shri N. N. Jha's 
Statement on Racial Discrimination,” “Shri Samar Sen's Speech at U. N. Security Council on Ceasefire Demand in 
Bangla Desk [sic],” “Shri Samar Sen's Speech it U.N. General Assembly on Bangla Desh,” “Speech by Shri S. Sen in 
the Security Council Urging hearing of Bangla Desh Representative,” “Shri S. Sen's Statement in Social Committee 
of ECOSOC on Human Rights on May 12, 1971,” “Shri G. Parthasarathi's Statement in General Assembly on South 
West Africa,” and “Shri S. Sen's Statement in Security Council on Rhodesia.” 
207 Niksch (1972) Pakistan at this time was separated into two “wings” called East and West Pakistan respectively. 
Post-war, these wings would become known as the countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
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Second, Gandhi was fixated on redressing the perceived imbalanced in India’s capabilities vis-à-
vis both China and Pakistan in her foreign policy at this time.208 Indian interest in South Africa 
suggests some continuation of the positive aims of India’s foreign policy begun under Nehru, such 
as anti-racialism, which manifested itself as outspoken criticism of Apartheid. What is interesting 
is that, although this topic might be thought of as indicative of a coercive grand strategy, given the 
focus on East and West Pakistan, that these concerns were brought up in the context of the United 
Nations suggests a more persuasive bent. 
Topic 2 is drawn from documents related to India’s pursuit of international agreements 
around the world. This topic is made up of not only of words related to Indian negotiations around 
global nuclear disarmament like “nuclear,” “weapons,” “weapon,” and “disarmament,” but also 
“trade,” “agreement,” “signed,” and “treaty.” A look at the documents most strongly associated 
with this topic reflects this bifurcation, with the documents fairly cleanly divided between India’s 
work on committees for nonproliferation or disarmament and its trade and economic development 
treaties.209 While eight of the top ten documents are related to nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament, there are also a relatively robust number of more commonplace agreements 
represented in the corpus. Notably, this focus on nuclear disarmament is a continuation of a trend 
seen in the previous case, where abolishing the weapons was a substantial piece of India’s foreign 
affairs agenda. This focus on the pursuit of international agreements is a hallmark of a persuasive 
grand strategy, however. 
 
208 Dixit (2004, 123) 
209 The top ten documents associated with topic 2, as measured by their gamma statistic are: “Shri V. C. Trivedi's 
Statement on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, “Shri Azim Husain's Statement in Political Committee on Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” “Shri Azim Husain's Statement in Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,” 
“Shri Azim Husain's Statement at Conference of Committee on Disarmament,” “Shri Azim Husain's Statement on 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” “Indian Delegate Shri Banerjee's Address on Disarmament at U.N. First 
Committee,” “Shri Azim Husain's Statement in Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee,” “Ambassador Hussain's 
Statement on Disarmament,” “Indo-German Credit Agreement Signed,” and “Indo-U.S. Food Agreement Signed.” 
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The unigrams identified for inclusion in Topic 3 yields a list that is fairly generic, with no 
immediately obvious topic. Looking at the gamma statistic, Topic 3 is associated with documents 
primarily related to speeches given by Indian leaders outside of the context of the United Nations 
(Topic 1), and negotiations over international agreements (Topic 2).210 Looking at the list of top 
bigrams, or word pairs, for the entire corpus, the top use of the term most strongly associated with 
Topic 3 (“countries”) is “developing countries,” and, for the second most strongly associated term 
(“world”), the top occurrences are “world community” and “world peace.”211 While it might be 
tempting to assume that the term “development” might be similarly linked to the term “economic” 
appearing later in the list, looking at the list of top bigrams, or word pairs, reveals that it actually 
refers to “development decade,” a reference to the United Nations initiative. Taken together, Topic 
3 appears to capture India’s attempt at leadership in the developing world, and comes from high 
level communications with other nations, using themes and language similar to the way Non-
Alignment was described under Nehru. 
Absent from the list once again are references to the superpowers, an indicator that, despite 
the fact that there were attempts by the superpowers to mediate the conflict between India and 
Pakistan, India was concerned with raising these issues with the international community more 
broadly.212 Given the topics, it appears most appropriate to again classify India’s grand strategy 
 
210 The top ten documents associated with topic 3, as measured by their gamma statistic are: “Prime Minister's Speech 
at State Banquet,” “President Giri's Address,” “President's Message on Republic Day,” “Shri Dinesh Singh's Address 
to Consultative Assembly,” “Shri Dinesh Singh's Statement in Trade and Development Board,” “Shri L. N. Mishra's 
Address at Ministerial Meeting of ‘Group of 77’,” “Prime Minister's Speech at Civic Reception,” ”Prime Minister's 
Address to Public Rally,” “President's Independence Day Message,” and “Shri Morarji Desai's Speech at Luncheon 
by Foreign Correspondents' Club.” 
211 It is important to note that the terms “developing” and “peace” also feature in the topic 3 list. 
212 Some scholars have described India’s attitude towards international institutions as “hostile.” See, for instance, 
Narang and Staniland (2012, 84). It is nevertheless noteworthy that, despite this attitude, India quite often interacted 
with the international community through multi-lateral forums, including prominent membership on a committee on 
nuclear disarmament. This is an important indicator of India’s belief that involvement in international forums had 
utility for advancing India’s interests.  
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during this period as primarily persuasive in nature. Given the earlier discussion about Gandhi’s 
worldview and the fact that this chapter picks up where Chapter 3 left off, I expected to find a 
persuasive grand strategy with either some coercive elements and/or a de-emphasis on ideational 
language. My analysis has uncovered the latter; India appears to have adopted a persuasive grand 
strategy with a reduced emphasis on ideational language in the period before its 1971 war with 
Pakistan.    
 
4.1.3 Post-1971 grand strategy analysis 
Tension between the two halves of Pakistan was nothing new; dating back to the mid-
1960s, they had co-existed uncomfortably for several years prior to the war in 1971, with the 
primary complaint being economic disparities between them.213 Tensions began to rise when 
president Ayub Khan, who had come to power in a coup, was forced from office in 1968 because 
of a deteriorating political situation in the country.214 Ayub Khan resigned and handed over the 
reins of the country to General Yahya Khan (no relation), who abrogated the constitution and, in 
1969, declared martial law in response to agitation for a move back towards a more representative 
democracy.215  
The tensions between East and West Pakistan over disparities in economic investment in 
the two regions came to a head in the parliamentary elections of 1970, when the Awami League, 
made up primarily of influential Eastern Pakistani, and thus Bengali, political parties, gained a 
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majority in the Pakistani parliament.216 After the Awami League’s victory at the ballot box, the 
Pakistani army, accustomed to political influence and general dominance in the political sphere, 
refused to cede power and decided to intervene militarily to resolve the situation.217 What resulted 
was both a military and humanitarian disaster. 
Two days before the national assembly was to meet, Yahya Khan announced its 
postponement, which led to an uprising in East Pakistan.218 Indian involvement in the conflict 
began almost as soon as the Pakistani army’s crackdown, with India not only providing refugees 
safe haven, but also sheltering the Awami League and declining to halt the creation of training 
locations for Bangladeshi fighters on its territory.219 Fearing that more open Indian involvement 
in the crisis was inevitable, as both Indian and Pakistani troops were being built up along the 
border, the Pakistani army decided to conduct a unilateral, pre-emptive strike on Indian forces on 
December 2nd, 1971.220 This triggered a two-pronged counteroffensive by the Indian military, 
which overwhelmed the Pakistani forces and managed to capture some territory in Eastern Pakistan 
in under two weeks. It also spelled the definitive end of a united Pakistan and left India’s primary 
rival dramatically weakened. 
Many scholars have argued that the events of 1971 heralded a new era in Indian security 
policy. They point to several reasons to believe such a claim. For example, on August 9th, India 
and the Soviet Union signed the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the 
Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”221 This is 
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notable, as previously India had studiously maintained a policy of non-alignment between the 
superpowers, and this treaty, while not a formal security guarantee, was a departure from previous 
Indian policy. Furthermore, given the thoroughness of the victory, and the dramatic weakening of 
Pakistan, India’s victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war was a significant potential inflection point 
for Indian grand strategy. Not only was India in a dominant military position, but Pakistan’s 
economy was weakened by the removal of Bangladesh and further plunged into crisis by the 
economic policies of President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.222 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war could therefore 
be interpreted as a shining example of the success of Indian grand strategy. India was neither the 
instigator of the conflict between East and West Pakistan nor the aggressor. The outcome of the 
conflict left it standing atop the remnants of its dramatically weakened adversary as the 
acknowledged leader of the sub-continent.223 This military ascendancy over Pakistan was then 
further solidified by India’s first nuclear test in 1974, even if it was billed as a ‘Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion.’224  
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285) 
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Figure 4.3. Topic Modeling results for India’s 1972-1977 Foreign Affairs Record entries – Beta Statistic 
 
Figure 4.3 displays the results of my analysis of the Foreign Affairs Record in the post-war 
period. There is a fair amount of overlap between the topics; words like “economic,” 
“cooperation,” “world,” and “peace” appear across topics, and evoke themes reminiscent of Non-
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Alignment.225 Topic 3 is perhaps the most easily parsed, as it clearly relates to India’s international 
agreements and efforts to pursue economic and development deals. One defining aspect of the 
early post-war period was Indian attempts at securing advantageous, if not necessarily friendly, 
relations with the newly created Bangladesh, as indicated by the presence of the term 
“Bangladesh.”226 Terms associated with this theme are readily apparent with “agreements” being 
the most obvious, but “trade,” “signed,” “rs” (the abbreviation for the Indian Rupee), and “million” 
are all equally suggestive. A look at the top ten documents associated with the term likewise 
confirms this focus on bilateral agreements between India and other countries.227 Emphasis on 
bilateral negotiations, where India may have more larger leverage over a narrower set of smaller 
or equally sized countries, as opposed to multilateral venues that would give India narrower 
leverage but a larger platform, is suggestive of the kind of realpolitik diplomacy associated with 
Gandhi. 
Topic 2 is similar to Topic 3 in that it deals with documents from Indian leaders in bilateral 
forums, most of which were public speeches. Here, India shows a shift away from the multi-lateral 
venues favored by Nehruvian Non-Alignment; while multi-lateral venues were still important 
enough to appear in both pre- and post-war analyses, bi-lateral forums were increasing in 
 
225 In the list of bigrams from the Foreign Affairs Record, the top pair of words containing any of these terms is a 
combination of two of the terms on the list: “economic cooperation.” 
226 A large number of India’s bilateral agreements around this time deal with Bangladesh. As a newly formed country, 
any number of mundane agreements (e.g. travel restrictions, residual border issues) would need to be renegotiated or 
created from whole cloth. Despite this, characterizations of the state of Indo-Bangladeshi relations since its founding 
have ranged from mediocre at best to problematic from the beginning. For examples of these different 
characterizations, see Datta (2002), Hossain (1981), Pant (2007) 
227 The top ten document titles for this topic (in order) are: “Agreement on Public 480 and Other Funds between India 
and the U.S.A.,” “Indo-Iranian Cultural Exchange Programme,” “Protocol on Credit Arrangement between India and 
Bangladesh,” “Indo-Bulgarian Trade and Payment Agreement,” “Agreement between Government of India and His 
Majesty's Government of Nepal regarding Projects taken up under Additional Assistance Programme,” “Economic 
Collaboration between the Govern ment of India and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,” “Indo-
Hungarian Trade Protocol,” “Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on Sharing of Ganga Waters at Farakka,” “Border 
Agreement between India and Bangladesh,” “India-Bangladesh Agreement on Travel Procedures.” 
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popularity. Importantly for a persuasive grand strategy, many of the same themes such as 
“cooperation,” “friendship,” and “peace” remain. Another intriguing holdover from Non-
Alignment that comes out in this topic is that, excepting a few speeches delivered in, or about, the 
Soviet Union, almost all of the top 100 documents are remarks delivered to the leaders of 
developing countries. This further reinforces the concept of a persuasive grand strategy, with India 
seeking diplomatic influence in the developing world. 
Topic 1 is drawn from documents from India’s dealings in multilateral forums. This is 
readily apparent from the presence of terms like “United Nations,” “conference,” and “committee.” 
Many of the same themes as those articulated in Topic 2 are present here, including a focus on 
“developing” countries, as well as “peace.”  That topics 1 and 2 refer to developing countries 
underscores Ganguly and Pardesi’s claim that India had interest in demonstrating leadership and 
building ties amongst developing countries. Despite the shift in the venue (from multi- to bi-lateral 
engagement), that India was attempting to build diplomatic influence, especially among those non-
aligned with the superpowers, is a quintessential example of a persuasive grand strategy. 
When considered as a whole, it is clear that, during this period, India continued to pursue 
a persuasive grand strategy. Given the contents of Topic 3, it could be argued that, with respect to 
Bangladesh, India chose to pursue a mixed persuasive-inducive grand strategy. This is evident 
from the fact that, while many aspects of Non-Alignment remain present in Indian rhetoric, there 
are clear signs of shift away from that version of a persuasive grand strategy: notably, a rise in the 
emphasis placed on bilateral forms of communication and efforts to secure advantageous 
agreements with Bangladesh. Based on this analysis, the relationship between Indian grand 
strategy pre- and post-war is best characterized by stability.   
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4.2 Potential explanations 
In the previous section, I identified India as having a persuasive pre-war grand strategy, 
even if there were some more realist elements in Gandhi’s foreign policy, as some scholars argue. 
Post-war, my analysis identified similar results. As in Chapter 3, in this section I first analyze each 
potential explanation of this grand strategic continuity for congruence between its expectation and 
the empirical record. I then utilize process tracing to validate the theories that are congruent. The 
two axes along which grand strategy theories have expectations are, first, whether to expect change 
or stability in form and, second, how fast this change should occur. Congruence testing can easily 
detect the first. The presence of the stipulated causal mechanism and the rate of change can be 
validated through process tracing.  
4.2.1 Externally oriented theories 
Externally oriented theories, both in the form of external threat or regional security 
architecture claims, should clearly explain this case, as it represents a dramatic change in both the 
external threat faced by India and the regional security balance; if such factors drive grand strategic 
change, they should do so in this case. In this section, I lay out each of the theories’ expectations 
and causal logic before determining whether or not they are congruent with the case. Assuming 
they are, I then look for evidence that the stipulated causal mechanism may be at work, before 




4.2.1.1 External Threat 
An external threat theory of grand strategic stability and change is one that, generally, 
expects stability when the threat landscape is stable and change when it is not. India won a decisive 
victory in 1971 and managed to cleave its arch-rival in two.  Because of this success, an external 
threat theory might offer a straightforward prediction for Indian grand strategy post-1971: India 
would continue its grand strategic trajectory. Recall that there were some signs of a shift towards 
a more coercively oriented strategy detected in the post-1962 war environment, as described in 
Chapter 3. The results of the 1971 war could have validated this trajectory; India managed to 
remove the threat of a two-front war with Pakistan at minimal cost. Furthermore, having lost a war 
in 1962 to China and fought Pakistan to a draw in 1965, such a decisive win could be seen as a 
major validation of India’s strategic direction and, as such, indicate that no further adjustments 
were necessary.  
However, the same logic might be used to justify change; given the relatively short 
turnaround from mere stalemate in 1965 to complete and relatively easy victory in 1971, theories 
of this type could just as easily predict India would double down on a shift away from a persuasive 
grand strategy and accelerate its rate of change. India had achieved conventional superiority over 
its arch-rival; only China stood between India and regional hegemony. If India continued to 
accelerate its military development and followed the path of a coercive grand strategy, it might 
plausibly have been able to challenge its only serious regional rival.  
The precise expectation of an external threat theory of grand strategic form is thus 
indeterminate. However, as there is a version of the claim that could be argued to expect India’s 
pre- and post-war grand strategic relationship to defined by stability, it could be congruent with 
the case. The analytical utility of the claim depends on whether there is evidence for the causal 
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logic stipulated by this theoretical claim: India’s grand strategic stability should result because it 
was considered to be strong enough vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China and, thus, no further changes 
were needed. 
In assessing this argument, it should be noted that scholars often contend India’s achieving 
conventional superiority over Pakistan and push to answer the threat of China’s nuclear weapons 
program drove Indian modernization policies during this period.228 This claim is suggestive of the 
causal logic of an external threat theory, and underscores the notion that stability in grand strategic 
form is attributable to the same impetus being present throughout the time period.  
There is some reason to think that external threats emanating from Pakistan and China were 
an important source of grand strategic stability. In defeating Pakistan in 1971, India can reasonably 
be said to have demonstrated that the conventional military deficiencies identified post-1962 had 
been adequately addressed. The investments in the coercive organization in Chapter 3, together 
with the signing of the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and the acquisition of weaponry 
from the Soviet Union and others, redressed the balance of power such that India had no further 
need to significantly invest in conventional forces to deal with that threat. However, in 1964, two 
years after India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war, China jumped even further ahead by successfully 
conducting a nuclear test, something no buildup of conventional arms could hope to match. Thus, 
while India may have been strong enough to defend itself conventionally, there was still the nuclear 
balance of power to consider. 
Scholars have noted that the origin of India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was at least in 
part a response to the threat of China’s nuclear program. Furthermore, the failure of Indian efforts 
to achieve nuclear guarantees that would assuage its security concerns convinced India that some 
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form of nuclear deterrent was needed.229 After conducting its test, India adopted a policy of nuclear 
ambiguity, not conducting another nuclear test for over 20 years.230 This restraint has been 
attributed to the fact that the international community’s outcry over the test surprised Indian 
decisionmakers, and the fact that the treaty with the Soviet Union left India with a strong enough 
security guarantee.231 The implication of all of this is that, by demonstrating some level of nuclear 
capability, India could arguably be said to have achieved sufficient parity that it could cease further 
immediate development.  
Thus, there is reason to believe that an external threat theory may have been the driver of 
Indian grand strategy during this time period. It is plausible that the observed stability in Indian 
grand strategy was driven by the balance of the reduced threat of conventional war with Pakistan 
and the increased nuclear imbalance with China. Once those threats had been adequately 
addressed, first by defeating and dismembering Pakistan and then by demonstrating some nascent 
nuclear capability and securing a diplomatic victory by concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union, 
there was no further need to change Indian grand strategy in a coercive direction. The Achilles 
heel of such a theory, however, is in its indeterminacy; India could just as easily have continued 
its trajectory and continued to transition towards a coercive grand strategy. For example, China, 
which had previously enjoyed a robust nuclear guarantee from the Soviet Union, continued to 
pursue nuclear weapons despite this guarantee, which contributed to the Sino-Soviet split.232 There 
is no necessary reason why, based on external threat calculations alone, India had to stop where it 
did, as the example of China clearly demonstrates. While the causal mechanism may plausibly be 
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at work, the theory on its own cannot provide guidance as to precisely why that particular branch 
of logic should apply in this particular case. As such, an external threat theory’s ability to explain 
the case is weaker than it otherwise might be. 
4.2.1.2 Regional Security Architecture 
A regional security architecture theory suggests that grand strategic change results from 
alteration in the web of alliances and guarantees in and around the country in question; stability is 
expected when that picture is relatively stable. In this case, the most straightforward expectation 
is that stability should result because India’s internal power and web of alliances were sufficient 
to defeat Pakistan in East Pakistan but not to capture Kashmir. However, it is also plausible that 
the defeat of Pakistan left a void in the region that India could fill with new constellations of 
alliances and diplomatic support. As with the external threat claim, a regional security architecture 
argument does not clearly suggest that there would necessarily be either change or stability in 
India’s grand strategy during this period. Given that India’s grand strategic trajectory over the 
course of the case is characterized by stability and there is a version of the regional security 
architecture theory that could account for such consistency, the claim could plausibly be congruent 
with the case. For the theory to offer a full explanation, there must be evidence that the 
constellation of alliances and diplomatic support was the driving factor in India’s decision to 
maintain a persuasive grand strategy. 
One of the most common pieces of evidence cited for India not pursuing complete victory 
against Pakistan is the pressure the superpowers exerted on India. In response to the crisis, the 
United States deployed the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal and the Soviet Union exerted 
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diplomatic pressure on India; both sought to secure a quick resolution to the conflict.233 There is 
also the matter that, by all accounts, India was caught off-guard by the international outcry 
generated by its first nuclear test, which played a role in restraining its nuclear development.234 If 
this narrative is correct, it suggests that India’s ambitions were restrained by the regional web of 
alliances and that there was no further space for India to expand in the coercive domain; any further 
or future aggressions on the part of India would likely lead to superpower intervention. However, 
this narrative may not be as straightforward as it appears. There are those who suggest that the role 
the superpowers played in the conflict has been overstated, and that instead it was structural 
factors, such as improved defenses on Pakistan’s west flank, a lack of materiel, the fact that most 
Indian forces were concentrated to the east, and other practical factors that may have restrained 
Indian ambitions.235 Thus, while considerations of external pressure clearly played a role in Indian 
decision-making at the time, the extent to which that pressure was decisive is a subject of debate. 
There is also one other incongruency in the historical record which warrants a brief 
discussion. As my post-1971 grand strategy analysis revealed, there were some indications that 
India attempted an inducive grand strategy with respect to Bangladesh. For a country whose grand 
strategy was generally predicated on persuasion, on first glance this seems odd. From the 
perspective of a theory that posits the web of relationships with which a country surrounds itself 
drives grand strategy, how India interacts with all of its neighbors should matter. Further, that 
treatment should be more or less consistent, lest it undermine the strategy. An external threat theory 
has no problem explaining this, as Bangladesh was so much weaker than India; India’s choice of 
whether and how to engage or ignore Bangladesh was immaterial. But if the power position of 
 
233 Raghavan (2013, 251) 
234 Ganguly (1999, 36) 
235 Cohen and Dasgupta (2010, 9) 
 155 
Bangladesh factored into Indian decision-making about how to engage, it suggests a focus more 
on external threat and power dynamics than a curated network of alliances, undermining support 
for the theory’s causal mechanism. 
On the whole, there is a reasonable degree of support for a regional security architecture 
hypothesis in this case; India was clearly cognizant of the effects its actions were having on the 
regional security dynamics. There are two factors that undermine confidence in the causal 
mechanism in this instance. First, the extent to which regional security architecture dynamics 
determined Indian behavior is in question; there is a case to be made that practical, operational-
level considerations influenced Indian decision-making. Second, there is no reason that India could 
not have asked the Soviet Union for more direct assistance in countering U.S. pressure, or press 
ahead and try and drag them along. The fact that it did not is somewhat problematic for this theory 
to explain, as there is no necessary reason it could not have acted more aggressively and tested the 
Soviet Union’s pledge of support. This reinforces the problem of theoretical indeterminacy 
inherent in external theories of grand strategy in this case. Indian behavior, while conforming to 
the theory’s expectations, displays some incongruencies under the surface that weakens confidence 
that the stipulated causal mechanism is at work.   
4.2.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case 
Both externally oriented theories are arguably congruent with this case and there is 
evidence suggesting their causal mechanisms may have been in play. However, the flaw in both 
externally oriented theories is in their indeterminacy; the same logic that justifies an expectation 
of grand strategic stability could be used to argue for grand strategic change, without any clearly 
specified criterion for expecting one or the other outcome to be dominant in this case study. Thus, 
while a credible argument can be made for both theories, a decisive one cannot, rendering support 
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weaker than it would otherwise be. Now, I will explore internally oriented theories’ ability to 
explain the case. 
4.2.2 Internally oriented theories 
This section examines how well a leadership theory and a strategic culture theory of grand 
strategic stability and change can explain Indian behavior after the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan War. 
As above, I first determine whether the theoretical expectations are plausibly congruent with the 
case and identify what causal logic to look at. I then determine whether that causal logic is 
plausibly at work. I conclude with a brief summary of both theories’ ability to explain the case. 
4.2.2.1 Leadership 
A leadership theory of grand strategic form expects change when leaders and/or their 
preferences change and stability when they do not. In this instance, Gandhi is a constant 
throughout, and there is no reason to believe her preferences were affected one way or the other 
by the outcome of the war, or even by her brief ouster from power in 1977.236 In analyses of 
Gandhi’s leadership style throughout the period, scholars have put emphasis on her desire to 
centralize power in her own hands and consult with only a few trusted advisors.237 Many of the 
actions India took in the time period, including the exact timing of its nuclear test, have been 
attributed to Gandhi’s direction and preferences for concentrating political power.238 This suggests 
that Gandhi had a preference for realpolitik in both domestic and foreign policy that continued 
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throughout the period. Thus, a leadership theory of grand strategy, predicated on the continuity of 
Gandhi and her grand strategic preferences throughout the period can plausibly be said to be 
congruent with the case.  
In assessing the question about whether Gandhi and her preferences set Indian grand 
strategy, three incidents are typically cited in support of this argument. One is her handling of the 
1971 conflict itself. In this interpretation, India’s decision to intervene in Pakistan was calculated 
almost from the beginning of the crisis, and the dramatic result served to secure Gandhi’s place 
atop Indian politics and victory in the parliamentary elections in 1972.239 This suggests Gandhi 
saw the opportunity to dismember Pakistan and secure India’s position in the region, and waited 
until conditions were right to take it. If this interpretation of Gandhi’s motivations is incorrect, 
however, it suggests that Gandhi was not the ‘militant Nehruvian’ some claim.240 The second event 
cited in support of a leadership theory is the timing of the 1974 Pokhran I nuclear test. Here, 
scholars point out that the exact timing of the test was dictated by Gandhi’s political calculus, and 
structural Indian weakness afterward prevented further ambition.241 The implication is the fallout 
from the test demonstrated to Gandhi that the limits of India’s coercive potential were reached and 
restrained her from further steps down that path. Other events that have been cited as part of this 
pattern are Gandhi’s 1974 decisions to simultaneously pull away slightly from the Soviet Union 
and re-engage with the United States in an effort to bolster India’s international position, with both 
efforts indicating that, at least when it came to the superpowers, India had not abandoned its 
persuasive grand strategy.242 
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Taken together, this evidence paints a compelling picture that Gandhi’s grand strategic 
preferences could have been the deciding factor in Indian grand strategy throughout this period. 
As a noted practitioner of realpolitik, Gandhi was able to maximize the tools at India’s disposal to 
great effect. In rebutting this narrative, some scholars have pointed out that India’s military buildup 
pre-dates Gandhi and was not directly influenced by her during her tenure.243 While slightly 
undermining the argument, this evidence does not serve to prove that Gandhi’s strategic 
preferences did not take full advantage of the earlier build-up, to India’s advantage. Thus, I 
conclude that a leadership theory may explain this case. 
4.2.2.2 Strategic Culture 
A strategic culture theory expects that grand strategies change as culture does and stability 
to result when it does not. After a victory as decisive as the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, it is entirely 
plausible that India’s strategic culture might begin to shift. It is equally plausible that the victory 
reinforced the existing culture. In either case, in the short-term stability is expected, as cultural 
change takes time to propagate. The empirical difference between the two is that, if the central 
paradigm of the culture shifts from pre-war to post-war, a strategic culture theory would expect a 
change in grand strategy over time; if the central paradigm remains the same, long term stability 
should result. Thus, while a strategic culture theory is congruent with the case, it remains to be 
seen if either of the stipulated causal mechanisms are at work.  
A decisive victory has the potential to change attitudes towards the use of force, just as a 
loss did in the 1962 case, but it is implausible to expect a rapid shift in cultural beliefs. In order to 
account for the observed stability, the first hoop a strategic culture theory must pass is 
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demonstrating evidence of its central paradigm. As established in Chapter 3, the central paradigm 
of Indian strategic culture at the time could plausibly be described as one which saw war as 
atypical, threat as variable-sum, and a limited role for force. To bolster the argument that this 
central paradigm was still in place, proponents of this class of theory might point to the decision-
making of Indian leaders in both the run-up to the conflict, but also its resolution, as affirmative 
evidence. Pre-war, there is evidence that Gandhi, both publicly and privately, did not want to 
intervene militarily in the conflict in East Pakistan, given that it could create more problems for 
India than it solved.244 In fact, a number of scholars have cited Gandhi as preferring a political 
solution.245 Even if this interpretation of Gandhi’s motivations is incorrect, India initiated a 
unilateral cease fire during the 1971 conflict.246 This suggests that India’s central paradigm, which 
saw limited utility in the use of force, was still in existence during this period. This interpretation 
of India’s central paradigm is further buttressed by the fact that, post-war, India did not follow up 
on its first nuclear test for another 25 years. Had India’s strategic culture viewed war as inevitable, 
or the threat posed by its neighbors as zero-sum, then India should have acquired nuclear weapons 
as fast as possible. On the basis of this evidence, India can plausibly be said to have a central 
paradigm which favored the choice of a persuasive grand strategy at this time. 
The central paradigm alone is not sufficient to determine whether a strategic culture logic 
was at work in this case. The other hoop that must be passed is to find proof both of the operational 
assumptions about when, how, and under what conditions the use of force is called for, and that 
they guided Indian behavior. Here, affirmative evidence of the preference of India’s strategic 
culture can be found in India’s push for a diplomatic resolution to the Kashmir question post-war, 
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as opposed to taking it by force in war. While India was quite willing to opportunistically utilize 
force to pry East and West Pakistan apart, seizing territory by force would only create a wider 
conflict.247 Scholars have pointed out that the fact that the Indian army did not pursue a military 
solution, or even utilize the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war captured in the fall of East Pakistan, 
as evidence of a pattern of strategic restraint on the part of India.248 Another piece of evidence that 
might be pointed to, as it relates to strategic restraint, is India’s decision to unilaterally end the 
war. A strategic culture theorist might contend that attempting to continue the war would be out 
of character for India; scholars such as Tanham have argued that India lacks an “expansionist 
military tradition.”249 The halt, and subsequent attempts by Gandhi to negotiate a settlement of the 
Kashmir question, can be interpreted as manifestations of this lack of an expansionist tradition. 
Taken together, these facts suggest that Indian strategic culture arguably saw limited utility in the 
use of force for deciding the outcome of disputes. 
This interpretation of India’s actions during the war as a manifestation of India’s strategic 
culture begins to be called into question, however, when considering other scholarship on this 
topic, some of which suggests that more practical concerns at play. For instance, there is some 
debate about whether or not a seizure of Kashmir during this conflict was actually feasible, as there 
was a credible threat of U.S. intervention and any seizure of territory by India might have led to 
escalation.250 Others have suggested that India’s reliance on imported Soviet weaponry and its 
associated need to secure Soviet consent for the invasion was at play in India’s decision-making.251  
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Thus, the evidence of the operational assumptions of India’s strategic culture being at work in the 
case is mixed, as there is a credible argument that more practical concerns were in play. 
While there is some evidence in favor of strategic culture as an explanation for Indian 
behavior in this case, it is not entirely compelling. I can find evidence of the first half of a strategic 
culture theory’s expectation: a central paradigm which places a reduced emphasis on the use of 
force. When it comes to the operational level assumptions that dictate when and how force is used, 
however, the evidence is mixed. As such, I conclude that, while a strategic culture explanation 
may plausibly be said to be at work in this case, it is not completely convincingly.  
4.2.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case 
 
As demonstrated above, internally oriented theories of grand strategy formation and change 
perform much better than external ones. A leadership theory of grand strategic change is congruent 
with the case, and there is strong evidence that Gandhi’s grand strategic preferences remained 
stable throughout. A strategic culture theory of grand strategic form also presents a relatively 
robust potential explanation of the case, passing one of the necessary hoops it needs to, but there 
is mixed evidence for the second, leaving it unable to be eliminated as the mechanism at work but 
also not convincingly affirmed. 
4.2.3 Organizational determinants of grand strategy 
My theory contends that a state’s grand strategic form flows from the allocation of its 
money, manpower, and elite attention. It expects stability when either the pattern of resource 
allocation follows a similar trend over time or when there are mixed indicators and path 
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dependence precludes alteration. Pre-war, India had a largely persuasive grand strategy; it pursued 
a similar grand strategy post-war. As resource re-allocations are less likely after a victory, 
especially one that does not net a corresponding resource influx, the observed stability broadly 
congruent with my theory’s expectations. The remainder of this section explores the extent to 
which my theory can fully explain the case. 
4.2.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources 
During the pre-war period, Indian state-level resources grew at a relatively steady rate. As 
Figure 4.4 below demonstrates, GDP growth was on a relatively gentle trajectory. This creates a 
baseline expectation that I should observe relatively stable increases in organizational-level 
monetary resources over the period, all other things being equal. Manpower likewise grew steadily. 
The population of India grew from a general population just under 510 million total people in 1966 
to around 568 million in 1971, while the number of military aged males, aged 15-64, grew from 
145 million to just under 165 million during the same period. 
 
Figure 4.4. GDP of India 1966-1971 (Constant 2010 USD) 
 163 
Finally, when considering state-level elite attention, India was broadly consumed with 
regional goings-on. Table 4.1, which summarizes the top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times 
of India headlines over the period, clearly demonstrates that Indian attention was primarily focused 
on its own region. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan appears prominently on the list, as India fought a war 
with Pakistan in 1965 and tensions between East and West Pakistan dominated headlines in the 
run-up to the 1971 war. Focus on the Vietnam war, which was in full swing during this period, 
also dominates, with events in China a distant third. Overall, these events generally continue the 
trends observed in Chapter 3, with the increased uptick in interest in Vietnam being an important 
but unsurprising exception. Given that there are no major surprises or large-scale discontinuities 
which require explanation, I will now examine how organizational-level resources were distributed 
in the pre-war years. 
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Table 4.1. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1966-1971 
Word(s) Total Number of Mentions 
"Pak" or "Pakistan" 35 
Viet nam or Viet Cong 31 









4.2.3.2 Pre-war organizational level resources 
All three types of organization examined in this dissertation show growth in their 
resourcing over the period, but all have notable dips in the 1967-1968 timeframe, as demonstrated 
in Figure 4.5. State-level monetary resources, as displayed in Figure 4.4,  do record a minor dip in 
calendar year 1968, and so the temporary decline in organizational-level resources is likely related 
to the corresponding reduction in state-level resources. In 1966-67, appropriations for the coercive 
organization are just over 5.5 Billion 2010 USD, before sharply contracting around six percent to 
5.2B, and ending at 5.7B at the end of fiscal year 1970-71; appropriations in the persuasive domain 
grow from around 175 Million 2010 USD in 1966-67 to around 225 Million by the end of the 
period. Inducive organizations followed a similar pattern, contracting nine percent before 
rebounding during this time. As before, the absolute value of the money and manpower allocated 
coercive organizations is orders of magnitude higher than allocations to the inducive and 
persuasive organizations. Trends in absolute levels of funding do not tell the whole story, however. 
When considering the rate of change, as opposed to the absolute value, persuasive efforts gained 
the most resources in the period, as demonstrated by Figure 4.6. The erratic jumps in resourcing 
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for the inducive organization are once again attributable to the frequent reorganizations this and 
affiliated ministries went through.  
Figure 4.5. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1966 – 1971 
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Figure 4.6. Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1966-1971 
 
When considering organization-level manpower, Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of 
civilian personnel amongst the various ministries. Here, there is a continuation of the trends from 
the post-1962 analysis; personnel engaged in persuasive activities continue on a general downward 
trajectory while an increasing number of civilians are employed in coercive endeavors. The 
inducive ministry shows more volatility in personnel; it is only towards the end of this timeframe 
that the reorganizations of the inducive ministry noted earlier began to stabilize. Given these 
frequent reorganizations of the inducive organization(s), the significance of the observed jumps in 
resources in either money or manpower should be discounted; these are more likely explained 
through the ebb and flow of resources as part of the re-organization process than any desire to shift 




Figure 4.7. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1965-1971) 
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Finally, Table 4.2 clearly displays that Indian elite attention was fixated primarily on 
internal issues, as four of the top 5 bigrams reference internal Indian affairs. The fourth most 
common word pair is “West Bengal,” which is the Indian state that bordered East Pakistan, and 
this topic likely references the refugees that flowed from East Pakistan into India as the crisis 
intensified. That 80% of the bigrams are focused on domestic concerns is highly suggestive of the 
fact that not a great deal of resources, at least in the form of elite attention, were being paid to any 
particular grand strategy.     
 
Table 4.2. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1966-1971 
Word 1 Word 2 Number of appearances  
Prime Minister 72 
Indira Gandhi 49 
Chief Minister 46 
West Bengal 26 
Home Minister 15 
Lok Sabha 14 
Union Government 13 
Congress President 12 
Madhya Pradesh 12 
Viet Nam 12 
 
Taken together, the three resource indicators point in different directions. More money, by 
percentage increase, was being allocated towards persuasion, which suggests a relative emphasis 
on a persuasive grand strategy. However, more manpower was flowing towards coercive 
organizations, which would suggest pursuit of a coercive grand strategy. Meanwhile, elite attention 
was firmly fixated on domestic events, resulting in grand strategic paralysis. In such a case, my 
theoretical expectation is that, due to path dependence, India should default to its existing grand 
strategy. In situations where path dependence and increasing return logic dominates, the costs of 
switching from one option to another become increasingly difficult. India had been pursuing a 
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persuasive grand strategy in the period immediately prior to this one. With money pointing in the 
direction of a persuasive grand strategy, and manpower pointed toward a coercive grand strategy, 
additional resources, perhaps in the form of elite attention, would be needed to achieve this 
strategic shift.  
Because elite attention was overwhelming fixated on internal issues, a shift was not 
possible. India’s prior grand strategy was persuasive, and my analysis of the documentary record 
above reveals a corresponding persuasive grand strategy in the pre-war analysis of Indian grand 
strategy; my theory explains why there was such continuity.  
4.2.3.3 Post-war state-level resources 
 
Post-war, Indian GDP continued to grow at a relatively constant, if slow, rate. Population 
growth continued more or less at the same pace, ending the period with a total population of just 
over 650 million, with 191 million men of military age. Interest in events in Pakistan, Vietnam, 
and the newly created Bangladesh dominated public attention in the realm of foreign policy. In 
short, India did not experience a dramatic shift in state-level resources that could account for any 
sudden increases in organization-level resourcing as a result of the conflict. These data indicate 
that India was firmly ensconced in its role as a middle power and its experience in the 1971 war 
did not significantly alter the resources available to the country, even if it did enjoy a strong 
regional position as a consequence of its victory. 
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Figure 4.8. GDP of India 1966-1977 (Constant 2010 USD) 
 
Table 4.3. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1971-1977 
Word(s) Total Number of Mentions 
"Pak" or Pakistan 41 
"Cong", "Viet", or "Nam" 40 
"Bangla" or Bangladesh 20 
U.S. 15 







4.2.3.4 Post-war organizational level resources 
 
India’s distribution of organizational level resources tells a richer story than the relatively 
slow growth of Indian state-level resources at the time. In my analysis of Indian grand strategy in 
the post-war years, I identified a continuation of its persuasive grand strategy. I also pointed out 
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in my post-war analysis that one of India’s goals was to secure an advantageous relationship with 
the newly created Bangladesh. Figure 4.9 displays the money appropriated to various Indian 
ministries over the period. Similar to my examination of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, appropriations 
for coercive elements of power spike in the year of the conflict before beginning a downward trend 
afterwards and then ticking up slightly at the end of the period. Significantly, appropriations to 
India’s persuasive element of power jump up dramatically in the year after the war before settling 
into a higher baseline in the post-war years. Also of note is the rapid increase in appropriations for 
the inducive elements of power, with dramatic gains seen from 1972 onwards. 
While by absolute value in both money and manpower the coercive organization 
dominates, when considering the relative investment, or percentage change, a more complex story 
unfolds. Figure 4.10 depicts relative changes in levels of spending and appears to show preferential 
investment in the inducive organization but, when one examines the data in further detail, this is 
not the case; dramatic year over year change occurs primarily in two fiscal years, 1966-67 and 
1973-74. In the pre-war analysis, I noted that the large percentage change in 1966-67 was 
accounted for by reorganization, but what of the investment in 1973-74? In examining the speech 
which presented that year’s budget, Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan announced: 
There are a number of ongoing schemes which form the core of the 
Plan and provide the necessary infrastructure for our industry and 
commerce. We have to find resources for these. The Plan provision 
for power is being increased from Rs.88 crores this year to Rs.115 
crores next year. Provision for increasing production capacity in the 
field of fertilizers and chemicals is being fixed at Rs.134 crores, as 
against Rs.95 crores in the 1972-73 Plan. Honourable Members will 
agree with me that an increased supply of power and of such critical 
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inputs as fertilizers will have a highly favourable effect on the 
growth in agriculture and industry.252 
This change in budgetary allocation is likely to have been more internally directed.253 When those 
years are discounted, the trend in relative emphasis in monetary investment is clearly on the 
persuasive organization. 
Further reinforcing the relative persuasive focus is the fact that later in the same budget 
speech, Minister Chavan stated “On the non-Plan side due care has been taken to restrict the growth 
of expenditure to the minimum level. Defence expenditure is retained at the same level as in current 
year, namely, Rs.1600 crores.”254 Future iterations of the budget speech during this period would 
attribute growth generally to pay increases, and other benefits increases, as opposed to increases 
in materiel.255 This underscores the persuasive interpretation of Figure 4.10 provided above and 
reinforces the argument that Indian monetary resources were being preferentially sourced in the 
persuasive direction. 
In my post-1971 grand strategy analysis, I highlighted evidence that India might be 
pursuing an inducive grand strategy with respect to Bangladesh. Obviously, a smoking-gun piece 
of evidence for this assertion would be statements by key leaders indicating that India planned to 
secure advantage in Bangladesh by way of monetary investments. One place to find such evidence 
is the yearly speech introducing the Union budget for India for that year. In the speech presenting 
the budget for 1972-3, Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan declared: 
Honourable Members would appreciate that we have to assist the 
friendly people and Government of Bangladesh in their immediate 
 
252 Chavan (1973, 7). Each year the Minister of Finance delivers a speech outlining the Government’s economic 
estimate and budgetary priorities for the coming year. A record of each of these speeches from the founding of the 
Indian republic to today can be found at: https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/bspeech.php 
253 Recall that the organization responsible for inducive functions during this time was the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and, as such, some internal functions are unavoidably captured. 
254 Chavan (1973, 9) 
255 Subramaniam (1976, 10, 1975, 8), Patel (1977, 9), Chavan (1974b, 3, 1974a, 8) 
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task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. To the extent that we have 
drawn upon the accumulated stocks in the economy and there has 
been unusual wear and tear of our productive assets, these will have 
to be made good. But above all, now that the refugees have been 
able to return to their homes, we have to redirect our energies 
increasingly to satisfy the aspirations of our own people.256 
 
While suggestive that India was investing in Bangladesh, this evidence does not rise to the high 
level required to confirm that the reason India was investing in Bangladesh was for inducive 
reasons; it does not clearly demonstrate intent to persuade Bangladesh to support India through 
monetary assistance, but it does lend some credence to the notion.  
 
256 Chavan (1972, 1) 
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Figure 4.9. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for years 1966-1977 
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Figure 4.10. Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1966-1977 
 
Figure 4.11 details personnel in the various ministries during the years in question, and 
represents a departure from the trends seen in the pre-war analysis. Personnel levels began to grow 
in both the inducive and persuasive ministries in the post-war period but, given the contraction of 
personnel seen in the pre-war time period, the total result is still a net loss in personnel for the 
persuasive organization. The significance of comparisons in numbers of inducive personnel pre- 
and post-war should be discounted due to the pre-war reorganizations. Civilian employees of the 
coercive organizations continue to rise, although at a much slower pace post-1972, which saw an 





Figure 4.11. Personnel employed by select Indian organizations per year, 1965 – 1977 
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Table 4.4. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1972-1977 
Word 1 Word 2 Number of appearances  
Prime Minister 97 
Indira Gandhi 45 
Chief Minister 41 
Lok Sabha 17 
Tamil Nadu 17 
Union Minister 16 
Maharashtra Government 15 
Ali Ahmed 14 
Congress Party 14 
West Bengal 14 
 
Table 4.4 lists the most frequently occurring pairs of words in the abstracts of articles 
surveyed. Of most interest in Table 4.4 is the complete lack of foreign policy topics listed amongst 
the Times of India abstracts surveyed in the post-war years. This is in sharp contrast to the post-
1962 era, when there were a large number of foreign policy topics. The change is likely due to the 
deteriorating political situation in India during this period and the declaration of a state of 
emergency in the country by Gandhi in 1975. Just as in the pre-war analysis, money generally 
points toward a persuasive grand strategy, manpower points to a coercive one, and elite attention 
is being directed elsewhere. In such instances, path dependence should dominate and grand 
strategic stability should result.  
Given this is what the empirical record shows with respect to Indian grand strategy over this 
period of time, there is sufficient evidence to suggest my theory may be at work in the case, but 
not enough to rule out any of the other theories.  While my theory clears the hoops it needs to, the 
available evidence does not rise to the level of being able to conclusively rule out alternatives. For 
example, the speeches by Minister Chavan are both suggestive of my causal mechanism at work. 
In one quote, it suggests India was clearly weighing its priorities because of limited resources, and 
minimizing investment in the coercive domain, but stops just short of indicating preferential 
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investment in the persuasive domain. In another, Minister Chavan talks about the need to assist 
Bangladesh, but is not specific enough to affirm the reason. Thus, while there is a solid amount of 
evidence in favor of the logic of my theory, it is not decisive. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In the wake of such an overwhelming victory, there are many potential expectations for 
Indian grand strategic direction, with certain theories having more or less explanatory power. 
India’s pre-war grand strategic direction was a persuasive grand strategy. My analysis of the 
documentary record revealed that, post-war, India continued to pursue a persuasive grand strategy. 
To explain the case, each theory must be able to explain both the form (stability) and rate of change 
(slow). Externally oriented theories, both external threat and regional security architecture, are 
plausibly congruent with the case, and there is some evidence to suggest their causal mechanisms 
might be at work. The trouble with these theories, however, is that, overall, they both offer 
indeterminant theoretical expectations about whether India’s grand strategy should change or 
remain stable during this period. Internally oriented theories fare better. A leadership-centric 
theory is also plausibly congruent with the case, with supporting evidence. A strategic culture 
theory is also congruent and plausibly at work in the case, but evidence for the operational level 
assumptions of that strategic culture is scant.  My organizational determinants theory also provides 
a plausible explanation, but available evidence stops just short of the bar to eliminate rival 
hypotheses. Table 4.5 below summarizes the expectations of the theories and their ability to 
explain the case. 
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Table 4.5. Summary of rival explanations ability to explain the case 












Indeterminate Indeterminate Stability Stability Stability 
Expectation 


















met? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explains the 
case? No No Yes Some Doubts Yes 
 
As has been noted previously, the key problem with externally oriented theories is their 
indeterminacy; it is not clear whether they would necessarily call for either grand strategic stability 
or change in this instance, and credible arguments could be advanced for either course. This leaves 
them in somewhat problematic theoretical territory. Internally oriented theories, on the other hand, 
have relatively clean theoretical expectations of grand strategic stability. A leadership theory is 
plausibly at work, as Gandhi and her grand strategic preferences are both constants throughout. 
Strategic culture passes a majority, but not all, of the theoretical hoops required to demonstrate the 
causal mechanism, as there is no definitive affirmative evidence of India’s operational level 
assumptions about the use of force at work. There are also some open questions around the reasons 
for India’s behavior during and after the conflict which cannot be fully accounted for, namely, how 
revisionist scholarship has cast doubt on the narrative of a restrained India. Despite these open 
questions, I cannot fully rule out this theory. 
My theory’s expectations are in line with the empirical record with regard to both the form 
and rate of change in Indian grand strategy. In the post-war period, India’s money, manpower, and 
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elite attention were split between the various different elements of power, with elite attention most 
notably not being allocated to foreign policy topics at all. In such cases, the path dependency and 
increasing returns logics of my theory forecast grand strategic stability. In cases such as this, the 
cost to choose alternative strategies are high. Unless sufficient resources are dedicated to an 
alternative strategy, the previous strategy (in this case a persuasive one) should continue to be 
dominant. Furthermore, my theory can add descriptive richness and highlight important nuances 
in Indian grand strategy, especially in the post-war era, by both offering a plausible explanation 
for the observed stability in grand strategy and advancing evidence that resourcing tradeoffs in line 
with my theoretical expectations were under consideration. While my organizational theory clears 
all of the theoretical hoops required to affirm it as plausibly at work, a lack of decisive evidence 
at key points means the evidence stops just short of being able to exclude alternate competing 
hypotheses. 
As such, it appears that this case is somewhat overdetermined, with all of the theories’ 
causal mechanisms plausibly at work. While externally oriented theories remain in problematic 
territory because of their indeterminacy, internally oriented theories, and most notably strategic 
culture, have fared well across the two cases thus far. Likewise, my theory also performs at least 
as well as others. The coming chapter examines Indian grand strategy surrounding the 1999 Kargil 
crisis, which once again saw India and Pakistan come into conflict, this time with an indecisive 
result. Given the fact that this case involves a substantial leap forward in time, it provides an 
important test of a strategic culture argument; Indian strategic culture would have had plenty of 
time to shift in the intervening years. Finally, the case also completes all potential variations of 
war outcomes (loss, win, draw) and provides a robust test for all theories under examination. 
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5.0 The 1999 Kargil Crisis 
My final case study examines India’s grand strategy around the turn of the millennium. 
The Kargil Crisis started in late 1999, after Pakistani army troops and paramilitary forces occupied 
Indian outposts that were abandoned during the winter months due to the inhospitable climate. 
After India became aware of the incursions, a response was mounted which ultimately saw 
Pakistani forces ejected from Indian territory. The Kargil Crisis is an attractive case primarily 
because it provides important variation in comparison to the other cases with respect to war 
outcome, geo-political landscape, and political party in power. As the conflict takes place almost 
50 years after the founding of the Republic of India, it also serves as an important test for the 
strategic culture hypothesis, as sufficient time elapsed from both India’s colonial legacy and the 
death of the country’s influential first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to allow for potentially 
significant shifts of Indian strategic culture to have taken place.    
5.1 Indian grand strategy and the Kargil Crisis 
Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha Rao, more commonly known as P.V. Narasimha Rao, 
became the ninth person to serve as Prime Minister of India in June of 1991, roughly one month 
after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and six months before the fall of the Soviet Union. At the 
time, India was going through a dire balance of payments crisis; facing double digit inflation, a 
devaluation of its currency, and depleted foreign exchange reserves, India’s economy was in urgent 
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need of reform.257 During his tenure, which lasted from 1991 to 1996, Rao not only reformed the 
economy, but also Indian foreign policy. The sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union at the end 
of 1991 left India without its primary provider of military aid and closest foreign policy partner.258 
Rao’s government initiated the Look East policy, which sought to re-orient India away from Non-
Alignment and towards affairs located in its own geographic region, with a particular focus on 
‘economic diplomacy.’259 
After the Indian National Congress, the political party that had traditionally held the 
dominant political position in Indian politics, was defeated at the polls in 1996, India went through 
a revolving door of Prime Ministers for a period of about two years, ending with the second 
election of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister. Though he 
was of a different party than Rao, Vajpayee largely maintained the general direction of India’s 
foreign policy, and notably continued the Look East policy. Despite this continuity, scholars such 
as G.V.C. Naidu have noted that the policy went through at least three distinct phases: one of 
intense activity and engagement with countries in the region, a period of stagnation roughly 
coinciding with the financial troubles of 1997-1998, and finally a renewal of interest in the 
policy.260  
If Non-Alignment was a vision of a world order (i.e., free of destructive superpower 
competition, and receptive to Indian ideals such as anti-racialism) with some notion of how to get 
there (e.g., friendly relations with as many countries as possible, abjuring the use of force), the 
Look East policy represented a markedly different means to achieve Indian security, even if the 
 
257 Sangvikar, Pawar, and Pahurkar (2019, 1) 
258 Chiriyankandath (2004, 199), Thakur (2007, 831) 
259 Haokip (2014, 246) 
260 Naidu (2004, 340) 
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end goal was the same. Whereas Non-Alignment sought to maintain friendly relations with as 
many countries as possible on a global stage, Look East sought to strategically target countries in 
India’s near abroad and increase Indian influence in the region. As Naidu describes it: 
The Look East policy was a multi-faceted and multi-pronged 
approach to establish strategic links with many individual countries, 
evolve closer political links with ASEAN, and develop strong 
economic bonds with the region. Second, it was an attempt to carve 
a place for India in the larger Asia- Pacific. Third, the Look East 
policy was also meant to showcase India's economic potential for 
investments and trade. In a way, this policy also started influencing 
India's foreign policy significantly.261 
There is some debate about the ‘depth’ of both the Look East policy and strategic thinking, 
in India during some of this time period. For instance, regarding strategic thought, Narang and 
Staniland contend:  
The coalition governments of 1989–1991, 1991–1996, and 1996–
1998 were all weak collections of regional and national parties. It is 
impossible to derive any new strategic worldviews from their 
leaders, who gave remarkably little attention to foreign policy (the 
Gujral Doctrine outlining India’s stance toward its immediate 
neighborhood notwithstanding). Instead, they mouthed the same 
vague platitudes that had animated Indian leaders for decades.262 
On the other hand, Staniland and Narang are quick to point out that this changes with the victory 
of the BJP.263 The Gujral doctrine was articulated by then-Foreign Minister, later Prime Minister, 
Inder Kumar Gujral. Gujral outlined “a set of five principles to guide the conduct of foreign 
relations with India’s immediate neighbors.”264  This set of principles included “initiating 
unilateral goodwill gestures towards India’s smaller regional neighbors.”265 Even if these gestures 
 
261 Naidu (2004, 337)  
262 Narang and Staniland (2012, 87, 2018, 87) 
263 Narang and Staniland (2012, 87, 2018, 87) 
264 Murthy (2008, 639) 
265 Sridharan (2006, 80) 
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were unilateral, they are indicative of a transactory relationship, the hallmark of an inducive grand 
strategy. Chietigj Bajpaee also argues that the typical ‘phased’ descriptors of the Look East policy 
are not as clear cut as the general literature suggests, and belies an ‘aspirational’ as opposed to 
substantive change in the thrust of the policy.266 Others, such as Chiriyankandath, argue that 
India’s post-Cold War policy is best summed up not by the Look East policy, but rather by the 
decision to adopt nuclear weapons in 1998 and to thaw Indo-American relations.267    
From the description above, there is some uncertainty about the overarching nature of 
India’s grand strategy at this time. This uncertainty offers an important opportunity for my 
approach to identifying grand strategic emphasis to shed light on the question. First, if the Look 
East policy, which aligns with an inducive grand strategy as I defined the concept in Chapter 2, 
was in fact India’s grand strategy, then the topics identified by my modeling should be dominated 
by words which suggest agreements or statements being made that involve the transfer of things 
such as money, goods, technical knowledge and the like. Alternatively, if Chiriyankandah’s 
assertion about India coercive bent in policy (i.e., defined by nuclear weapons and the US-Indian 
détente) is correct, I should observe evidence of these hard power concerns. Should Narang and 
Staniland’s assessment regarding the lack of attention to foreign policy concerns be correct, I 
should observe evidence of no particular grand strategy. My topic modelling, having demonstrated 
its capacity to identify Indian grand strategy in the earlier periods, when India’s approach was 
clearer than it was in the 1990s, should help resolve this debate. 
 
266 Bajpaee (2017, 18) 
267 Chiriyankandath (2004, 200) 
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5.1.1 Measuring grand strategy 
Just as in the previous cases, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modeling is used to 
analyze statements, speeches, trade agreements, and other key documents released by the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).268 The Foreign Affairs Record released annually by the MEA 
provides the data underpinning my analysis of India’s pre-Kargil Crisis grand strategy. The 
Foreign Affairs Record was discontinued in its original format in 1999, however, which means 
that my post-Kargil analysis draws on a similar, although slightly different, pool of documents. 
Despite these differences, which will be described further below, the two corpora are comparable.  
As previously discussed, the Foreign Affairs Record contains a large assortment of press 
releases, transcripts of speeches by various Indian government officials, official statements, and 
texts of agreements made between India and other countries. In keeping with prior chapters, the 
data was scrubbed of any joint statements, or speeches attributed to non-Indians. The end result is 
a corpus of 1,452 documents spanning the years pre-Kargil years, 1994 to 1999, which is the 
largest selection of documents in all of the cases. The Foreign Affairs Record was discontinued, 
for reasons that are not immediately clear in 1999; in its place, the MEA began publishing the 
types of documents formerly contained in the Foreign Affairs Record in an online database on 
their website, sorted by year and document type. There are two caveats that warrant noting. One 
is that, because of the transition, information for the year 2000 is missing from the online data. 
Another is that there is a potential for significantly more noise in the data than had heretofore been 
the case.  For example, the category of press releases now includes notices regarding all changes 
 
268 As a reminder, topic modeling identifies a set number of topics from a dataset (corpus), where each topic is 
composed of a set of words, and each document is composed of a set of topics; it is a method to quickly and efficiently 
extract probable themes from large datasets, without having to read each individual document. 
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of ambassadors. As there is currently no method to download the documents in bulk, and the 
government of India prohibits both data scraping and blocks Internet Protocol Addresses that 
download large amounts of data in one session, I collected a smaller, more targeted set of 
documents. I prioritized acquisition of speeches and statements from Indian leaders to ensure as 
much compatibility with previous data as possible. As texts of agreements and major press releases 
are missing from what was collected through this targeting strategy, it is possible that there is some 
loss of fidelity. 
Despite these limitations, the assembled statements still yield a dataset of almost 400 
documents, which is roughly the same size at the dataset for the pre-Sino-Indian War analysis. In 
keeping with the other cases considered in this dissertation, I used k-means clustering to determine 
how many topics to model for each time period. Pre-1999, the model identified two very different 
numbers of potential topics, either two or six. While in previous cases I noted sharp drop-offs in 
the sum of squares when going from one topic to two, the bend at two topics is remarkable. 
Although difficult to detect with the naked eye, there is another knee in the curve where the slope 
alters at six topics. For the sake of analytic and descriptive richness, six topics were chosen, to 
avoid reading too much into too few topics. Post-1999, three topics were identified.269 The results 
of this analysis can be seen graphed below in Figure 5.1. 
 
269 In order to ensure that either choice did not represent affect my results, I ran the analysis for both two and six 
topics; the results were broadly similar and will be discussed in more detail in section 5.1.2. I also present the results 
of both figures, to allow the reader to draw their own conclusions. 
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Figure 5.1. Estimated number of clusters for topic modeling 
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5.1.2 Pre-1999 grand strategy analysis 
I defined the Look East policy as an inducive grand strategy, which means that, if it was 
India’s grand strategy at this point in time, there should be strong evidence of transactory suasion 
in the form of economic and diplomatic agreements as well as the primacy of words related to 
these topics. Alternatively, if India was adopting a coercive grand strategy, there should be 
coercive language, and an emphasis on hard power. If Narang and Staniland are correct, no 
discernable grand strategy should be identifiable. Figure 5.2 shows the results of my topic 
modeling for the Pre-Kargil years. As can be seen, the corpus contains topics related to economic, 
cultural, and educational transactions at a significantly greater frequency than was observed in 
either of my previous case studies. This lends credence to the claim that Look East was India’s 
grand strategy as this time. I noted earlier that, per k-means clustering, the number of topics for 
this time period appeared to be either two or six. The results of an analysis with only two topics 
does not significantly from the reported results with six topics. The addition of four additional 
topics, however, does allow for both greater descriptive richness and, while allowing for some 
consideration of India’s coercive efforts in the foreign policy domain, ultimately reinforces the 
preeminence of the Look East policy as the encapsulation of Indian grand strategy.  Without these 
additional topics, the Look East policy completely dominates the topics. 
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Figure 5.2. Topic Modeling results for India's 1994-1999 Foreign Affairs Record entries (Six Topics) 
 
Topics 1, 3, 4, and 6 are all strongly indicative of an inducive grand strategy, being 
overwhelmingly related to topics of international agreements on trade, and international 
development. Topics 1 and 3 are broadly alike, with a similar mixture of words between the two. 
 190 
It is important to remember that the numbering of the topics is arbitrary; the most notable 
difference between the two is that Topic 1 refers to topics covered in bilateral discussions and 
meetings while Topic 3 draws primarily from India’s engagement(s) in multi-lateral venues over 
the time period.270 An important aspect of the Look East policy was engagement not only on a 
bilateral level with the countries in India’s near abroad, but also in placing increasing emphasis on 
multi-lateral forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).271 Both of 
these topics, and terms they contain, are strongly indicative of an inducive grand strategy. 
Topics 4 and 6 refer to different types of agreements signed over this time period. For 
instance, Topic 4 appears to be investment and contracting services agreements, as evidenced by 
the strong association of the terms “contracting,” “agreement,” and “investment” with the topic. 
Topic 6 relates to the exchange of personnel, and provision of training, featuring the terms 
“exchange,” “development,” “training,” “cultural,” “education,” and “programme.” These 
interpretations are generally bolstered by looking at the documents most associated with each 
topic. A noteworthy point emerging from this examination is that these topics appear to refer to 
agreements made between India and developed countries such as the United States, the European 
Commission, and Russian Federation amongst others. 
 
270 Top documents associated with Topic 1 include: “President's visit to Germany, Portugal, Luxembourg and Turkey,” 
“Visit of H.E. Mr. Kim Young Sam, President of the Republic of Korea to India,” and “Visit of President of India to 
Oman, Poland, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic and Italy.” Some of the top document titles for Topic 3 are: “Speech 
of Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee at Asia Society, New York,” “Statement by H.E. Mr. Sharad Pawar, 
Member of Parliament, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha at the General Debate of the First Committee at 
New York,” and “Statement by External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee at UN General Assembly,” although 
it is important to note that not all documents in the top 10 relate to multi-lateral forums. This is likely due to the fact 
that the number of topics being modeled could be two or six, and the larger number of categories means a lower chance 
of stark contrasts between the two. 
271 Andersen (2001, 768). It is also important to note that this enthusiasm did not extend to the South Asia Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Andersen (2001, 769) 
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Topic 2 is drawn from documents about India’s views of how the international environment 
changed in the post-Cold War world, and more specifically relates to its acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and verbal rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is evidenced by the terms 
“nuclear,” “weapons,” and “disarmament,” amongst others. When looking at the document-topic 
matrix, the top two documents are drawn from Narasimha Rao’s Prime ministership, several years 
before the country formally announced itself as a nuclear power with their Pokhran II nuclear test. 
It is tempting to classify Topic 5 as relating to issues originating in bilateral discussions 
between India and Pakistan, especially as the number one term associated with the topic is 
“Pakistan.” In fact, the document-topic matrix reveals that the documents most associated with 
these topics are overwhelmingly regionally focused.272 The relatively weak associations of the rest 
of the terms in the topic is evidenced by the relatively low beta for the others. This suggests that 
the additional topics identified by my k-means analysis saw significantly diminishing returns. As 
can be seen in Figure 5.3, Topics 3 and 5 completely disappear from view when the number of 
topics is reduced; this bolsters my assessment that they are only weakly represented as topics in 
the corpus.  
Taken together, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 paint a picture of a fairly comprehensive and 
coherent inducive grand strategy, which seems to largely bear out both the Look East policy and 
its extension, the Gujral Doctrine, as the orienting policy of pre-Kargil India. This analysis casts 
serious doubt on the argument that Indian foreign policy, over this timeframe at least, is best 
understood and described through the lens of its improving relations with the United States and its 
 
272 For instance, the top five documents associated with this term are: “First ASEAN - India Joint Cooperation 
Committee Meeting,” “Details of Deliberation of the Seventeenth Session of the Council of Ministers of SAARC,” 
“Second Meeting of the ASEAN-India Joint Sectoral CooperationCommittee (AIJSCC)” [SIC], “Foreign Secretary 
Level Discussions in Male,” and “Participation of India in ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference.”  
 192 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. While these are undoubtedly important events, such an argument 
appears to fly in the face of the manifold engagements India was having throughout the world, and 
particularly in its near abroad. I now turn to an examination of its grand strategy post-Kargil. 
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5.1.3 Post-1999 grand strategy analysis 
Relations between India and Pakistan hit new lows in 1998, when, within the span of 17 
days, both countries announced they had conducted successful nuclear weapons tests.273 However, 
in less than a year, relations appeared to be on the upswing as the two countries signed the Lahore 
Declaration. Although technically only a declaration between the two prime ministers and an 
additional “memorandum of understanding,” the document laid out several confidence building 
measures aimed at reducing the risk of inadvertent war between the two countries.274 One 
important measure was an agreement to consult on nuclear and conventional doctrines: 
The   two   sides   shall   engage   in bilateral     consultations     on     
security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view    to    
developing    measures    for confidence building in the nuclear and 
coventional [sic] fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.275 
After signing the declaration, speaking at a banquet hosted by Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee, said of the declaration and bilateral dialogue: 
We have also discussed those areas of relationship on which we do 
not see eye to eye. That is only inevitable. As we seek to resolve 
issues, we have to be conscious that there is nothing which cannot 
be solved through goodwill and direct dialogue. That is the only 
path.276  
While on the surface this seemed like positive news, any hope for the Lahore Declaration to 
translate into sustained momentum for improved relations between the two countries was not to 
last. In just under three months, the two countries would be at war high in the mountains of 
Kashmir. 
 
273 Wallace (1998, 386) 
274 Pattanaik (1999, 86) 
275 Government of India and Government of Pakistan (1999) 
276 Vajpayee (1999) 
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Pakistan had been engaged in a proxy war in Kashmir for much of the 1980s and onward, 
which saw numerous acts of terrorism and violence sweep the region. This activity saw a dramatic 
increase in the early months of 1999.277 Indian defenses in the mountainous parts of the Kargil 
district consisted largely of a string of border positions, which were typically left abandoned during 
the winter months, as the weather can be extremely inhospitable during that time.278 Once the 
Indian army heard word of heavy shelling along the border region and Pakistani infiltration along 
the Line of Control, they sent two patrols to the area, which were promptly wiped out.279 What 
followed was a spiral of conflict that saw initial Indian setbacks, but eventually resulted in the 
expulsion of all Pakistani troops from Indian-controlled territory.280 
Despite the fact that the Indian armed forces were ultimately victorious, the Kargil Crisis 
generated a large outcry within India. This outcry centered on the initial ineffectiveness of the 
armed forces to retake the heights and the fact that the forces were caught off guard.281 That 
preparation for the infiltration had occurred almost concurrently with the signing of the Lahore 
declaration came as another shock to India.282 It also came as a strategic surprise, despite 
intelligence reports indicating that an operation in the region might be occurring, and forced a 
rethinking of the defense management system.283 Thus, while Kargil was technically an Indian 
battlefield victory, it represented a strategic shock to the nation’s system. For the analytic purposes 
of this dissertation, Kargil represents a more neutral war outcome. Thus, the Kargil crisis’ 
aftermath serves as another potential inflection point for Indian grand strategy.  
 
277 Malik (2006, 28-31, 33) 
278 Qadir (2002, 25) 
279 Anand (1999, 1054) 
280 Lambeth (2012, 303) 
281 Basrur (2002, 40-41) 
282 Basrur (2002) 
283 Prasad (2019) 
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When looking at the corpus of documents compiled for the years immediately after the 
Kargil Crisis (i.e., 2001-2004, as documents from 2000 are absent from the record), my k-means 
analysis rather unambiguously pointed toward three topics as the number to be modeled. Figure 
5.4 displays the results of my topic modeling, which seem on their face to point towards continuity 
in Indian grand strategy. It is important to remember that the order of the topics is determined by 
the model and position in the chart does not imply an ordinal topic ranking. 
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Figure 5.4. Topic Modeling results for selected Indian leadership speeches from 2001-2004 
 
Topic 1 is drawn primarily from speeches by Indian leaders, largely to and in international 
forums, although it is interesting to note that the top three documents associated with this topic are 
all speeches by various Indian Presidents to joint sessions of the Indian parliament. That terms 
 
 198 
such as “economic,” “trade,” “development,” and “cooperation” all rank fairly highly along with 
terms such as “region,” “SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation),” and “Asia” 
suggest continuity with topics seen in the pre-war analysis. Particularly notable is that, despite the 
fact that the data source of the corpus having changed slightly, many of the same topics still 
emerged. 
Topic 2 appears to be similar to Topic 1, as evidenced by the fact that many of the same 
terms appear. The terms “economic,” “cooperation,” “development,” and “Asia” all appear as 
associated with each topic. Given the fact that LDA allows for non-exclusivity of terms to topics, 
this suggests that something else may be driving the divide between topics. The terms “bilateral,” 
and “ASEAN” in Topic 2 and the term “SAARC” in Topic 1 suggests that the divide may be best 
construed as similar topics addressing slightly different regional audiences. The similarity between 
the two topics is striking, even without an ability to more finely separate the topics. The similarity 
suggests that the pursuit of advantageous deals was a primary tool of Indian statecraft, which is a 
hallmark of an inducive grand strategy. 
Topic 3 is distinct in that it reflects major world events during this time period in its focus 
on the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is an issue India had been dealing with for a long time, given 
the history of its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir region. The terms “terrorism,” “war,” 
“global,” and “Pakistan” all but confirm this. It might be tempting for Western readers to arrange 
some of these words into the phrase “global war on terrorism,” a popular phrase utilized by the 
George W. Bush Administration to describe its objectives at the time, but this would be incorrect. 
In fact, the two most frequent bigrams (pair of words) associated with the term “terrorism” are 
“international terrorism,” and “border terrorism.”  Given the fact that the Kashmir region had been 
experiencing border terrorism for years, it is straightforward to conclude that Topic 3 reflects 
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India’s attempts to highlight its ongoing struggle with Pakistan and draw international support 
towards its position. 
Taking a step back and looking at these three topics as a whole, I conclude that these 
represent a broad continuation of Indian grand strategy post-Kargil, with a slight shift in focus 
highlighting the tensions with Pakistan. Considering that this period of time saw two major 
invasions in the region, one of which was in India’s near abroad and involved its arch-rival, 
Pakistan, it is reasonable to assume Indian leaders would want to discuss Pakistan’s record as an 
alleged sponsor for terrorism. The other was the United States invasion of Afghanistan. This 
suggests that the general thrust of India’s grand strategy was not significantly altered by the Kargil 
crisis, despite the outcry it generated within the country.  
5.2 Potential explanations 
In the previous section, I determined that India’s essentially inducive grand strategy 
persisted throughout the period. Given the narrative of the aftermath of the Kargil Crisis in India, 
and the Kargil Review Commission that was assembled in its wake, this stability might first come 
as a surprise. Yet, my analysis of the past two case studies showed that Indian grand strategy 
remained markedly consistent in the face of both positive and negative shocks, even when many 
leading theories would suggest it should be otherwise. This continuity around the Kargil Crisis is 
thus perhaps to be expected. Like previous chapters, the balance of this section explores the three 
competing types of explanations for grand strategic change: external drivers, internal drivers, and 
organizational determinants. 
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To reiterate, in order to explain the case, a theory must be able to account for both the form 
change takes as well as the rate at which change occurs. A theory can call for change in grand 
strategic form, but expect short-term grand strategic stability; theories which operate on longer 
time scales, such as strategic culture, will expect to observe short term stability while change 
percolates through the system. If a given theory fails to describe either the form or the rate of 
change, it is incongruent with the case. After this congruence test, remaining theories are 
scrutinized via process tracing to determine which best fit the facts of the case. 
5.2.1 Externally oriented theories  
This section explores whether or not either of the two externally oriented theories can 
plausibly explain India’s observed grand strategic stability. As in previous chapters, first an 
assessment is made about whether or not the expectations of the theory are congruent with the 
empirical record. If they are, I then attempt to find evidence of the theory’s causal mechanism at 
work. The section concludes with a brief summary of the findings for this class of theory. 
5.2.1.1 External Threat 
External threat theories expect grand strategic change with and at the rate of changes in 
threat. Since India was technically victorious in the Kargil crisis but the outcome saw both 
countries revert to the pre-war status quo, it could be argued that the Kargil Crisis did not change 
the objective balance of power between the two nations. As the relationship between India’s pre- 
and post-war grand strategy is best described by stability, this understanding of constancy in 
India’s strategic environment suggests would suggest congruence between the theory’s 
expectations and the empirical record.  
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This apparent congruence between the theory and the empirical record is called into 
question, however, when digging deeper into how the Indians perceived their conventional and 
nuclear security environment in the wake of the Kargil Crisis. Focusing first on the conventional 
balance of power between the two countries reveals that the Indians believed there were some 
significant changes in the level of external threat they faced. In the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis, India set up a review committee in order to dissect the intelligence failures that led to the 
Kargil Crisis and to unpack India’s performance in the conflict. The prologue of the report 
succinctly states that “Yet India was not militarily well prepared [for the conflict]. There were 
critical gaps in the Armed Forces’ inventory.”284 The Commission’s recommendations further 
went on to detail a large number of recommended changes to the Indian intelligence and defense 
establishment in order to prevent such a crisis from occurring again.  
Further doubt is cast on the assertation that Kargil did not substantially alter the 
conventional balance of power between the two nations when considering what the government of 
India did after it received the recommendations of the review commission. After the commission 
submitted its report, the government of India convened a Group of Ministers to follow up on the 
finding of the Kargil review commission and determine how to implement them. As the Group of 
Ministers final report states, it viewed its remit as touching upon all of India’s security apparatus: 
It noted that its mandate was substantially wider than that of the 
[Kargil Review Commission]. While the [Kargil Review 
Commission] had been required to review the events leading up to 
the Pakistani aggression in Kargil district and to recommend 
measures necessary to safeguard national security against such 
armed intrusions, the [Group of Ministers] was, inter alia, required 
to review the national security system in its entirety and to formulate 
specific proposals for implementation. Conscious of the scope and 
extent of the holistic nature of its remit, the [Group of Ministers] 
saw in it a historic opportunity to review all aspects of the national 
 
284 Kargil Review Committee (2000, 23) 
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security system, impinging not only on external threats but also on 
internal threats.285 
This significant restructuring of the bureaucratic apparatus and military command structure would 
call for greater joint integration and the creation of entirely new positions to strengthen planning.286 
The Kargil crisis also exposed deficiencies in India’s capabilities. Most telling is Gen V.P. Malik’s 
reflections on the tenth anniversary of the Kargil Crisis, where he notes: 
Due to a continuous lack of budgetary support, new raisings of 
regular units and Rashtriya Rifles, and an extremely tedious 
procurement system, many of our bottom line holdings and reserves 
were in a depleted state at the time of the war. We had shortages of 
weapons, equipment, even the clothing required for high-altitude 
warfare. The war also highlighted gross inadequacies in the nation’s 
surveillance capability. Aerial imagery, except from the Aviation 
Research Centre, was non-existent.287 
This underscores that India realized it was ill-prepared to fight this kind of conflict again in the 
future. Thus, while India was technically able to defeat Pakistan, Kargil exposed significant 
weaknesses that needed to be redressed. Taken together with the considerable bureaucratic reforms 
that were called for, it undermines the argument that Kargil did not alter the perception of the 
conventional balance between the two nations. Given this, I conclude that there was actually a 
change in the perceptions of the conventional balance of power after the Kargil Crisis and, 
accordingly, an external threat theory of grand strategic form cannot fully account for the stability 
observed in the case. 
But what of the balance of nuclear power between the two countries? If that was stable, 
perhaps that would explain India’s observed grand strategic stability.  For this explanation to be 
the correct one, I would expect to find evidence in India’s Kargil post-mortems about the primacy 
 
285 Advani et al. (2001, 2) 
286 Mukherjee (2016, 23-5) 
287 Malik (2009, 355) 
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of nuclear weapons in underwriting its security. Instead, it seems that India drew the opposite 
conclusion. As the Group of Ministers report states: 
Thus, while India needs to ensure credible nuclear deterrence to 
prevent the possibility of a nuclear misadventure by its potential 
adversaries, it has to simultaneously maintain adequate and duly 
modernized conventional forces which are properly managed, led 
and equipped to take advantage of the [Revolution in Military 
Affairs] and which can take care of any possible conventional 
conflicts.288 
This quote suggests that Indian thinking was focused on maintaining nuclear weapons to prevent 
being overmatched by its adversaries and not as the primary force driving the balance of power 
between the two rivals. Furthermore, scholars such as Kapur have argued that it was precisely the 
nuclear balance of power between India and Pakistan that increased the possibility of limited 
conventional war between the two countries.289 This is further underscored by the Kargil Review 
Committee’s report, which contends that the conventional balance of power is of paramount 
importance, stating: 
It is also argued that a policy of “no first use” and a commitment to 
only retaliatory use of nuclear weapons will, in fact imply an 
enhanced level of conventional military capability. The goal must 
be to raise the nuclear threshold to as high a level as feasible.290 
While the Kargil Review Committee’s position does not necessarily reflect the official position of 
the Government of India, the fact that its opinions were drawn from discussions with Indian 
officials, amongst others, suggests it is indicative of the general thinking of decisionmakers during 
 
288 Advani et al. (2001, 8) 
289 Kapur (2003, 81). There has been a large amount of scholarly interest in the Kargil Crisis as an example of the 
Stability-Instability paradox; put simply, this paradox states that because of the potential stability inherent in a nuclear 
crisis where both actors fear potential destruction, there is increased crisis instability in conflicts that remain below 
the nuclear threshold. For a sample of such literature, including as it pertains to the Kargil Crisis, see: Watterson 
(2017), Rajagopalan (2006), Panday (2011), Sultan (2014), Early and Asal (2018), Ganguly (1995)  
290 Kargil Review Committee (2000, 180) 
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the time. The available evidence thus severely weakens the argument for stability in the nuclear 
balance of power serving as a driver of India’s observed grand strategic stability.  
A closer examination of the conventional and nuclear balance of power that obtained on 
the subcontinent thus reveals that India did believe the nature and severity of the external threat it 
faced changed after the Kargil Crisis. As such, an external threat theory simply cannot account for 
Indian grand strategic stability in the wake of the fight. It may be discarded as a potential 
explanation for Indian grand strategy in this time period. 
 
5.2.1.2 Regional Security Architecture 
A theory of grand strategic change predicated on regional security architecture predicts 
stability if the balance of alliances and diplomatic support, especially amongst the key players 
within the system, are generally stable. On one hand, the outcome of Kargil Crisis represents no 
fundamental change in the balance amongst the key regional players if one only considers India, 
Pakistan, and China. However, if one considers the role played by the United States and how it 
changed over the period, there is good reason to believe that the theory might anticipate change in 
this case. Historically, Pakistan enjoyed diplomatic and military support from the United States 
while India received military support, primarily in the form of equipment, from the (then) Soviet 
Union. The United States’ backing of India in the Kargil crisis marked the beginning of a change 
in how the world’s only remaining superpower engaged in the region.291  
 
291 For more general discussions of how the Kargil crisis either redefined the US-Indian security relationship, or played 
a decisive role in the conflict, see, for instance: Bommakanti (2011), Chiriyankandath (2004, 207), Lavoy (2009, 29), 
Riedel (2019), Tellis, Fair, and Medby (2001, 53) 
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Scholars such as Chiriyankandath have pointed out that, from India’s economic opening in 
the early 1990s and onwards, U.S.-Indian ties gradually deepened before the Crisis. Furthermore, 
the structural factors identified in the pre-war period began to accelerate post-war, only 
increasingly the potential for cooperation. As Ganguly and Scobell pointed out in 2005: 
[India’s] economic growth over the past decade has been robust, its 
political institutions have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the 
face of myriad domestic challenges, and its military prowess is 
steadily increasing. Finally, the country has, for all practical 
purposes, abandoned its hoary commitments to nonalignment. 
These factors in concert make conditions propitious for the 
emergence of a U.S.- India strategic partnership.292 
Joint U.S.-Indian naval exercises began in the early 1990s as well—something that was 
previously unthinkable—and U.S. support in Kargil only opened the door wider for further 
cooperation.293 Air exercises followed in 2002 and picked up in 2004, and the  U.S. and India 
signed a framework for cooperation on military issues in 2005.294 Despite the fact that the U.S. 
was also heavily reliant on Pakistan at the time to support the logistics of the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan, any increased U.S.-Indian cooperation represented a sea change for the region. For a 
pattern of relationships that had been well-defined for decades by the US and Pakistan on one side 
and India and the Soviet Union/Russia on the other, the rapid increase and deepening of U.S. 
engagement with India during this period represents an unprecedented change.  
While the benefit of hindsight may make it seem obvious that this strategic partnership was 
doomed to never fully materialize, that failure was not necessarily clear at the time. Although the 
U.S. and India had had occasion to cooperate in the past, that cooperation had been sporadic and 
infrequent. The period after the Kargil crisis saw both deeper and more frequent engagement 
 
292 Ganguly and Scobell (2005, 37) 
293 Chiriyankandath (2004, 207-8) 
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between the two countries. It is clear that from the early 1990s onward, and especially around the 
time of the Kargil crisis, the trajectory of relationships in the region was beginning to 
fundamentally change. In cases like this, a regional security architecture theory expects change 
due to the change in the balance of engagement in the region. This expectation of change is 
incongruent with the observed grand strategic stability. Thus, a regional security architecture 
hypothesis may be discarded as a potential explanation of India’s grand strategic form over this 
period.  
5.2.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case 
 
Both external threat and regional security architecture fail to account for Indian grand 
strategic stability around the Kargil Crisis. The flaw with an external threat account is the theory’s 
expectations of change. While focusing on the nuclear balance of power between India and 
Pakistan could forecast stability in Indian grand strategy, India’s perceptions of change in the 
conventional balance between the two countries would forecast grand strategic change. Given that 
India was more focused on the impact of the crisis on the conventional balance of power, the theory 
cannot account for the observed grand strategic stability. A regional security architecture theory 
performs even more poorly, as Kargil marked a watershed moment for the region’s patterns of 
alliances and support, as the U.S. not only sided with India, but deepened its engagement post-
war. Under the logic of this theory, change should result. Instead, stability is observed and the 
claims’ predictions are incongruent with the empirical record.  
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5.2.2 Internally oriented theories 
In this section, I explore internally oriented theories’ ability to describe Indian grand 
strategic stability around the Kargil crisis. Both theories are scrutinized for how their theoretical 
expectations match the empirical record and for evidence that their causal mechanisms may be at 
work. I conclude with a brief summary of my findings. 
5.2.2.1 Leadership 
Theories that posit that leaders and their preferences dictate grand strategy expect stability 
if grand strategic preferences remain stable even while leaders themselves vary. There were five 
different Prime Ministers over the time period covered by this case.295 Despite what appears to be 
high turnover, there is little reason to suspect that the leaders held fundamentally different grand 
strategic preference. As was discussed in the examination of Indian grand strategy during the 
period, Rao, Gujral, and Vajpayee all fundamentally supported inducive grand strategies. This 
leaves Gowda and Singh to consider in greater detail, both of whose tenure was also generally 
marked by adherence to previously established foreign policy preferences.296  
In assessing precisely whether or not continuity of leaders’ preference accounts for the 
stability in the case, special attention should be paid to the tenure of Gowda, who held office 
between June 1996 and April 1997. In describing Gowda’s tenure, Kapur states: 
Once again India was faced with the spectacle that the architecture 
of India’s foreign policy was constructed elsewhere: by I.K. Gujral, 
 
295 The list of Prime Ministers who held office in the period covered by the case were: P.V. Narasimha Rao, H.D. 
Deva Gowda, Inder Kumar Gujral, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh. While the pace of leadership turnover 
was fairly rapid in this period, one of the Prime Ministers between 1996 and 1998 was Vajpayee himself, although his 
first tenure lasted less than a month. The next two Prime Ministers, H.D. Deve Gowda, and Gujral, each held office 
for under a year. In mid-2004, at the tail end of the period, Manmohan Singh assumed the Prime Ministership. 
296 Kapur (2013, 5943, 6851) 
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whose nomination as Foreign Minister had been decided by the 
coalition partners over which Deve Gowda had no Control. 
From all indications it would seem that the new Prime Minister had 
accepted that India’s foreign policy would be left in the hands of the 
Foreign Minister.297 
While Gujral clearly preferred an inducive grand strategy, which aligns with the general theoretical 
expectation of grand strategic stability, that it was Gujral’s preferences that were dictating grand 
strategy, and not Gowda’s, is somewhat problematic for the analytical power of this specific claim. 
For a theory that stipulates leaders and their preferences dictate grand strategy, this is a clear case 
where a leader’s preferences did not set grand strategy. There are two different ways this can be 
interpreted. At worst, Gowda’s tenure suggests that other factors may actually determine the 
strategy. Although exactly how a given leader arrives at their preference for a particular grand 
strategy is not necessarily relevant, what is problematic in this instance is that Gowda had no 
influence. Thus, an uncharitable reading of this evidence would be that Gowda did not set the 
strategy at all. It suggests that additional information may be needed to identify which leaders’ 
preferences matter most, and under what conditions; in this case, the leader(s) whose preference 
mattered most were Gowda’s coalition partners, and it was their preferences that dictated the 
strategy. While this is not sufficient to discount the theory, it does undermine its explanatory 
power. 
This leaves only the question of whether Singh’s preferences can be said to align with his 
predecessors’ preferences for an inducive grand strategy. In contrast to Gowda, Singh’s 
preferences are much easier to determine. Early on in his tenure, Singh addressed the Lok Sabha 
on the topic of foreign policy, where he stated: 
 
297 Kapur (2013, 5943) 
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My meetings with Asian leaders in Bandung also gave me yet 
another opportunity to reiterate India's commitment to the 'Look 
East Policy' and to closer relations with the countries of South-East 
and East Asia. We are committed to work with ASEAN and with 
East Asian Countries to make the 21st century a truly Asian 
Century.298 
This clearly demonstrates that Singh endorsed Look East as the preferred strategy for India.299 On 
the basis of this evidence, it is relatively safe to conclude that, at least until the end of the time 
period under consideration, Singh’s preferences can be said to be similar to his predecessors.   
Given the available evidence, it appears that a leadership theory of grand strategic form is 
broadly congruent with the case, given the apparent stability of both Indian leaders’ grand strategic 
preferences and the country’s grand strategy. All but one of the leaders in the case clearly shared 
similar grand strategic preferences; the weight of evidence suggests that a leadership theory may 
plausibly be at work in this case. While the constraints on Gowda’s ability to influence foreign 
policy during his tenure as prime minister are not necessarily fatal, it does call into question the 
theory’s ability to fully account for the empirical record. As such, there is reason to believe that a 
leadership theory may be at work in the case, even if the evidence is not as strong as might 
otherwise be. 
5.2.2.2 Strategic Culture 
A strategic culture theory expects stability and change in grand strategy to track with 
alterations in dominant cultural beliefs. When those cultural beliefs are static, stability should 
result; when they are not, change should occur. In the short term, however, such a theory generally 
 
298 Singh (2005) 
299 For other examples of Singh’s preferences for this strategic approach, see (for instance): Sundaram (2013, 172), 
Saint-Mézard (2016, 178) 
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expects continuity; as previously discussed, culture takes time to change. There are two crucial 
hoops that need to be cleared in order to show that strategic culture is at work. The first is the 
existence of the country’s ‘central paradigm,’ which is its views on the role of war, nature of its 
adversary, and the efficacy of force.300 Identification of this central paradigm, and its congruence 
with India’s inducive grand strategy, serves as the first hoop a strategic culture theory must pass.  
The second is a “limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences,” which dictates how a 
country will respond to a given crisis and should be stable across sources, and time.301 Thus, the 
second hoop is that this set of preferences remains stable despite the increase in threat, or in this 
case threat perception, created by the weaknesses uncovered by Indian performance in the Kargil 
Crisis. If there is evidence to pass these two hoops, a strategic culture approach may be at work in 
this case. Alternatively, signs of rapid change in grand strategic preference or rank-ordering would 
provide evidence that this class of theory is not at work. 
To begin determining if a strategic culture theory is at work, a central paradigm must first 
be identified consistent with the inducive grand strategy identified earlier. As shown in Chapters 
3 and 4, there were few changes in the central paradigm of India’s strategic culture between 1960 
and 1976. The hallmarks of this stable central paradigm were: war is an aberration, threats can be 
considered variable sum, and there is limited utility for the role of force. Some scholars have 
argued that Non-Alignment, even at this late date, still represented the dominant vein of Indian 
strategic culture, suggesting that some version of the previous central paradigm remained 
fundamentally intact. Additionally, strategic culture theorists might point to additional supporting 
evidence like the Lahore Declaration, which sought to restrain nuclear competition with Pakistan, 
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reduce mis-understandings, and reiterate “the determination of both countries to implementing the 
Shimla (sic) Agreement in letter and spirit.”302 The Simla agreement technically ended the Third 
Indo-Pakistan War by calling for a peaceful resolution to the two countries’ border dispute, but 
did not bind them to any particular process or course of action and was never fully implemented. 
While this can be interpreted as maintenance of India’s central paradigm, a more cynical read 
might be either that it is an example of ‘cheap talk’ or driven primarily by the desire to reduce 
chances of misperception that could escalate to a nuclear exchange. Given that a coherent central 
paradigm exists and remains consistent across all three cases, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
strategic culture explanation passes this hoop.  
Next, evidence needs to be found of the ‘second half’ of strategic culture: the ranked set of 
preferences, which affect operational level details of a country’s strategic culture. Take for instance 
the Gujral doctrine, which in some ways could be considered the progenitor of the Look East 
policy. As laid out in Section 5.1, the Look East policy was firmly anchored in the Gujral Doctrine, 
which was articulated by Prime Minister Inder Kumal Gujral in September of 1997: 
The “Gujral Doctrine”, if I may call it so, states that, first, with its 
neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and 
accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. Second, we 
believe that no South Asian country should allow its territory to be 
used against the interests of another country of the region. Third, 
that none should interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, 
all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they should settle all their 
disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.303 
The continuation of these fundamental themes throughout the period is evidence of a set of ranked 
grand-strategic preferences whereby India preferred to focus on its near abroad, primarily through 
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a transactory lens. Second, it lays out a policy of non-interference, and a preference for bi-lateral 
dispute resolution. This represents a fairly concrete articulation of operational level assumptions. 
As such, a strategic culture explanation can be said to clear this hoop as well, even if there is some 
question as the dominance of this vein of thought, given the dispute in the secondary literature 
about the lingering ghost of Non-Alignment in Indian foreign policy. 
However, similar to the period surrounding the 1962 Sino-Indian war, a strategic culture 
explanation cannot fully account for the historical record in this case. Much like in the aftermath 
of the Sino-India War, India after Kargil conducted notable reforms aimed at addressing internal 
balancing against Pakistan (i.e., the Kargil Review Commission). In the two cases, India’s central 
paradigm remained the same while its operational level execution of that paradigm shifted from 
the implementation of a persuasive grand strategy to the use of an inducive approach. If the same 
central paradigm can allow for two opposing grand strategies, it calls into question whether or not 
the paradigm is at work, or if grand strategy is wholly a function of operational level assumptions. 
This provides further evidence that a strategic culture hypothesis, as posited by Johnston, may 
require updating or require refining, as a near identical central paradigm of the culture seems to 
allow for opposing grand strategic forms. Notwithstanding, a strategic culture explanation does 
pass the requisite hoops, and so cannot be conclusively ruled out, even if its ability to fully explain 
the empirical record may fall short. 
5.2.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case 
In contrast to externally oriented theories, both leadership and strategic culture are 
plausibly at work in the case. A leadership theory’s explanatory power is somewhat weakened by 
the twin facts that during Gowda’s tenure it was actually his Foreign Minister preferences that 
dominated and Gowda had no control over the appointment. A strategic culture theory is also 
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plausibly at work in this case, although this case raises questions about how a near identical central 
paradigm of strategic culture can yield two opposing grand strategic forms. Despite these 
reservations about both internally oriented theories’ ability to fully explain the empirical record, 
the available evidence is not sufficient to exclude them.  
5.2.3 Organization determinants of grand strategy 
My theory expects change at a rate consistent with rate of change in the pattern of resource 
allocation amongst the various organizations. When that pattern is generally stable, or indicators 
are mixed, stability should result. Since the relationship between India’s pre- and post-war grand 
strategy is best described by stability, for my theory to be congruent and explanatory, the empirical 
record would need to show stability or mixed patterns of organizational resourcing. The remainder 
of this section unpacks the available evidence to determine if this is the case. I do so by first 
examining the pre-war resource distribution at the state and organizational level, to set a baseline 
expectation for the observed inducive grand strategy. Then, I explore the post-war distribution of 
resources to determine if my theory might account for the observed stability. 
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5.2.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, my theory’s causal logic begins at the level of resources 
available to the state; how it chooses to allocate those resources to various organizations dictates 
the country’s choice of grand strategy. As Figure 5.5 demonstrates, Indian GDP was steadily 
increasing, with the country having started to see results from the economic restructuring that took 
place in the early 1990s. India’s GDP at the time puts it squarely in the middle power category, 
with countries like the Russian Federation, Australia, and the Netherlands. It also suggests that 
India had sufficient resources to allocate towards external affairs. India’s population, on the other 
hand, had for years been the second largest in the world, with over one billion people in 1999. The 
military recruiting pool, which I have defined as males between the ages of 15 and 64, was around 
326 million, which would have still made India the second most populous country on the planet.304 
This suggests that, relative to the other countries mentioned, there were fewer resources per capita. 
 
Figure 5.5. GDP of India 1994-1999 (Constant 2010 USD) 
 
304 The World Bank Group (2018d, 2018c) 
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Elite attention at the state-level is operationalized by analyzing the headlines of articles from The 
Times of India, which traditionally has been India’s widest circulating English language 
newspaper. As Table 5.1 below shows, Indian attention in the foreign affairs realm suggests that 
its attention was occupied primarily with goings-on in the United States and events in neighboring 
Pakistan and China. Given India’s historical focus on these latter areas, this is in line with the other 
case studies reported in this dissertation.  
Table 5.1. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1994-1999 
Word(s) Total Number of Mentions 











What may at first appear to unusual is the low number of mentions of other countries as well as 
how precipitous the drop-off appears to be between mentions of the U.S. and Pakistan and the rest 
of this list. I interpret this as signaling that India, as it frequently is, was paying more attention to 
internal affairs; this is unsurprising given the frequent changes in government. It is clear that, in 
the pre-war period, India was possessed of modest but not inconsiderable monetary resources and 
a very large pool of manpower while its elite attention was mostly focused inward with foreign 
considerations dominated by the near abroad.  
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5.2.3.2 Pre-war organizational-level resources 
 
In the cases examined thus far, one of the factors complicating comparisons between 
coercive, inducive, and persuasive organizations was that the inducive organization(s) underwent 
frequent re-organization and realignment. This caused observed levels of manpower and monetary 
resources to jump around erratically as various parts of the organization were detached and 
subsequently reattached over time. In this period, there was no such challenge; inducive 
organizational realignments are relatively clean, making for more straight-forward comparisons.  
As Figure 5.6 demonstrates, budgets for the organizations tasked with carrying out 
persuasive and coercive functions slightly increased over the period, while the top line budget for 
the inducive organization appeared to shrink slightly, before remaining flat. Given that the country 
seems to have been pursuing an inducive grand strategy, this seems incongruent. However, when 
one considers the fact that in 1998 India conducted its second nuclear test and declared itself a 
nuclear power, things become clearer. It is very likely that India’s nuclear test is the primary driver 
of the increase in funding for both the persuasive and coercive organizations, which implies a 
response to a discrete event as opposed to signaling a grand strategic shift.305 A deeper look inside 
the coercive budgets also show that capital outlays made up a substantial portion of the budget, 
which could be a result of the loss of the Soviet Union as its chief arms provider, as capital outlays 
are typically maintenance or upgrade expenditures.306 Additionally, given that this increase in 
capital expenditure occurred in the year immediately prior to the nuclear test, the bump in 1997-
 
305 Scholars such as Bhumitra Chakma (2005) point out that given India’s nuclear ambiguity it is not clear at what 
point before the nuclear test India had actively developed a nuclear weapon, as opposed to maintaining a rapid breakout 
posture. 
306 Government of India (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) 
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98 is likely at least partially attributable to that effort. It is not entirely clear what causes the 
anomalous spike in funding for persuasive organizations in 1998-1999 but, given that it occurs in 
the same year as the nuclear test, it very likely is related. Afterwards, funding returns to its 
generally linear trend, which suggests that it is likely this increase in funding was tied to Indian 
diplomatic efforts in the wake of its nuclear test and its attempts to manage the diplomatic 
repercussions rather than signaling the beginning of a sea change in Indian grand strategy. 
Discounting this anomalous event, funding for the persuasive ministry grew an average of three 
percent per year. 
Funding for the inducive ministry decreases sharply in 1994-5, both in absolute and 
percentage terms. After this contraction, however, the inducive ministry grew around three percent 
a year. The contraction was very likely caused by the fact that, from 1991 to 1994, India was 
investing heavily in efforts to boost its economy, and the inducive organization had a strong role 
to play there. This suggests that my window for data capture may be too narrow in this particular 
instance to fully describe the inducive nature of India’s grand strategy. In the previous case, which 
occurred almost 20 years prior, in the post-war period the inducive ministry was seeing investment 
increases of around 25% per year. The total share of monetary resources allocated to the inducive 
ministry drops from approximately 19% in 1976 to only around 4% in 1994, with the coercive 
domain accounting for the difference.  
This alone does not tell the whole story. If one considers the next fiscal year, 1977-1978, 
the inducive ministry’s share of the total continues to grow from 1976-1977 to around 23% in 
1977-1978. This suggests that the trend in post-Kargil monetary resources for the inducive 
ministry generally continued its upward momentum for some meaningful period of time, and the 
data from fiscal year 1977-1978 underscores this. Thus, there is reason to assume that this trend 
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continued for some, but not all, of the intervening twenty years, and helps to establish that an 
inducive grand strategy is plausible. While this evidence suggests an inducive grand strategy may 
be in play, it is not definitive proof.  
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Figure 5.7. Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1995-2000 
 
When considering the manpower available to these organizations, Figure 5.8 lays out the 
distribution of civilian personnel at these organizations in 1991 and 1995. While the data is 
unfortunately incomplete due to India’s decision to abandon yearly central government employee 
censuses, there are at least a couple of data points for the pre-war years. Civilian employment at 
both the coercive and inducive organizations dropped while employment at the persuasive 
organization remained essentially flat in years when census data was available (1991, 1995). The 
45% decrease in personnel experienced by the inducive organization between 1991 and 1995 is 
the largest reduction amongst the three.  
Here the passage of time between the Third Indo-Pakistan War and the Kargil Crisis is 
revealing, although comparing the personnel data from the Kargil Crisis to the data from the Third 
Indo-Pakistan War must be done with caution. Appropriations for the various ministries are 
generally reported in a more disaggregated form, which allows for highly targeted datasets which 
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are reasonably comparable across time. This is not necessarily the case for manpower. In the 2001 
Census of Central Government Employees, personnel are aggregated across the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, with no ability to disaggregate them. In 1991 and 1995, these figures are 
reported separately, but were aggregated in order to systematically compare the pre- and post-war 
data for the Kargil Crisis for the purposes of this dissertation. Thus, while the personnel numbers 
presented in the figures for the two cases (Third Indo-Pakistan War, Kargil Crisis) are internally 
consistent and can be compared within case, comparing the figures between cases is not 
straightforward.  
To enable such a comparison, the data presented in this paragraph considers only personnel 
assigned to the Ministry of Commerce in 1991.  Doing so creates the most straightforward 
comparison between the two cases as possible, but it means the figures in this paragraph are not 
comparable with post-2001 data. The inducive organization’s personnel grew 97% between 1976 
and 1991. This is in contrast to 1976 to 1991 personnel growth rates of -1% for the persuasive 
organization, and a 5% increase in personnel in the coercive domain. This growth in inducive 
manpower allocations from 1976 to 1991 points toward an inducive grand strategy. This fact is 
underscored if you look at the share of total personnel between the three domains. The inducive 
organization accounted for only 1.3% of the total manpower across the three domains in 1976. In 
1991, the inducive organization saw that share grow to 2.4%, almost doubling in allocation. This 




Figure 5.8. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1991-1995) 
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Finally, where was elite attention was focused on during this time period? This analysis 
maintains the approach of previous chapters, where I examine the abstracts of the articles, utilizing 
bigrams instead of unigrams and opening the aperture beyond the names of foreign entities, which 
were the indicators used to assess state-level elite attention. This allows for a richer description of 
where Indian elite attention was focused and reveals the specific organizations and issues to which 
it paid the most attention. Table 5.2 reinforces the notion that Indian elite attention was 
predominantly focused on internal affairs during this time period, which is in line with the way 
high level elite attention was focused in the previous section(s) and years.  
Table 5.2. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 1994-1999 
Word 1 Word 2 Number of appearances 
Prime Minister 56 
Chief Minister 40 
Shiv Sena 30 
Janata party 28 
Lok Sabha 28 
Bharatiya Janata 26 
Narasimha Rao 26 
Congress President 16 
party BJP 16 
 
Viewed only in the five-year window being utilized for my pre-war analysis, these three 
indicators, when combined, present somewhat of a mixed bag for an organizational determinants’ 
perspective. When these numbers are put into their proper historical context, there are clear signs 
of an organizational determinant theory at work. Although the relative trend for money between 
1976 and 1994, in both absolute and relative terms, points away from the inducive organization, 
there is reason to believe that the increases in investment continued for some time after 1976. On 
the other hand, the trend in manpower points clearly in the inducive direction. Elite attention is 
once again firmly fixated on internal events, and may be discounted. Considering the trend of 
investments in monetary resources post-1976, and the increase in manpower in the inducive 
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organization between 1976 and 1991, it is plausible that an inducive grand strategy may be in play. 
This raises the bar for evidence in the post-war period, however. Given that the grand strategic 
relationship is characterized by stability, I would expect to observe relative stability in resources, 
with any increases primarily going to the inducive organization(s). Any deviation from this 
expectation would weaken confidence in my theory’s explanatory power.    
5.2.3.3 Post-war state-level resources 
 
In the aftermath of the Kargil Crisis, India’s growth rate, bolstered by the economic reforms 
undertaken earlier in the decade, began to accelerate, increasing in real terms almost 70 percent 
between 1994 and 2004. This represents the potential for a substantial influx in organizational 
resources. India’s population likewise continued to grow, ending with a total population of 1.1 
billion (and just over 360 million military-aged males).307 Elite attention is also generally stable, 
with events in Pakistan, the U.S., and the disputed Kashmir region being high on the list. The only 
notable addition is the increased frequency of mentions of Afghanistan, which is unsurprising 
given the September 11th, 2001, terror attacks and subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.  
 
307 The World Bank Group (2018d, 2018c) 
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Figure 5.9.  GDP of India 1994-2004 (Constant 2010 USD) 
 
Table 5.3. List of top 10 foreign entities mentioned in Times of India headlines, 1999-2004 
Word(s) Total Number of Mentions 











5.2.3.4 Post-war organization-level resources  
 
India’s state-level resources were generally increasing, and its organizational resourcing 
decisions in the post-Kargil period were both straightforward and in line with my theoretical 
expectations. Resources, in the form of money, increased across all three organizations, but most 
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markedly in the inducive organization. That organization witnessed a 68% increase in appropriated 
funding in the period between fiscal years ‘00- ‘01 to ‘04-’05. Increases for the persuasive and 
coercive organizations over the same time period were only 27% and 17% respectively. Figure 
5.11 further underscores that the relative pattern of investment in monetary resources is in favor 
of the inducive organization, which sees a much larger relative investment in three of the five 
years, greatly outstripping the relative increases in the other two domains. 
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Figure 5.10. Money appropriated to select Indian organizations for the years 1994-2004 
 
 228 
Figure 5.11. Percent change year over year in appropriations to select Indian organizations 1995-2005 
Manpower, in contrast to monetary allocations, decreased across the board, as Figure 5.12 
demonstrates. The coercive organizations saw the largest decrease, with a loss of almost 30% of 
their personnel over the period of 1995 to 2006. It is important to recall that the personnel being 
counted here are limited to civilian personnel. India’s armed forces saw a modest 5% growth from 
2001 to 2004, but remained constant after that.308 The civilian portion of the coercive workforce 
was not so lucky. It is unclear what prompted such a large-scale downsizing in coercive 
organization personnel at this time, but the fact that all three sectors saw fairly significant 
downturns suggests that a reclassification in any one organization is not to blame. It is possible 
that the 2004 return to power of the Indian National Congress (in the form of a coalition 
government, of which it was the head) resulted in departures.309 The inducive organization shed 
approximately 19% of its manpower, while the persuasive organization saw a modest 10% increase 
in personnel.  
 
308 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2001, 2004, 2006) 




Figure 5.12. Personnel employed by various Indian organizations per year (1991-2006) 
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Finally, organizational-level elite attention remained firmly fixated on internal events. As 
Table 5.4 below shows, there was some increased interest in Pakistan, as the increase in references 
to Pervez Musharraf are a notable change from Table 5.2, but this is directly in line with my 
theoretical expectations of focus given that, post-Kargil, Indian grand strategy also pivoted 
somewhat more towards Pakistan.  If anything, this focus suggests a move toward a coercive grand 
strategy. 
 
Table 5.4. List of top 10 bigrams in select Times of India abstracts between 2000-2004 
Word 1 Word 2 Number of appearances 
Minister Atal 68310 
Prime Minister 38 
Chief Minister 9 
Pervez Musharraf 8 
Sonia Gandhi 8 
Delhi Prime 7 
Gen Pervez 7 
Supreme Court 7 
George Fernandes 6 
 
   Pre-war, I demonstrated that the trajectory of resource allocation in the years between the 
1972 and 1999 case pointed in the direction of an inducive grand strategy. Post-Kargil, monetary 
resources increased dramatically in favor of an inducive grand strategy while personnel trends 
pointed somewhat in favor of a persuasive grand strategy. Elite attention, while primarily internally 
directed, was if anything pointed weakly in the coercive direction. This is another case where the 
path dependence component of my theory comes into play. Here, my theory expects stability as 
no one organization was receiving a preferential allocation of all three resources. If anything, given 
just how dramatic the relative increase in inducive funding was, that strategy may be expected to 
 
310 This total includes variants of Atal Behari/Bihari Vajpayee, who was Prime Minister of India during the entire 
period from 1999-2004. 
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come into sharper focus, which is precisely what is observed. Thus, I conclude that my theory 
passes the necessary hoops and is a plausible explanation for the case, even if there are some doubts 
about its ability to fully explain the case. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Which of the theories can provide the best explanation for India’s grand strategic stability 
around the Kargil Crisis? In this case, three theories are potential candidates while two others 
outright fail. Based on the available evidence, a leadership theory, strategic culture, and my 
organizational determinants may plausibly be at work. Both an external threat and a regional 
security architecture explanation greatly disappoint in the Kargil case, as they cannot account for 
the observed stability in the face of the changes that surrounded the Kargil crisis. Table 5.5 
provides an overview of the various theories’ expectations and how they performed. 
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Table 5.5. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the case 












Indeterminate Change Stability Stability Stability 
Expectation 


















met? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Explains the 
case? No No Some Doubts Some Doubts Some Doubts 
 
When surveying the three macro-level explanations, the most surprising failure is that of 
externally-oriented theories. The flaw with external threat is its incongruence with the stability 
observed in India’s grand strategy. The change in India’s perception of Pakistan’s conventional 
threat suggests grand strategic change, as India was caught off-guard for the type of threat Pakistan 
was posing even though it was undeniably the more powerful actor in the dyad. Focusing solely 
on the nuclear balance could suggest grand strategic stability, but India’s Kargil post-mortems 
reveal that nuclear stability did not factor large in its leaders’ thinking. A regional security 
architecture approach unraveled even faster as, for the first time, the U.S. sided with India over 
Pakistan, altering the balance of arrangements in the region. For a theory that posits that such 
relationships determine grand strategy, that Indian grand strategy did not change in response to 
this opening was notable, given the depth and vigor with which the U.S. engaged India in the post-
war period. While it may be unreasonable to assume that the rate of change would be swift given 
the two countries’ history, it is still problematic that I observed an inducive grand strategy prior to 
U.S. involvement and found even stronger evidence of such an approach post-war. 
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As far as internally oriented theories are concerned, a leadership theory of grand strategic 
change is plausibly at work in the case, although there is some question about Gowda’s tenure. 
Strategic culture continues to be a robust theory which cannot be ruled out as potentially in 
operation. The Gujral doctrine, and the Look East Policy that came after it, demonstrated 
consistency with the central paradigm of India’s strategic culture, even if its operational execution 
had changed from a Nehruvian persuasive grand strategy to an inducive grand strategy. The fact 
that a single central paradigm can yield two fundamentally different grand strategies is somewhat 
problematic, but not enough to discount it as a potential explanation of the case. 
 My organizational determinants theory of grand strategy had its theoretical expectations 
met and is likewise able to posit a potential explanation for the case. While the initial window of 
observation for the pre-war period was too narrow to clearly identify an inducive grand strategy, 
looking back over the intervening years between the Third Indo-Pakistan War and the Kargil Crisis 
helped establish a plausible expectation of an inducive grand strategy. Post-war, the data suggest 
that stability should result because of path dependence, as money, manpower, and elite attention 
were slightly muddled. As such, it is a potentially viable explanation for Indian behavior in the 
case, even if there are some doubts about its ability to fully explain the case. 
This concludes my set of three primary observations of Indian grand strategy. In the next 
chapter, I explore a set of three miniature case studies. The three cases I explore are Australia 
around the Vietnam War, Pakistan around the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and finally the 
Netherlands around Operation Trikora. My emphasis will be on conducting a plausibility probe of 
my theory in each of the cases. These mini-cases provide an opportunity to provisionally assess 
the generalizability of my theory by briefly applying it to cases outside of the Indian context.  
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6.0 Three Additional Cases of Interest 
This chapter investigates the generalizability of my theory by applying it to cases identified 
in Chapter 2 as potential candidates for testing my organizational determinants theory. The cases 
were not rejected for any flaws on their own, but rather due to the virtues of a within-case analysis. 
Specifically, holding constant the country, and thus many variables typically used for assessing 
the robustness and generalizability of a theory, offered the most direct opportunity to attack the 
notoriously tricky problem of analyzing grand strategy. The major drawback to a within-case 
approach, however, is the danger of a lack of generalizability, specifically because so many 
variables are held constant.  In the series of cases that follow, I redress this weakness by performing 
a brief examination of three non-Indian cases, by suggesting what my theory would expect, 
provisionally assessing the congruence of my theory and the empirical record, and discussing 
possible data sources that could yield the information necessary for further testing of my theory’s 
power in the cases in future research. 
The chapter is organized into three substantive sections, each covering a different case. 
Within each section, I discuss the background of the case before I explain what it adds to an 
analysis of my theory. I then examine secondary literature on the case in order to determine each 
country’s pre- and post-war grand strategy, and if the relationship between the two is better 
characterized by stability or change. I then analyze a sub-set of my independent variables to 
determine plausible congruence between the case and my theory before discussing any 
implications for rival hypotheses. I end each section by identifying where the data required to fully 
test my theory may reside. 
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6.1 Australian grand strategy around the Vietnam War 
The first case to consider in assessing the generalizability of my claim is Australian grand 
strategy surrounding the Vietnam War.311 Australia was firmly in the ranks of middle powers 
around the time of the Vietnam War, with a total GDP placing it below India but above Mexico.312 
While, unlike other cases in consideration, Australia did not have any territory involved in the war, 
it felt uneasy about the potential for communism to spread closer to its borders.313 This case is a 
particularly significant test of my theory because it represents a potentially easy test for a number 
of alternative hypotheses, chief amongst them regional security architecture. The remainder of this 
section briefly describes the history of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, identifies 
Australia’s likely pre- and post-war grand strategy, performs a preliminary assessment of 
congruence with my theory, and finally identifies potential sources for data necessary for testing 
my theory in depth. 
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War can be traced, in part, back to both its regional 
interests and concerns over the commitments of its most important ally, the United States, to 
defend Australia should the need arise.314 Australia’s presence in Vietnam grew rapidly from 30 
military advisers in 1962 to a battalion in 1965, eventually reaching a peak of just under 6,900 
soldiers in May of 1969.315 During the war, Australian forces operated in the U.S. III Corps’ area 
of responsibility and conducted many of the same missions as American forces, even if their 
capabilities were not identical.316 As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, a robust anti-war 
 
311 My thanks to Sir Lawrence Freedman for suggesting this case as a possible testing ground. 
312 United Nations Statistics Division (2016)  
313 Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch (2014, 109) 
314 Cox and O'Connor (2012, 175-6) 
315 White (2016, 31), Cox and O'Connor (2012, 176), Edwards (2014, 289) 
316 Grey (2008, 243-247) 
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movement grew back in Australia.317 Ultimately, Australian forces left more or less in tandem with 
their American counterparts, and completely withdrew from the conflict in 1972.318 
This case is a relatively tough test for my theory, as regional security architecture is a 
leading theory for explaining any observed change in the Australian grand strategy. In the wake of 
the Vietnam War, Australia’s main ally in the region, the United States, was forced to retrench and 
the credibility of its security guarantees to Australia were in question.319 Furthermore, Australia 
undertook defense reforms in the wake of its withdrawal from Vietnam, with an eye towards being 
more self-reliant.320 As such, any potential variation in the dependent variable could very plausibly 
be explained by a change in the American security commitment to Australia or the region at large, 
making this case a tough test for my theory and an excellent candidate for future research. 
Post-World War II, Australia had aligned itself closely with the foreign policy of Great 
Britain. After Britain’s recognition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1950, however, 
Australia’s anti-communist stance and non-recognition of the CCP began to more closely resemble 
the United States’ policies in the region.321 Characterizing Australian pre-war grand strategy is 
thus relatively straight forward. Australia’s most important relationship was its military tie to the 
United States, and it sent forces overseas in the period before the war; Australia appears to have 
been pursuing a coercive grand strategy.322  
 
317 Grey (2008, 248) 
318 Stockings (2010, 192) 
319 Millar (1978, 218) 
320 Edwards (2014, 300) 
321 Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch (2014, 109) 
322 See Grey (2008, 220-254) for a detailed description of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia during this period. It is also important to readers to remember that, in my taxonomy, coercive is not 
synonymous with aggressive; it is concerned with deriving security primarily through the use, or threat, of force, 
and/or reliance on military forces and relationships. 
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After the Vietnam War and the United States’ relative withdrawal from the region, 
Australia was presented with an opportunity to undertake a grand strategic pivot.  Yet, post-war, 
Australia’s grand strategy showed very little change. Australia’s foreign policy and its security 
continued to be dominated by the U.S.-Australian alliance.323 The shift in approach was to 
withdraw a majority, if not all, of its forces deployed in countries around the region and instead 
provide greater military assistance and training to Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.324 
Accordingly, while some aspects of the manifestation of Australia’s grand strategy changed from 
a focus on active military deployments and interventionism toward providing advisors and military 
aid, the broad contours of its coercive substance stayed largely the same.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. GDP of Australia 1960-1977 (Constant 2010 USD)325 
 
 
323 Grey (2008, 258) 
324 Gyngell (2017, 119) 
325 The World Bank Group (2020).  
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If Australia’s grand strategy remained stable, I expect to observe similar stability in state-
level resources, and consistent preference for distributing resources to coercive entities over the 
pre- and post-war time period. There was a shift in the manifestation of Australia’s coercive grand 
strategy from overseas troop deployments to provision of military aid. Given this, my theory does 
not expect increases in coercive manpower, but rather increased coercive budgets. Significant 
shifts in resourcing away from the coercive organization would suggest that my theory could not 
explain Australian grand strategic stability in this era. Figure 6.1 displays Australia’s GDP for a 
number of years before the war, during their involvement, and for 5 years afterwards.326 This data 
shows relatively steady GDP growth. Military age population growth likewise remains fairly 
consistent, with Australia’s population of males age 15-64 went from 3.2 million in 1960 to 4.6 
million in 1977. Given this was a peripheral war that did not directly threaten Australian territory 
or resources, I would not expect to observe radical resource shifts tied to their participation in the 
conflict.   
Organizational-level resource allocation patterns of money and power in the coercive 
domain are in line with my expectations above. Figure 6.2 shows Australia’s approximate defense 
expenditures from 1961 to 1977, and shows a continued increase in the post-war period. While 
preliminary data from the entirety of the pre-war period was not available, the post-war pattern is 
consistent with the trends expected by my theory.  Figure 6.3, which shows military personnel 
during the same period, further underscores this post-war trend. Australia underwent a troop drawn 
down post-war. Australia disbanded its version of the draft in 1972, however there was a continued 
 
326 Because of the unusual length of the Vietnam War, I have presented data for the entire period of the war, and the 
five years after to avoid choosing an arbitrary break point. However, data prior to 1960 is generally unavailable. 
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increase in coercive organization expenditures.327 It appears from the available empirical record 
that my theory is congruent with the case. 
 
Figure 6.2. Approximate military expenditure of Australia 1961-1977 (2010 USD)328 
  
 
327 Doyle, Grey, and Pierce (2002, 163) 
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Figure 6.3. Approximate Number of Australian Military Personnel 1961-1977 (Tens of Thousands)329 
 
In considering the Australian case, there are a number of potentially significant explanatory 
challenges for rival hypotheses to overcome. For example, on its face, this seems to be yet another 
instance in which a regional security architecture explanation struggles to account for grand 
strategic choice. Not only had British Commonwealth forces generally withdrawn from the region 
prior to Vietnam, Australia’s main ally—the United States—had also withdrawn from the region, 
leaving it to shoulder a larger part of the burden. Yet, Australian grand strategy appears stable, 
running contrary to the theory’s expectations. An external threat theory might provide better 
explanatory power; while the Vietnam conflict did not constitute an existential threat, the threat 
from global Communism did, which would give Australia a reason to continue with its previous 
grand strategy. Finally, the preliminary evidence I have gathered suggests that, while strategic 
culture may have driven Australian grand strategic decision-making, there are some open questions 
 
329 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966b, 1967b, 1968b, 1969a, 1970, 
1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977) 
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that require further examination to make a proper determination. For instance, I noted a shift from 
more active deployments in other nations to more assistance and training. This may represent the 
first steps on the path toward a persuasive grand strategy, as it represents a shift away from the 
harder power elements of a coercive grand strategy. If so, it implies a rate of change faster than a 
strategic culture predicts, but as of now this remains speculative.  Given just this quick look at the 
competing hypotheses, it appears that my theory may be the most compelling potential 
explanation. 
In order to properly test my theory, and indeed to determine its ability to explain the case, 
more information is needed on both Australian grand strategy, which was sketched in the above 
paragraphs, and organizational level resources, in the form of money, manpower, and elite 
attention. The next few paragraphs outline where future researchers can look for data to build upon 
the preliminary analysis conducted here. Operationalizing the dependent variable, Australian 
grand strategy, in the manner undertaken in this dissertation requires a large volume of data. Not 
all countries are as notoriously bureaucratic as India, and thus a ready set of data such as the 
Foreign Affairs Record may not always be available. This is a problem relatively easily overcome 
in the Australian case. Australia’s archives contain extensive records of all of its Prime Ministers 
and their cabinets, with some even having their own research guides. The total volume of data, 
required, however, can vary depending on how one defines the start of Australia’s participation in 
the conflict. Australia began its involvement in Vietnam in 1962 with the provision of 30 trainers, 
so choosing that start point means that ideally a full dataset would include data from 1957. 
However, if one chooses the commitment of Australian combat forces, which was in 1965, it would 
require only data from 1960 onward. Australia began withdrawal of its forces in Vietnam in 1970, 
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with its final exit coming in 1972.330 Thus a complete dataset requires data somewhere between 
the years of 1957 to 1977. Data on Gross Domestic Product, Consumer Price Index, and the like 
can become problematic to find prior to 1960. Thus, in order to ensure sufficient data exists to 
conduct an analysis relatively comparable to that which I presented in the case studies on India, I 
have focused my preliminary efforts on identifying data on Australian grand strategy and state- 
and organization-level resources from approximately 1960 to 1977. 
A search of the National Archives of Australia reveals that a first source of data on 
Australian grand strategy during this time period may be found there.331 During the period in 
question, Australia had six Prime Ministers, most with relatively short tenures.332 Of these six, 
there are research guides to the archives of Harold Holt, Gough Whitlam, and Malcom Fraser.333 
These guides suggest that the files may contain a single omnibus akin to the Foreign Affairs 
Record. What is more likely, however, is a collection of speeches, communiques, and the like more 
akin to the corpus I assembled for Chapter 5. Furthermore, the research guides suggest that the 
documents span the time period required.334 A further search of the electronic holdings of the 
National Archives of Australia indicate that speeches by the remaining prime ministers and their 
cabinets, for which there are currently no research guides, are also available; Figure 6.4 is an 
example of one such holding. Finally, to supplement these sources, Australia’s Department of the 
Prime Ministers and Cabinet hosts a detailed list of transcripts of Australian government speeches 
from the 1940s to 2015, which are freely available online.335 The benefit of supplementing the 
 
330 Millar (1978, xix-xx) 
331 The National Archive of Australia’s website can be reached at: https://www.naa.gov.au/ (as of 9/23/2020) 
332 The six prime ministers were (in order): Harold Holt, John McEwen, John Gorton, William McMahon, Gough 
Whitlam, and Malcom Fraser. 
333 National Archives of Australia (2020) 
334 Hocking et al. (2016, 74), Masters and Wood (2012, 70-75), Pemberton (2003, 95) 
335 These records can be found at: primeministers.moadoph.gov.au/collections/pm-transcripts (as of 9/23/2020) 
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information available from the Department of Prime Ministers and Cabinet with archival research 
is that it creates both a more robust data foundation and increases the potential for unveiling 
smoking gun evidence of my theory in action. Taken together, these resources should yield a more 
than a sufficient corpus to analyze Australian grand strategy during the period. Now, I will turn 
my attention to identifying data sources to measure my theory’s independent variables at both the 
state- and organizational-level.  
 
Figure 6.4. Example record of Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's speeches336 
 
 
336 National Archives of Australia. NAA: M533, 112. Image is used courtesy of the National Archives of Australia. 
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As I previously identified state-level money and manpower during my congruence testing, 
the only missing indicator to test my theory is to locate a suitable data source from which to 
measure elite attention. Operationalization of elite attention at the country level is fairly 
straightforward, with The Sydney Morning Herald offering digital archives from 1955 to 1995. 
While the full articles are available for a fee, the free search function suggests that one could utilize 
The Herald’s metadata to create a corpus of headlines similar to those which I produced for my 
full case studies.337 When measuring elite attention at the country level I utilized headlines, and so 
that serves as the minimum data requirement. 
Turning to the organization-level independent variables, elite attention is perhaps the most 
straightforward to specify, as it can be assessed through an analysis of the metadata of The Herald, 
using the identical methodology I detailed in Chapter 2; at the organization-level, I utilized 
abstracts of articles to measure elite attention. Money can be operationalized in a similarly 
straightforward manner, as the Government of Australia hosts an extensive digital archive of its 
appropriations bills, as well as budgets and speeches containing important background information 
on said speeches.338 Finally, manpower appears to present the trickiest of the three variables to 
operationalize. I was unable to locate manpower data at the organization level similar to that which 
was used in the Indian cases examined earlier, though Australia’s budgets do contain civil salaries 
for defense professionals, so it is possible that these records exist and may be found by either 
requesting them directly from the relevant organization(s) or examining other supplementary 
budget documents.  
 
337 The archive can be searched for free at: https://archives.smh.com.au/. The Sydney Morning Herald has both an 
extensive digital archive, wide readership, is the closest major metropol to Canberra, and is considered by many to an 
authoritative source for the New South Wales region, which completely encloses the Canberra region. Wei et al. 
(2015) 
338 This archive currently resides online at: https://archive.budget.gov.au/ (as of 09/23/2020) 
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In this section, I have demonstrated that my organizational determinants theory is plausibly 
congruent with the case. My preliminary research suggests that there are likely relatively easily 
obtainable data that can be used to replicate my methodology and fully test my theory. As this case 
presents a relatively tough test for my theory, looking at Australian grand strategy around Vietnam 
makes a logical starting place for any follow-on research on an organizational determinants of 
grand strategy theory. 
6.2 Pakistani grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War 
After Partition with India, Pakistan was one country divided into two non-contiguous 
“wings,” East and West Pakistan. While East Pakistan was more populous, West Pakistan was 
both territorially larger and politically more influential. This imbalance across the two wings led 
to an increasingly acrimonious series of internal disputes and, ultimately, an election that would 
have put a coalition of (primarily) East Pakistani political parties into power in East Pakistan. West 
Pakistan refused to accept this outcome, and began a brutal campaign of repression of East Pakistan 
by the Pakistani military.339 East Pakistan declared independence as the nation of Bangladesh 
shortly thereafter. From the outset, India had been allowing refugees onto its territory, as well as 
amassing troops at both of its borders with Pakistan. The specter of Indian intervention in the 
conflict prevented more robust attacks by the Pakistani military on Bangladesh for several months. 
Ultimately, however, the situation deteriorated to the point where the Pakistani military opted for 
a preemptive strike on India in an attempt to forestall what it believed to be an inevitable overt 
 
339 Haider (2009, 539) 
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Indian intervention in Bangladesh.340 In a somewhat ironic twist, the preemptive attack triggered 
the feared intervention by Indian forces, which rapidly defeated the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh 
and ensured the permanent division of Pakistan into two independent states. 
This is an analytically intriguing case for several reasons. It represents the inverse of the 
conflict analyzed in Chapter 4, looking at Pakistani grand strategy in the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan 
War. Additionally, the case expands the war outcome variable to cover not only a battlefield loss 
(as in the 1962 Sino-Indian War), but also, for the first time, a dramatic loss in territory and 
resources, as East and West Pakistan were sundered into Bangladesh and Pakistan. As such, it 
serves as a very stark break from the status quo ante and represents a relatively rare example in 
modern history of a case where, if any event were to offer a state an opportunity to break from its 
prior grand strategy, it would be in such an instance. Thus, this case provides a robust test of both 
my methodology as well as allows for a wide range of potential variation in the dependent variable, 
as there are many potential ways Pakistani grand strategy could reorient after such a devastating 
defeat. 
Pre-war, Pakistan pursued what, on the surface, appears to be a fairly straightforward 
coercive grand strategy. As Ahmed has noted. “Since independence, Pakistan’s foreign policy has 
pursued two major objectives: security through military capability and economic development.”341 
He goes on to say, even more bluntly, “The Pakistani elites’ approach to security, especially in the 
context of Afghanistan and India, revolved around military threats…”342 To facilitate this grand 
strategy, Pakistan had effectively been under either martial law or military rule for at least a decade 
 
340 Schofield (2000, 142) 
341 Ahmed (2012, 318) 
342 Ahmed (2012, 318) 
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in the years leading up to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. At the same time, Pakistan’s diplomatic 
capabilities were diminishing: it did not even have a foreign minister.343 
Post-war, despite the dramatic change in the composition of the government after 
Pakistan’s defeat brought down the military dictatorship and re-established civilian rule, there 
appears to be little change in the country’s coercive grand strategy. As Ahmed asserted above, the 
general tenor of Pakistan’s foreign policy leans in a coercive direction. Other scholars have noted 
that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did reorient some aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the wake of the 
defeat, such as withdrawing from SEATO.344 The chance that a civilian government would 
abandon a coercive grand strategy was not to be; as others point out, the weakened military position 
of Pakistan relative to India post-1971 was directly tied to an increase in the size of Pakistan’s 
armed forces, and the decision to pursue nuclear weapons.345 This evidence indicates a shift in 
preference from Pakistan utilizing external balancing to trying to internally balance against India. 
As with Australia, it appears that continuity, with some adjustments in specific operational 
emphasis, was the fate of Pakistani grand strategy in the wake of its defeat.  
In this case, my theory would expect to observe a shift in Pakistani grand strategy only if 
there were corresponding shifts in resource allocation amongst the organizations which executed 
Pakistani grand strategy. Because Pakistani grand strategy was characterized by continuity over 
the period, and the analysis above suggests Pakistan adopted an internal balancing approach, my 
theory would expect money, manpower, and elite attention to shift further in favor of the coercive 
 
343 Schofield (2000, 142) citing Choudhury (1974). It should be noted that not having a foreign minister, in and of 
itself is not necessarily a problem, as Jawaharlal Nehru famously functioned as both Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister due to his intense interest in foreign affairs. However, in this case, the military dictator at the time, Yahya 
Khan, had the foreign minister fired, and simply never bothered to replace him. Choudhury (1973) 
344 A. Ahmed (2017) 
345 S. Ahmed (1999, 183-4) 
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organization. This is because internal balancing requires a greater dedication of resources to 
coercive elements of grand strategy in order to build capability; had Pakistan chosen to adopt a 
persuasive or inducive grand strategy instead, the investment pattern would look very different. 
From the readily available data, my theory appears congruent with the case. Figure 6.5 
shows that the GDP of Pakistan plummeted when the united Pakistan was sundered into Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. Given the dramatic loss in GDP, I would expect to observe some downturn in all 
ministries, as tax revenue from East Pakistan was no longer available; any increase in spending off 
the baseline, or preferential shielding from across-the-board cuts would be particularly notable. 
The population of military aged males likewise dropped, from a peak of roughly 65.5 million in 
1971, to approximately 19.5 million in 1976.346 Given that Pakistan’s civil service was notoriously 
powerful, how they dealt with these shake ups at the organizational level is especially revealing.  
 
Figure 6.5. GDP of Pakistan 1966-1979 (Constant 2010 USD)347 
 
346 The World Bank Group (2018c) 
347 Note: The available World Bank data presents data for Bangladesh and Pakistan as separate, even when they were 
part of a united Pakistan. For this preliminary analysis, I have aggregated the figures from 1966 to 1971, and report 
only the numbers for (the former West) Pakistan after that. The World Bank Group (2020) 
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Figure 6.6. Approximate Military Expenditure of Pakistan 1966-1976 (2010 USD)348 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Approximate Number of Pakistani Military Personnel 1966-1976 (Tens of Thousands)349 
 
 
348 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1966a, 1967a, 1968a, 1969b, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 
1976) 
349 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1966a, 1967a, 1968a, 1969b, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 
1976) 
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Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show Pakistani military expenditure and personnel in the period 
five years pre-, and post-war. Figure 6.6 mirrors the dip in Figure 6.5, but shows significant 
reinvestment in the military in the post-war period. Pakistani military personnel numbers continued 
to grow despite the split, probably due to the fact that Pakistani military personnel were mostly 
drawn from West Pakistan before the war. Taking these two datapoints together, they appear 
directly in line with my theoretical expectations, as I observe a generally stable trend in manpower 
with continued growth in military spending. Given this preliminary data, it appears that my 
organizational determinants theory is congruent with the case. 
What then, are the potential implications of this case for rival hypotheses? Pakistani grand 
strategic choices are a fairly easy test for the external theories of grand strategic change, as they 
should be most likely to explain the case. From an external threat perspective, stability should 
result, as a united Pakistan was already existentially threatened by India, and the loss of East 
Pakistan left it weaker and more threatened than before. Thus, there should be evidence of a clear 
link between this increase in threat and Pakistani actions.  Regional security architecture is also a 
plausible explanation for the case, because the reliability of Pakistan’s security arrangements 
changed post-war as the United States sided with India. Given this change in the regional security 
architecture, Pakistan’s choice grand strategic stability can potentially be explained by its pivot 
towards internal balancing.  
As for internal theories, this case appears to pose yet a problem for the leadership theory, 
as Pakistan changed from a military dictatorship to a civilian government; the continuity in grand 
strategy, and particularly the continued reliance on a coercive grand strategy, is difficult to explain. 
This case also has implications for a strategic culture argument. There are several factors which 
complicate an analysis of Pakistani strategic culture in this case, as the internal composition of the 
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state shifted when non-defense civilians regained the presidency. Even if one accepts that the 
change from military to civilian leadership did not change Pakistani strategic culture by itself, the 
rapid shift from external balancing to internal balancing is difficult for a strategic culture 
hypothesis to explain, leaving its ability to fully explain the variation in the case in doubt. 
Having outlined the general contours of the case, Pakistan’s pre- and post-war grand 
strategies, preliminary evidence of congruence between the case and my theory, and implications 
of the case for competing theories, I now turn to identifying data sources which could be used to 
fully operationalize the dependent and independent variables required to test my claim in more 
detail. There are many diverse sources from which the necessary corpus of documents can be 
created to test Pakistan’s apparent and persistent coercive grand strategy. For instance, the National 
Archives of Pakistan have records of debates held in the National Assembly covering the entire 
period from 1967 to 1977, sometimes listed day by day, sometimes by month.350 There are also 
extensive collections of diaries, speeches, and statements made by the Pakistani Presidents. For 
example, Ayub Khan, the military dictator of Pakistani from 1958 to 1969, has an extensive body 
of speeches published.351 Compilations of speeches by the next Presidents of Pakistan—Yahya 
Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Fazal Chaudhry—are comparatively harder to find, but some 
published books of their speeches do exist, and it is likely that more might be found in Pakistan’s 
archive.352 Finally, the journal Pakistan Horizon, published by the Pakistan Institute of 
International Affairs, contains documents of note in the back of its quarterly issues, which cover 
the entire period. These documents are very similar to the corpus created for assessing Indian grand 
 
350 National Archives of Pakistan (2009, 18 – 28) 
351 Examples of the published material available which might be of use in this case are: Baxter (2007), Ayub Khan 
and Ghani (2010), Ayub Khan (1969) 
352 Bhutto, Mujibur, and Khan (1978), Bhutto and Khan (2015) 
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strategy in this dissertation, though slightly fewer in quantity.353 Additionally, it is worth noting 
that these are only the English language speeches; more may be available in Urdu. When 
combined, these resources represent a potentially robust corpus with which it should be possible 
to assess whether or not Pakistani grand strategy was indeed coercive during the relevant time 
period. 
Similar to Australia, money and manpower figures at the country level for Pakistan can be 
found via the World Bank. Elite attention, however, is somewhat more problematic. The challenge 
lies not in the dearth of data, but rather in the effort required to digitize existing records. The 
National Archives of Pakistan has extensive newspaper holdings from a number of papers in 
Pakistan covering the period in question, including The Dawn, Morning News, and The Pakistan 
Times.354 Only some of these have been converted to microfilm, however, with The Pakistan Times 
and The Dawn having the most robust presence in microfilm archives.355 It is possible that wider 
archives exist either in Urdu or that, as digitization efforts increase, metadata archives like those 
available in the Australian and Indian cases may become available.356 Thus, while comparable data 
exists to operationalize elite attention in a fashion similar to that employed in earlier chapters, 
considerable effort would need to be undertaken to execute it.  
Of the three independent variables of my theory, elite attention and money are again 
straightforward to operationalize at the organization-level. Assuming a digitization effort has been 
undertaken to access The Dawn’s headlines, one would likewise have access to the abstracts 
 
353 Pakistan Horizon can be found online at: https://www.piia.org.pk/pak-horizon/archives or via JSTOR 
354 Of the three, The Dawn possesses the widest readership of English-language newspapers, which are favored by 
Pakistani elites. Siraj (2009, 44) 
355 Information on the National Archives of Pakistan’s holdings can be found online at: 
https://archives.gov.pk/pdf/Newspapers.pdf (as of 09/23/2020). 
356 Both the United States Library of Congress, and the New York Public Library possess microfilm holdings of The 
Dawn which cover most (if not all) of this era and, as such, this represents yet another potential source of the requisite 
material. 
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required to operationalize elite attention. At the organizational level, monetary allocations likely 
can be found for most of the period in question on the “Budget of the central government of 
Pakistan,” which was published yearly from 1951 to 1972.357 After 1972, the “Annual Budget 
Statement of the Central Government” provides the necessary information.358 
While I have not been able to identify conclusive proof of the existence of organizational 
level manpower data, there are a number of indications such data very likely exists. In his work on 
ruling elites and administrative reforms, Khan points to several pay commissions that were 
undertaken in Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, which suggests records on numbers of personnel 
do exist. Khan also notes, however, that the power of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was such 
that it was able to successfully block the release of at least one of those pay commission reports 
for years.359 This suggests that at least some data on the number of civil service personnel employed 
in the relevant organizations exist, but that it is very likely either not available or buried in reports 
for political reasons. For instance, Wilder reports that in the period from 1949 to 2009 there were 
over 20 studies done on administrative reform in Pakistan, but that Pakistan’s bureaucracy has 
remained much more powerful than its general democratic institutions, impeding access to 
potentially sensitive or controversial information such as personnel and pay data.360  However, 
given the extent to which civil service in Pakistan has been studied, it is possible that such data, or 
at least some relevant data points, may exist in the public domain.361 
 
357 This holding is available via the National Library of Australia, and the record (including years available) can be 
accessed at: https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3408474 (as of 09/23/2020). 
358 This holding is available via the United States Library of Congress, and the record (including years available) can 
be access at: https://lccn.loc.gov/73930495 (as of 09/23/2020). 
359 Khan (1980, 745) 
360 Wilder (2009, 20-1) 
361 Some examples of the literature looking at civil service reform throughout the years are: Wilder (2009), Khan 
(1980), Gorvine (1965) 
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While I was not able to easily identify data sources for this case that are perfectly parallel 
to those used in other cases considered, it is likely that within Pakistan’s archive usable data does 
exist; of all the countries examined in this dissertation, Pakistan’s digitization and online 
cataloging lags the furthest behind. Manpower data, at least on the civilian personnel side, has 
been the hardest to identify. However, of the three variables in my theory, it is the least likely to 
see dramatic change given the fact that Pakistan’s civil service enjoyed power and bureaucratic 
pull similar to India’s. Additionally, as an authoritarian state for a significant portion of the time 
under question, even being able to identify a significant portion of the datasets required to test my 
theory bodes well; given that both my theory and methodology require large amounts of data to be 
properly tested, if sufficient data can be found even in authoritarian regimes prone to data 
obfuscation, it suggests both my theory and method can be applied to a much larger and more 
generalizable set of cases than the case of India alone would suggest.  
6.3 The Netherlands grand strategy around Operation Trikora 
The Netherlands’ attempt to decolonize what was known as the Dutch East Indies was a 
fraught endeavor. First, Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands in 1945 and, after 
a five-year struggle, was successfully recognized by both the Netherlands and the entire 
international community as a sovereign state.362 One of the remnants of the Dutch East Indies that 
the Netherlands was able to hold onto, however, was the western half of the island of New Guinea, 
then known as West Papua. Over a 17-year period from 1945 until 1962, Indonesia remained at 
 
362 Steedly (2013) 
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loggerheads with the Netherlands over West Papua’s fate; the former sought to quickly incorporate 
the territory into Indonesia while the latter aimed for gradual decolonization and independence.363 
While this dispute took place primarily in the diplomatic arena, Indonesia executed a military 
operation in 1961 to take the territory by force, which came to be known as Operation Trikora.364 
A full-scale military invasion did not take place, but Indonesian troops did attempt to infiltrate the 
island and the fighting culminated in the Battle of the Arafura Sea in early 1962, which saw the 
sinking of an Indonesia patrol boat and the death of a prominent Indonesian military officer.365 
When considering the scope of conflicts examined in this dissertation, this case is perhaps 
most similar to the Australian case examined earlier in this chapter, as it represents another 
example of a middle power engaged in a peripheral conflict.  An important variation in this case, 
however, is that it represents the only instance of a conflict between a former colony (Indonesia) 
and its colonizer (the Netherlands). As a relatively minor conflict involving a country that was in 
the decolonization process anyway, it presents a tough test; this case serves as a least-likely case 
for any theories expecting grand strategic change.366 
This case also provides desirable variation in selection criteria. First and foremost, as 
alluded to earlier, the Netherlands was a colonial power, and all previously considered states were 
former colonies. Two other important distinctions of note are, first, that this case represents the 
first application of my theory to a Western power, and, second, it represents the first application 
to a country which is not a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. If a within-case analysis 
represented the strongest research design to test my theory in this dissertation, as it held many 
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potentially confounding variables constant, this case adds important diversity that can bolster 
confidence in the generalizability of my theory.367 
Prior to World War II, the Netherlands pursued the twin strategies of neutrality in European 
affairs and mercantilism abroad. When it did begin to engage in a more activist foreign policy 
again, it was in the context of decolonization abroad and the ravages of post-World War II Europe 
at home.368 Hallmarks of this newly emergent activist foreign policy were involvement in 
international organizations and an emphasis on diplomacy and foreign aid. In the post-World War 
II period, the Netherlands was focused on providing aid for economic development in order to 
secure its business interests, especially with less powerful countries or its colonies.369 For example, 
Hoebink notes that one of the initial pushes for expansion of Dutch foreign aid came from 
employers’ organizations for economic reasons.370 This use of transactional suasion, whether for 
moral or economic reasons, is a hallmark of what I call inducive grand strategies; as such, the 
Netherland’s pre-war grand strategy can best be characterized as inducive.   
Post-Operation Trikora, the Netherlands’ grand strategy remained relatively unchanged as 
an inducive grand strategy. While Heldring notes that the Netherlands was becoming a more 
idealistic, activist force in foreign policy in the late 1960s and 1970s, this does not imply that its 
grand strategy was shifting in a persuasive direction.371 Despite a shift in motivation from 
economic self-interest to more idealistic pursuits, the use of aid as a key tool of Dutch foreign 
policy did not change. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the Netherlands began to invest a 
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368 Heldring (1978, 410) 
369 Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk (2013, 10) 
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significant portion (around 1.2 percent of GNP) in foreign aid.372 Baehr points out that the 
Netherlands was consistent in utilizing its development aid to advance concepts such as human 
rights, but that it still sought to use aid as a means of influencing behavior. 373 Thus, by my 
definition, the Netherlands continued an inducive grand strategy. Given that the relationship is best 
characterized by stability, and the fact that this was a peripheral conflict for the Dutch, I generally 
expect to observe little in the way of deviation from pre-war patterns of investment. 
 
Figure 6.8. GDP of the Netherlands 1960-1967 (Constant 2010 USD)374 
While preliminary data is not available for the entire period, as reliable pre-1960 data are 
difficult to come by, there is enough to at least preliminarily suggest congruence between the case 
and my theory. When considering data at the state level, Figure 6.8 confirms that the rather abrupt 
end to its decolonization of West Papua did not materially affect the resources available to the 
country. Military aged males also show nothing to indicate a disjuncture in grand strategic form, 
with the population growing from roughly 3.5 million in 1960 to 3.9 million in 1967, which 
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indicates a largely stable population pool.375 While there is overwhelming support for continuity 
in an inducive grand strategy in this instance, what remains to be found is evidence of 
congruence..376  
At the organization level, comprehensive historical foreign aid budgets for the Netherlands 
reaching that far back do not appear to be readily available in English. Despite this, there are some 
budgetary numbers available. Dutch foreign aid grew from $2.9 million in 1955 to $63.1 million 
in 1962 before backsliding for several years, only to regain its previous high in 1966.377 Given that 
the decline in aid was tied to the loss of West Papua, but still recovered after the period both 
underscores the inducive nature of the Netherland’s grand strategy: it was aiming to use economic 
tools to achieve political effect. Furthermore, while it is somewhat surprising that I observe some 
fluctuation in resourcing, there are strong indications that elite attention was still directed that way. 
For instance, the Dutch only began providing foreign aid to other countries in 1949. By 1965, 
foreign aid had become important enough to warrant a Minister of Development Cooperation, even 
if the program was still reliant on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.378 As such, it appears my theory 
is congruent with the case. 
The observed stability in Dutch grand strategy is relatively easy to explain from an external 
threat perspective; given the limited nature of the conflict that it took place half a world away, and 
that the Netherlands was in the process of decolonizing Western Papua anyway, there was no 
existential threat to the Dutch. Likewise, a regional security architecture approach would point out 
 
375 The World Bank Group (2018c) 
376 The question of the reasons for giving aid, both for the international community at large and for the Netherlands 
specifically, has been the subject of a lot of scholarly attention. For a sample of this scholarship, and that which 
generally contends the Dutch gave foreign aid during this period primarily for transactory reasons (which indicates an 
inducive grand strategy) see: Arens (2003), Alesina and Dollar (2000), van der Veen (2011), Hoebink (1999), Spitz, 
Muskens, and van Ewijk (2013) 
377 (Arens, 460) citing Kuitenbrouwer (1994) 
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that there was no change in the Cold War balance of power in the Netherlands immediate vicinity, 
and a conflict over West Papua represents a peripheral conflict. A leadership theory of grand 
strategic stability and change appears to take a blow, as the Netherlands had multiple prime 
ministers of different parties over the years of the case. It is theoretically possible that the prime 
ministers and differing parties all had similar grand strategic preferences. However, a leadership 
theory suggests that grand strategy changes as leaders (or their preferences) change, and such 
homogeneity of thought suggests either an incomplete theory or another variable at work, like 
strategic culture or external threat. Strategic culture also takes a blow as a viable explanation; 
Dutch colonial ambitions were quickly set aside after Indonesian independence and foreign aid 
rapidly gained prominence as a tool of Dutch statecraft.379 Given the fact that the Dutch kept 
detailed records that are widely available, this case represents one of the strongest additional cases 
on which to test my theory against a strategic culture argument.  
Despite the extensive records kept by the Dutch, there are some challenges to being able 
to begin identifying data that could be used to code the variables employed by my theory. As I do 
not speak Dutch, my ability to comprehensively search is limited, but I have endeavored to identify 
as many potential sources of data as possible. Assessment of the substance of Dutch grand strategy 
during the relevant time period should be possible given that the Netherlands has a robust archive 
of government papers open to researchers. There were six Prime Ministers between 1956 to 1967, 
which covers roughly the time period in question, and the National Archives of the Netherlands 
has extensive records for more than half of them.380 There also appears to be extensive holdings 
 
379 Dierikx (2016, 640) 
380 The archives contain extensive records of the papers of Prime Ministers Drees, Beel, de Quay, and Marijnen. I was 
unable to locate archives for Prime Ministers Cals and Zijlstra, but this should not be taken as evidence that such 
archives do not exist. For specific records, see (for instance): Bervoets and Kaajan (1978), Gaemers (2007)   
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on Dutch colonial administration, especially during the decolonization period, and those holdings 
include specific information on the Indonesian campaign against Dutch New Guinea.381 Taken 
together, this suggests that there is a wealth of information that would allow for the creation of a 
robust corpus of documents to analyze in order to determine Dutch grand strategy. Additionally, 
the presence of such a large archive leaves open the possibility of finding smoking gun evidence 
of one or another theory at work, buried in the papers containing more robust discussion of reasons 
for decisions. 
Data at the country level should likewise be relatively easy to obtain. The World Bank 
generally has the requisite manpower and GDP data for the Netherlands over the time period in 
question.382 For elite attention, the archives of either of the Netherlands’ two leading ‘elite’ 
newspapers, de Volkskrant, or NRC Handelsblad, will provide a wealth of material, with de 
Volkstrant likely to be the slightly more useful because of its larger circulation.383 Holdings for de 
Volkstrant exist from 1948 through 1960, although they are listed as incomplete, meaning that 
there could be some missing coverage.384 Fortunately, the Library of Congress does have complete 
microfilm archives of NRC Handelsblad from 1948 to 1970, which provides a backup source of 
data should the missing years for de Volkskrant be unlocatable.385 In fact, it would be valuable to 
measure both papers, should the remaining archives of de Volkskrant be located, in order to help 
rule out any impact of political bias in reporting. 
 
381 Centrale Archief Selectiedienst (1997) 
382 The World Bank Group (2018b, 2018d) 
383 Janssen (1999, 333) 
384 The most complete available holding in the Americas seems to belong to the Library of Congress, which can be 
found here: https://lccn.loc.gov/sn90017951. A search of the National Library of the Netherlands, as well as the 
National Archive of the Netherlands did not turn up listings for the newspaper, but that may simply be due to the 
language barrier. 
385 A link to the Library of Congress’s holdings of NRC Handelsblad can be found here: 
https://lccn.loc.gov/sn95058062 
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Data sources for money and manpower at the organizational level are also available. The 
National Archive of the Netherlands appears to have both budgetary data and personnel statistics, 
located under the Directorate-General for the National Budget of the Ministry of Finance 
(Directoraat-Generaal Rijksbergroting van het Ministerie van Financiënn). According to the 
finding aid provided by the National Archive, there are records from the Office of Personnel 
Statistics (Inrichting personeelsstatistiek) from 1960-1973, which is missing a couple of the years 
required to cover the case, but there may be further leads located elsewhere in the boxes.386 
Additionally, there are promising indications that budgetary data exists as well, as there are 
extensive records of Budget Calls (Begrotingsaanschrijvingen) and general budgetary 
information.387 
In summary, this case presents a relatively tough test for theories of grand strategic change, 
primarily because there does not appear to have been any meaningful change nor would any change 
be obviously related to the conflict. While the outcome may have multiple potential explanations 
at first glance, there exists a wide range of data sources which could be tapped in order to measure 
the variables in my theory and other theories to better understand the relative power of each claim. 
In addition, the case adds diversity on a number of important axes and, if explored further, it could 
bolster confidence in the generalizability of my theory. In any future testing of my organizational 
determinants theory, or really any theories of grand strategic change, this represents a potentially 
rich case to explore.  
 
386 Centrale Archief Selectiedienst (2010, 26) 
387 Centrale Archief Selectiedienst (2010, 25 – 28). Reference to general budgetary information (in Dutch): Serie 
circulaires aan de ministeries (I Begroting / algemeen; I A zgn. blauwe boekje; I B Suppletoire begrotingen; II overige 
regelingen inzake de Rijkscomptabiliteit, III Personeels-aangelegenheden; IV Rijksgebouwendienst; V Voorschriften 
t.a.v. andere uitgavencategorieën; VI Diversen). 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored three different cases in brief: Australian grand strategy in the 
wake of the Vietnam War; Pakistani grand strategy around the third Indo-Pakistan War, and the 
Netherlands grand strategy around Operation Trikora. The focus of this chapter was on 
determining my theory’s plausible congruence with each country’s grand strategy over time, 
fleshing out what makes them attractive cases for future research, and identifying datasets which 
could be of use to future researchers looking to further probe my theory. In doing so, I have 
addressed a key structural weakness in my within-case research design—generalizability—and a 
potential methodological constraint in the data-intensive requirements of my theory. By 
identifying additional cases and data sources, I have demonstrated that both my theory and my 
methodology can be applied beyond the case of India. Furthermore, I have laid out a plausible path 
for future research by identifying several more tests which could help determine whether or not 
my theory stands up to additional empirical scrutiny. Having done so, in the next chapter I provide 
summary analysis of the evidence for my organizational determinants theory of grand strategy and 
some concluding thoughts. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I present a brief review of all of the cases considered in this dissertation, 
summarizing how well each of the competing explanations fares, before looking across the set of 
cases. The discussion then addresses the questions about grand strategy posed in the introduction. 
I also touch upon the implications of my research for a debate on Indian grand strategy. Finally, I 
provide a set of more general conclusions and offer areas for future research. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
In this section, I provide a brief summary of each case and present an overview of my 
findings before concluding by looking across the range of cases. Of the five theories of grand 
strategic stability and change considered in this dissertation, three stand out as more viable than 
the others: leadership, strategic culture, and my organizational determinants arguments. Of these 
three, strategic culture and organizational determinants are most consistently useful in 
understanding the form and rate of change observed in grand strategy. 
7.1.1 The 1962 Sino-Indian War 
The first case centers on India’s grand strategy around the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This war 
took place less than 20 years after the founding of India, when its first and most influential Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was in power. Here, Nehru’s famous grand strategy of Non-Alignment 
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is correctly identified by topic modeling as a persuasive grand strategy, which corresponds with 
the description in the secondary literature and validates my methodological approach. India’s pre- 
and post-war grand strategic approach is essentially stable, though there are some signs of a shift 
towards a more coercive grand strategy after the conflict. Looking across the competing 
explanations, an external threat theory is only partially able to explain the case as, while stability 
is plausibly anticipated by the claim, it is problematic for the theory that India did not focus more 
effort on addressing the Chinese threat after having lost the war. This leaves regional security 
architecture, leadership, strategic culture, and my organizational determinants theory as potential 
explanations of the case. Table 7.1 below summarizes the results of my analysis. 
 
Table 7.1. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the 1962 Sino-Indian War case 













Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
Expectation 


















met? No No Yes Partially Yes 
Explains the 
case? No No Some Doubts Some Doubts Yes 
 
A regional security architecture hypothesis cannot explain the case because India failed to 
utilize the web of relationships it had built post-war to help address the increase in threat from the 
Chinese; India chose to internally balance instead. There is no mechanism specified by the theory 
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to govern why this should be the case, especially because Non-Alignment was a strategy which 
was built on managing the web of alliances and security commitments in the region. A leadership 
theory provides a potential explanation, given the leaders in question generally shared the same 
grand strategic preferences. However, the theory has no plausible mechanism which accounts for 
Indian behavior. Previously, China had been identified as a threat to Indian security, but Indian 
leaders chose a persuasive grand strategy. Post-war, they chose to internally balance, primarily 
against China. It is unclear why Indian leaders would update their preferences only vis-à-vis China, 
but not Pakistan as well. This casts some doubt on a leadership theory’s ability to explain the case.  
Strategic culture is an explanation that generally provides a robust explanation of the case, 
as the slight shift in the form of grand strategy could be indicative of either a nascent shift towards 
a more coercive grand strategy or normal variance within a band of acceptable grand strategic 
approaches defined by the country’s central strategic paradigm. Finally, my organizational 
determinants theory fares the best, as it both explains the stability in grand strategy and accounts 
for the rate of change. My theory accounts for the stability in grand strategic form, by pointing to 
continuation in monetary resourcing trends post-war. My theory also explains the shift towards a 
coercive grand strategy, given that personnel employed in the coercive domain increase relative to 
the other domains; this expectation is validated by a corresponding increase in coercive language 
in the post-war grand strategic analysis. As such, my theory outperforms its rivals in this case. 
 
7.1.2 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War 
The second case examines Indian grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. This 
case has a less well articulated grand strategy, as there is debate in the literature over Prime 
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Minister Gandhi’s grand strategy at the time. Some scholars argue that Gandhi is better thought of 
as a Machiavellian realist, while others suggest that her grand strategy was simply a coercive twist 
on Non-Alignment. This latter interpretation is generally in agreement with the observations 
coming out of the Sino-Indian War. My analysis, drawing on insights from hundreds of primary-
source documents, determined that the pre-war grand strategy did have some coercive elements, 
but is still best characterized as a persuasive one. India’s post-war grand strategy was also 
identified as persuasive, with a slight shift away from the coercive undertones detected pre-war. 
Overall, India’s grand strategy during this period was best characterized by stability. 
An external threat theory does not clearly expect either stability or change given the 
dramatic reduction in the threat India faced from Pakistan and thus offers little insight into the 
case. Comparatively, there is more robust support for a regional security architecture theory, but 
there are some doubts about the extent to which the constellation of alliances and diplomatic 
support in the region factored in to Indian decision making. Internally oriented theories fare 
somewhat better in this regard, with both a leadership theory and strategic culture theory predicting 
stability. Gandhi and the stability of her grand strategic preference provide a reasonable 
explanation of the case. Strategic culture theory is also plausibly at work, although there is 
relatively scant evidence that the operational assumptions of India’s central paradigm are actually 
observable in this case. Finally, my organizational determinates theory is able to explain both the 
form and rate of change. Pre-war, the relative emphasis of money was on the persuasive domain. 
Post-war, the resource indicators were mixed, indicating grand strategic stability should result, 
which is precisely what is observed. My theory also has the added benefit of providing an 
explanation of why topic modeling showed a narrower focus for Indian grand strategy in the post-
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war period by demonstrating elite attention was focused on internal, rather than external, matters. 
Table 7.2 below summarizes the results of my analysis. 
 
Table 7.2. Summary of rival theories' ability to explain the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War case 












Indeterminate Indeterminate Stability Stability Stability 
Expectation 


















met? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explains the 
case? No No Yes Some Doubts Yes 
 
7.1.3 The 1999 Kargil Crisis 
The final case examines Indian grand strategy around the 1999 Kargil conflict, which 
resulted in a strategic stalemate. In this case, the questions revolve around how to define Indian 
grand strategy at the time, as the literature proposes both the inducive Look East policy and the 
more traditional persuasive Non-Alignment may have been in operation. Here, topic modeling 
validates the Look East policy as both India’s grand strategy and inducive in form, bringing clarity 
to the scholarly debate. These results further underscore the promise of the methodology for 
identifying a country’s grand strategy. Post-war, the results of my analysis showed a continuation 
 268 
of an inducive grand strategy, which means that Indian grand strategy in this period is best 
characterized by stability.  
 
Table 7.3. Summary of rival theories ability to explain the 1999 Kargil Crisis Case 












Indeterminate Change Stability Stability Stability 
Expectation 


















met? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Explains the 
case? No No Some Doubts Some Doubts Some Doubts 
 
Table 7.3 summarizes my findings in the analysis of rival hypotheses, and highlights that 
two theories that are unable to meet theoretical expectations. An external threat theory fails to 
account for India’s grand strategic stability because Kargil altered Indian perceptions of the 
conventional balance of power on the subcontinent. A regional security architecture hypothesis 
fails because, in the Kargil Crisis, Pakistan’s most powerful ally, the United States, actually shifted 
support to India and thus this theory would expect India’s grand strategy to change. Leadership 
and strategic culture provide plausible explanations, but there are questions about a leadership 
theory’s ability to account for the tenure of Prime Minister Gowda, whose preferences were not 
clearly reflected in India’s choice of grand strategy. There is also evidence that a strategic culture 
theory might be at work. However, despite the central paradigm of Indian strategic culture being 
identical across all three cases examined in this dissertation, in this case, an inducive, not 
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persuasive, grand strategy is observed. It is problematic that the identical strategic core can 
seemingly yield two opposing grand strategies at different points in time. Finally, my 
organizational determinants theory provides another plausible explanation for the case, even if 
there are some doubts about its ability to fully explain the case. The initial window of observation 
used to identify India’s pre-war grand strategy, by not capturing the whole of the country’s grand 
strategic development between the Third Indo-Pakistan War and the Kargil Crisis, seems too 
narrow to clearly establish the warrant for an inducive grand strategy. Post-war, India resourced 
coercive, inducive, and persuasive organizations differently with money, manpower, and elite 
attention, creating a muddle in terms of organizational determinants and indicating that path 
dependence should dominate; the resultant expectation of stability is validated by the continuation 
of an inducive grand strategy after the war.  
 
7.1.4 Mini-case study results 
Three mini-case studies were conducted to assess the generalizability of my theory to non-
Indian contexts: Australian grand strategy around the Vietnam War, Pakistani grand strategy 
around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and the Netherlands’ grand strategy around Operation 
Trikora. My theory appears plausibly congruent with the broad outlines of the historical record in 
each case. I also identified data sources that can be of use to future scholars looking to apply my 
theory and methodology to these cases. Combined, these efforts help redress the potential criticism 
of the intense data requirements required for replicating my methodology. Collectively, these cases 
demonstrate that both my theory and my method can be generalized beyond the single case of 
India. 
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7.1.5 Synthesis of findings 
Of the five theories of grand strategic stability and change under consideration, two are 
clearly less analytically useful than the others. External threat theory is indeterminate in its 
expectations of grand strategic stability and change in all three of my primary cases. A theory that 
cannot make clear predictions about grand strategic stability and change cannot be relied upon to 
explain any such developments. Regional security architecture also fares poorly across the range 
of cases, having been rejected in the Kargil case and weakened by indeterminacy in the other two. 
Leadership preference is a potentially viable explanation across the broad range of cases, but the 
incongruence between Gowda’s preferences in the Kargil case is somewhat problematic. This 
leaves strategic culture and my organizational determinants theory, which generally perform the 
best across the range of cases. My case studies collectively raise an important question about 
strategic culture, as it is unclear how or why a single central paradigm can or should yield two 
opposing grand strategies. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw in the theory, but it is a call for more 
research. My organizational determinants theory performs as well as, if not better, than the other 
theories considered across the board, although in the Kargil case does raise questions about the 
proper length of the data window required to properly contextualize the relative strength of the 
organizations. Since my theory outperforms many of the leading theories of grand strategic 
stability and change, and perform equally as well, if not better than competitors it appears to be a 
valuable potential explanation for grand strategic stability and change. 
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7.2 Implications of this dissertation for arguments regarding understanding grand strategy 
In my introductory chapter, I highlighted three open questions in the field of grand strategy: 
does grand strategy exist in practice; can we know grand strategy in real time; and, what causes 
states to adopt the grand strategies they do? I have found answers for two of them and shed light 
on the third. 
7.2.1 Grand strategy exists in practice 
One of the most fundamental questions in the academic study of grand strategy centers on 
whether it actually exists in practice. Grand strategic nihilists vigorously assert that the concept 
has no practical meaning; if it exists at all, they contend, it is a theoretical construct rather than an 
observable phenomenon. The results of my dissertation severely weaken this line of argumentation 
by finding specific evidence of India’s grand strategy over time. I did so by utilizing a novel 
methodology and dataset to identify their articulation of that strategy. Through the use of topic 
modeling, I was able to identify the specific Indian theory of security suggested by other scholars 
in all instances. This is compelling evidence that grand strategy is not merely a theoretical 
construct, but that it exists in practice. 
7.2.2 Grand strategy is knowable in real time 
Some grand strategic skeptics believe that a country’s choice of strategy can only fully be 
known in retrospect. Here too, topic modeling provides a useful tool for the real time identification 
of grand strategy. While in my cases I focused on historical events, this method can easily be 
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applied to the current day; in fact, given the rapid advances in modern computing and the ease of 
access to machine readable files, a research project using my methodology to analyze current grand 
strategies would have a vast array of data to work with. For instance, the website for the White 
House routine publishes transcripts of remarks by the United States President, as well as statements 
and press releases on a variety of topics, including foreign policy. These documents, along with 
others, could be collected and analyzed to identify the American grand strategic form, and even 
detect perturbations and change in real time. Charges that grand strategy only has retrospective 
coherence are unwarranted. 
7.2.3 What causes states to adopt the strategies they do? 
My organizational determinants theory of grand strategy can provide insight into when to 
expect grand strategic stability and change. In many cases, my theory outperforms other leading 
theories, such as regional security and external threat. My theory’s closest competitor is the 
strategic culture hypothesis; both theories highlight the power of path dependence in grand 
strategy, noting that, once a country goes down a particular strategic path, it will usually continue 
absent an extremely large shock. A strategic culture theory emphasizes the role of people, and their 
beliefs. My organizational determinants theory focuses on money, manpower, and elite attention. 
The difference in variables between the two theories has interesting implications for how, and the 
rate at which, policy makers can effect change. 
Strategic culture is a diffuse theory that, by Johnston’s definition, takes into consideration 
the culture’s attitude towards utilizing force. It follows that the way to effect grand strategic change 
is to change a culture’s beliefs about the best course of action. While this makes intuitive sense, 
the empirical record examined in this dissertation cases some doubt on the claim. Specifically, in 
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the period surrounding the Kargil Crisis, India’s central paradigm of strategic culture was the same 
as in earlier periods. Yet, the resultant grand strategy was driven by a set of operational 
assumptions that diverged significantly from the previously considered cases, and resulted in an 
inducive, rather than persuasive, grand strategy being adopted. It is problematic that the same 
strategic culture can yield opposing grand strategies.  Finally, strategic culture theory implies that 
rapid change is unlikely given the diffuse nature of culture and the difficulty in achieving broad 
cultural change. Stability should almost always be expected. My organizational determinants 
theory allows for the possibility of more rapid change than a strategic culture theory, as there are 
potentially more numerous ways to effect change.  
7.3 On Nehru’s Shadow 
One pervasive debate in the literature is on the proposition that Nehru’s legacy casts such 
a long shadow that Indian grand strategy is constrained because of the legacy of Non-Alignment. 
The essence of the argument is that Indian grand strategy has never fully emerged from Nehruvian 
Non-Alignment. Chaulia epitomizes this perspective, contending: 
The leitmotif of my essay is that 37 years after [Nehru] relinquished 
his obsessive and officious grasp over India, the worldview and 
epistemic parameters he bequeathed live on despite changing winds 
of domestic politico-ideological forces. Political actors with 
radically non-Nehruvian ideologies may control levers of power and 
decision-making, but the quintessence of Indian foreign policy was 
laid out by the original helmsman.388 
 
388 Chaulia (2002, 215-6) 
 274 
Rauch similarly raises the point that some believe Indian leaders have felt pressure to at least pay 
rhetorical homage to Nehruvian ideals.389 My research has something useful to add to this debate.  
My findings reinforce the claim advanced by Rauch and others that the grand strategy of 
Non-Alignment, as envisioned by Nehru, was distinctive from the concept of being non-aligned. 
As I noted in Chapter 3, Non-Alignment has to do with a very specific set of foreign policy ideas 
and is a persuasive form of grand strategy. Being non-aligned has to do with not taking sides 
between the competing superpowers. However, my analysis also shows that, while there was an 
Indian preference for persuasive grand strategies in two of the three cases, there was also a clear 
shift to an inducive grand strategy in the late 1990s, all while India still remained ‘non-aligned’ 
between the post-Cold War superpower in the United States and emerging challengers in Russia, 
and China. Thus, I conclude from the available evidence that, while Nehru remains an important 
symbolic figure for India, Indian leaders have been charting their own course for longer than some 
in the field suggest. 
7.4 Concluding thoughts and areas for future research 
 This dissertation, when looked at as a whole, points to two other, more general conclusions 
about grand strategy and my organizational determinants theory. One particularly noteworthy 
observation is that, in all three cases, despite variation in war outcomes, grand strategic stability is 
observed. This stability came in the face of stunning victory (India 1971), dramatic loss (India 
1962, Pakistan 1971), tie (India 1999), and negligible defeat (Australia 1972, Netherlands 1962). 
 
389 Rauch (2008, 2) 
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It is clear, at least from the cases examined, that external theories outright fail to explain this lack 
of change. As noted by Silove, this may be because most external theories operate at the level of 
the international system, while grand strategy may primarily be a product of a state-level 
phenomena.390 This is not a new observation, as scholars such as Porter have noted that grand 
strategy is notoriously resistant to change.391  
Porter suggests that a combination of a state’s “power” (as measured by economic size and 
military capability) and “habit” (defined as unexamined underlying assumptions) cause grand 
strategic paralysis, at least in the case of the United States.392 In some ways, this argument is 
similar to my own, as habit as defined by Porter can be seen as a variant of elite attention, while 
power is similar to the concept I advance of resources, and more specifically money. The evidence 
provided in my dissertation has implications for the generalizability of Porter’s theory, as I provide 
many examples of fluctuations of power and the potential for fluctuation in habit, albeit in a middle 
power context. In the cases of the Clinton and (early) Trump administration Porter looks at, my 
organizational determinants theory would also predict stability. My theory would expect that 
stability would be driven by the overwhelming volume of resources provided to the Department 
of Defense, especially in comparison to those allocated to the State Department and U.S. Agency 
for International Development. There is thus more work that could be done on organizational 
determinants to see how portable it is to other contexts, and how it bolsters and expands on existing 
scholarship. 
Looking across the primary cases in this dissertation, there are suggestions about how to 
further refine my theory moving forward. In Chapter 2, I advance three resources—money, 
 
390 Silove (2017, 4) 
391 Porter (2018)  
392 Porter (2018, 11) 
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manpower, and elite attention—as my primary independent variables, as they were hypothesized 
to be the most likely to make a difference at the state level. The results of my analysis consistently 
bear out the notion that these three variables were not created equal, with money being the most 
important of the three and manpower not far behind, although it is not always clear how personnel 
equate across the various organizations, even if the focus is only on relative rates of change. The 
connection between elite attention and grand strategic form and change is less obvious. Future 
tests of the theory could modify how elite attention is handled. This could be done either through 
simply omitting elite attention, or perhaps finding a different operationalization. 
My research also has potentially interesting implications for policy-makers. I have 
provided a clear set of theoretical expectations that could potentially be used to anticipate or effect 
grand strategic change. For instance, policymakers or scholars who want insight into the evolution 
of a given country’s grand strategy might do well to observe the trends in relative resource 
allocation across the relevant organizations. Alternatively, those desiring change in grand strategic 
direction have a plausible set of levers, in the form of money and manpower, with which they 
could use to affect change. The path dependent nature of grand strategy highlighted by my theory, 
however, cautions that this change may be difficult to achieve. 
Future work on my organizational determinants theory of grand strategy should also 
expand the number of cases under examination. As I described in Chapter 6, there are a number of 
potentially interesting cases that could be examined with the methodology described herein and 
scrutinized to determine whether the factors identified by my theory are at work. While it is true 
that the data requirements to execute this work are high, they are not an insurmountable barrier. 
Expanding the set of cases under examination to other middle powers would yield yet further 
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insights into the constraints driving middle power grand strategies, and test whether my theory 
holds up under additional examination. 
Another, potentially more ambitious, research program would be to look at countries higher 
up the power ladder to determine whether or not they are constrained by organizational 
determinants the same way middle powers are. The reasons for selecting middle powers in this 
dissertation were to increase inference and highlight most likely cases where grand strategy might 
exist. Having lent additional credence to the existence of grand strategy, it would be a valuable 
addition to the literature to determine whether my theory might be in operation in countries with 
more resources and potentially more diffuse elite attention. But, for now, this work will have to 
remain the future.  
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